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IMISCOE owes a lot to Michael Bommes. It is no surprise that he was a
key figure in the groundwork and establishment of the IMISCOE Network
of Excellence. Michael took on several important roles in our organisation.
He led the research cluster on economic integration. As director of the
Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), he hosted
the Second Annual IMISCOE conference at the University of Osnabrück.
To this day, Michael remains irreplaceable on the IMISCOE Board of
Directors, where his modestly offered interventions and proposals were as
constructive as they were brilliant. When the Network of Excellence trans-
formed itself into the current IMISCOE Research Network, his support and
advice were always to be found.
Although he passed away on 26 December 2010, Michael knew that
IMISCOE hoped to bring together the fruit of his labour, publishing it as a
whole. Even during his protracted period of illness, he continued to work
as much as possible. Among other things, he sharpened and updated some
of his earlier articles, which now form part of this manuscript.
This publication of his major contributions to the field of migration and
integration studies is a way of honouring Michael, our colleague. At the
same time, it is meant to serve the scientific community by making the na-
tionally acclaimed research of Professor Bommes available and accessible
to a wider, international readership. It was easy to carry on the momentum
of such a scholar, motivated and engaged till his last breath.
Rinus Penninx
Coordinator IMISCOE Research Network

Preface
Christina Boswell and Gianni D’Amato
Michael Bommes was an outstanding scholar and an enormously influen-
tial figure in the field of migration studies. With a characteristically
German background in sociology – being heavily influenced by the theory
of Niklas Luhmann – he was able to translate and export complex ideas
across his extensive network of research collaborators and students
throughout Europe, Turkey and North America. Michael himself had a
strong impact on German sociology, contributing to important theoretical
innovations and the opening up of new areas of research. He was also piv-
otal in initiating collaboration among researchers and policymakers both
within Germany and at the European level. His scholarly interest had an
unusually broad sweep, from linguistics and philosophy to economics and
organisation theory.
In mid-2010, Michael was faced with the prospect that he may be unable
to fight his illness. At the suggestion of the editors, he began to develop
the idea of publishing a book that would disseminate his contributions on
immigration and integration to a larger, English-reading audience. As col-
leagues enjoying a long-standing friendship with Michael, who have
gained much from his wise advice and unflagging support, we were hon-
oured to carry through this project. Michael put a lot of energy into the se-
lection and presentation of the articles in this, his last book. He saw the fi-
nal manuscript before he died on 26 December 2010.
In Michael, we lost a friend with a great sense of loyalty and humour,
but also a passionate interlocutor with broad knowledge in many fields,
from Schubert to the Bundesliga. We miss his sonorous voice, his sharp
wit and ironic insights and not least his enjoying a well-earned pint after
an intense research discussion or seminar.
Our acknowledgements go to all those who were close to Michael and
who helped make this book possible. We thank Sigrid Pusch, who man-
aged his office and helped us in numerous ways to prepare the manuscript
at the project’s onset. We are particularly indebted to Andrea Lenschow,
Michael’s companion in life, and to Andreas Pott, his successor at the
University of Osnabrück. Both offered crucial comments and precious ad-
vice during the production of this edition. A special thanks goes to Karina
Hof, managing editor of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee, and to Rinus
Penninx, coordinator of the IMISCOE Research Network, both of whom
have been extremely supportive and helpful throughout preparation of this
publication.
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Introduction
Christina Boswell and Gianni D’Amato
Michael Bommes was one of the most innovative and profound theorists
of immigration and integration of our time. His work drew on the systems
theory of Niklas Luhmann to develop a highly compelling and sophisti-
cated alternative to predominant contributions in migration studies. His
writing constantly questions and challenges mainstream theories and con-
cepts in migration studies, from notions of assimilation and transnational-
ism, to multiculturalism and discrimination, irregular migration and mi-
grant networks. But equally important is his attempt to advance sociologi-
cal research through the lens of immigration. His repeated assertion is that
immigration has had major consequences for modern social systems and
welfare states, and that understanding these impacts needs to be a central
question not just for migration scholars, but for sociologists more
generally.
Through his research, teaching and policy work, Bommes earned him-
self a dedicated following, especially across Europe. However, we feel that
his work deserves an even wider audience. One of the impediments to
achieving a broader impact is that much of his work has been published
exclusively in German or in outlets that are not widely disseminated out-
side of German-speaking countries. Michael’s tragic and untimely death in
2010 also meant that he never had the opportunity to collect the different
strands of his opus into one collection.
This book therefore brings together what we believe is a representative
sample of Bommes’ most important work on migration and integration. It
includes a number of articles or chapters that are appearing in English for
the first time, as well as articles that were published in German outlets.
The book starts with a series of four chapters on immigration, social sys-
tems and the modern welfare state, one of the core themes of his work.
Two chapters follow on immigrant integration, with subsequent chapters
dealing with, respectively, illegal migration, networks and migration re-
search. In this brief introduction, we start by setting out some of the key
themes of his work and introduce the nine chapters. In a second part, we
say something about Bommes’ academic career and his work with students
and practitioners.
I
Bommes was particularly gifted in bridging applied themes in migration re-
search with broader theoretical questions in sociology. Many of his essays
start with a question, which is currently modish in migration research:
How does immigration affect welfare states? Are western welfare states
culturally discriminatory? Which is more plausible, transnationalism or as-
similation? In what sense does integration take place at the local level? He
then proceeds to unravel the question in his characteristically rigorous and
methodical style, gradually building up a line of argument that poses a
powerful challenge to received wisdom on the topic.
Bommes’ distinctive account is informed by Luhmann’s theory of social
systems. According to this theory, the primary building blocks of modern
society are not individuals or groups, but functionally differentiated social
systems. In pre-modern, stratified societies, rank and status provided the
primary categories of the societal fabric, determining social roles and life
opportunities. But modern societies have become increasingly divided into
autonomous systems such as education, health, economy, religion, welfare
or housing. Each of these operates according to its own distinct codes, pro-
grammes, logic and mode of inclusion, which regulates which individuals
are relevant participants. Indeed, societal subsystems tend to operate
according to fundamentally inclusive criteria, not linked to ethnicity or
national origin, thematising the individuals’ actions and communications
exclusively in terms of each system’s generalised code and programmes.
Thus, the labour market as a product of a modern economy operates ac-
cording to a logic that selects workers according to their skills and price
(ethnicity or nationality being relevant only insofar as they may be con-
verted in variations of skills and prices); and public health, education and
welfare institutions generally adopt criteria of inclusion based on the life
stage or needs of individuals.
This theory of functional differentiation has two quite radical implica-
tions for migration studies. First, it implies that international mobility is a
quite normal and expected response to the inclusive character of social sys-
tems. The labour market, housing, education and health systems are, in
principle, quite accessible for foreign residents in terms of their functional
codes – even for those without regular status – and are actually willing to
include them based on their ability to conform to systems-specific criteria
of inclusion. Although the political systems of welfare states may attempt
to exclude non-citizens or non-residents (more on this below), the systems
most important to an individual’s well-being tend to be blind to their na-
tional or ethnic origin. This provides a fresh and unorthodox perspective
for making sense of mobility, irregular migration and integration processes.
Second, systems theory implies that in order to understand immigration
and integration, we need to study immigrants’ inclusion within, and impact
12 CHRISTINA BOSWELL AND GIANNI D’AMATO
on, these differentiated systems. Concepts such as ‘integration into soci-
ety’, ‘social cohesion’ or ‘community relations’ are unhelpful, as the re-
searcher has no possible way of observing or making sense of ‘society’ as
an integrated whole, or the characteristics of ‘ethnic groups’ as such.
Instead, the characteristics and behaviour of individuals only make sense
from the perspective of their participation in a number of distinct social
systems, whether these be functional systems in general, or organisations
in particular. Again, this perspective has far-reaching consequences for re-
search on immigration integration.
Bommes’ social theory is augmented by the importance he pays to a sec-
ond type of social system crucial to modern society: organisations. While
he argues that social systems are essentially inclusive, one of his most im-
portant contributions to systems theory is his work on the role of organisa-
tions in perpetuating forms of discrimination and inequality. Recognising
that, in practice, immigrants frequently face impediments to participation
and equality of life chances, Bommes sought to explain such disadvantages
in terms of organisations. Access to welfare, education or employment, for
example, is implemented via organisations that specify terms of member-
ship, access to services or recruitment. They tend to base decisions on
standardised expectations about ‘normal’ or appropriate life courses. Those
who deviate from such standardised careers – and this often includes immi-
grants – may suffer from particular barriers to inclusion. So it is the institu-
tionalisation of expected careers or life courses that leads to indirect dis-
crimination against migrants in welfare states.
These concepts of social systems and organisations are elaborated and
applied to make sense of a variety of issues in migration research. Chapter
1 of the book, ‘Migration in modern society’, explores the relationship be-
tween functional systems and the welfare state. While most social systems,
as we have seen, operate according to inclusive criteria of participation,
immigrants are clearly seen as a problem in political terms. Indeed, unlike
other social systems, modern welfare states as organisational systems oper-
ate according to a fundamentally exclusionary mode, i.e. national citizen-
ship. Their logic of inclusion is exclusive and permanent, designed to guar-
antee a relationship of loyalty and service between citizens and state. Thus,
despite the inclusionary tendencies of the functional systems most relevant
to migrants’ life chances, welfare states attempt to exclude access to non-
citizens based on concerns about loyalty.
Chapter 2, ‘National welfare state, biography and migration’, develops
this theme, discussing some of the means through which welfare states ex-
clude non-citizens. Bommes suggests that welfare states mediate inclusion
through developing and institutionalising predictable life courses, or biog-
raphies. Such biographies comprise sequences of inclusion into different
systems, based on three main stages of life: childhood and education,
founding a family and working life, and retirement. To participate in
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welfare provisions at each stage, the individual needs not just to meet the
general conditions linked to that stage of life, but must also have accumu-
lated relevant qualifications through participating in each stage. This is
where migrants face problems, as they often deviate from these institution-
alised life courses, for example, through limited or unrecognised education-
al qualifications, limited or unregistered labour or participation in pension
schemes.
Chapter 3, ‘Systems theory and the “ethnic inequality” of migrant work-
ers’, advances a complex argument about how systems theory can contrib-
ute towards theories of inequality. At first sight, systems theory would ap-
pear to be a poor candidate for explaining or addressing inequality: indi-
viduals’ possibilities for inclusion (and thus their wealth or opportunities)
are effectively fragmented across different social systems, each of which
has its own mode of inclusion and no possibility for cross-system regula-
tion of inclusion between systems. However, Bommes argues that it is the
various organisations mediating inclusion into systems that imply the trans-
ferability of inequality across systems, and which reproduce inequality
across generations. First, the organisations of the welfare state establish ex-
pectations about standard life courses or careers, which it is difficult for
migrants (especially first-generation) to conform to. Thus, initial exclusion
from education, labour or welfare implies further exclusions in other
systems. Moreover, the initial exclusion of the first generation becomes
reproduced for subsequent generations, as the organisations that mediate
inclusion – through recruitment or extension of services – frequently base
recruitment decisions on social networks, as well as fixed presuppositions
about the characteristics of immigrant groups. Thus, while social systems
are, in principle, inclusive, the organisations mediating access to them tend
to transfer and reproduce inequality for certain groups.
Chapter 4, ‘Welfare systems and migrant minorities’, looks at the more
applied question of whether European welfare states are imbued with cul-
tural models which discriminate against ethnic minority groups. Bommes’
seemingly counter-intuitive answer is that they are not: while welfare states
may be highly exclusionary in their treatment of non-residents, they have
proved to be generally inclusive of residents regardless of ethnicity.
Indeed, welfare states are increasingly abandoning their preoccupation with
national loyalty, instead focusing on ‘activating’ reforms to equip all mem-
bers to be productive and competitive in the face of economic globalisa-
tion. However, some welfare states may indirectly discriminate against
ethnic minorities insofar as their life courses deviate from institutionalised
expectations (see chapters 2 and 3). Moreover, in cases where welfare
states organise the delivery of services through cultural organisations (such
as church groups in Germany or the Dutch system of pillarisation), one
can indeed observe cultural discrimination based on religion.
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The next chapters turn to aspects of immigrant integration. Chapter 5,
‘Transnationalism or assimilation?’, offers a brilliant critique of current de-
bates on integration. Bommes argues that the debate between transnational-
ists and assimilationists rests on a false opposition. On the one hand, trans-
nationalists fail to understand that immigrants do assimilate when they take
up roles inside organisations and fulfil the expectations linked to them –
indeed, assimilation is a ‘basic condition of the mode of individual life in
modern society’. However, assimilationists, in turn, make the mistake of
assuming a strict coupling between assimilation across different dimensions
– cognitive, structural, social and identificational. As transnationalists have
observed, globalisation has led to a loosening of these couplings, so that
assimilation across these dimensions does not necessarily take place in the
same place. Thus, the debate between the two schools can be reformulated
about two rival empirical hypotheses about strict or loose coupling of di-
mensions of assimilation.
Chapter 6 explores the claim that, as its title specifies, ‘Integration takes
place locally’, which has become a familiar mantra of German and other
European local authorities. Why has integration become such a priority
and rallying cry for local government? Bommes rejects the claim that this
is a response to a new crisis, or new research findings. Instead, it reflects
the realisation that the welfare state has failed to effectively mediate the in-
clusion of growing numbers of migrants into social systems. The national
political response has been to repackage existing measures in order to mo-
bilise support and demonstrate that something is being done. Local author-
ities, meanwhile, are keen to be associated with this symbolic initiative
because it enables them to procure additional resources and to legitimise
their role. Nonetheless, such measures remain essentially symbolic, espe-
cially in the case of local authorities, which have limited means of steering
those dimensions that might actually make a difference to inclusion, such
as employment, education or family policy. Such levers continue to reside
at the level of the national welfare state, or within functionally differenti-
ated social systems.
In chapter 7, Bommes addresses the question of ‘Illegal migration in
modern society’. This is one of the central themes of his later work linked
to the idea of the development of foggy social structures (as elaborated in
his co-edited book Foggy social structures, published posthumously in the
IMISCOE-Amsterdam University Press Series in 20111). Building on ear-
lier work on social systems and the welfare state, he argues that the inclu-
siveness of social systems generates multiple incentives and opportunities
for irregular migrants to move in order to improve their life chances.
Indeed, their status as illegal in many cases enhances their possibilities for
inclusion because of their flexibility and limited demands. Political at-
tempts to manage illegal migration, however, are fraught with contradic-
tions. While the state is keen to retain its control over the population
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through enforcing the law, it is also committed to providing legal, political
and social security for residents. Calls for regularisation may address the
problem of immigrants’ protection, but they imply that the state explicitly
accepts law-breaking behaviour, renouncing control over its territory. Thus,
many states resort to some form of limited recognition of the rights of ir-
regular migrants, such as Duldung in Germany, which guarantees legal
protection without implying an approval of the person’s residence status.
Chapter 8, ‘General and specific characteristics of networks’, makes an
outstanding contribution to theories of social networks, with important
ramifications for the analysis of migrant networks. Bommes and co-author
Veronika Tacke theorise networks as lists of addresses that enable partici-
pants to access heterogeneous and otherwise unconnected services
through mobilising the resources of other participants. Networks are ‘an-
chorless’ in that both their membership and the expected reciprocity asso-
ciated with membership are contingent on the motives for establishing
them: they are not embedded in particular social or cultural roles or
statuses. Nonetheless, some networks simplify their self-descriptions
through adopting myths about the conditions and content of membership,
such as ethnicity or kinship. Such descriptions miss the point about mod-
ern networks, i.e. the fact that they derive their rationale and scope from
expectations about the reciprocal provision of services, rather than rela-
tionships of close proximity or shared characteristics. In so doing, they
risk overburdening participants through setting up unfeasible expectations
about both the scope of membership and the duties of reciprocity between
members.
The final chapter, ‘National paradigms of migration research’, is one of
Bommes’ last papers. Co-authored with Dietrich Thränhardt, the piece re-
turns to an earlier theme about the contribution of migration studies to core
disciplines. The authors argue that migration research generally focuses on
research problems and questions that are politically constructed, rather than
worked up within their relevant disciplines. These politically constructed
problems are associated with the particular challenges that immigration
poses to national welfare states, and are influenced by nationally specific
ways of framing these problems. Thus, despite some parallel tendencies in
problematising and framing migration issues across states, migration re-
search is nonetheless imbued with national paradigms. It is the politically
applied nature of migration research that both guarantees its influence and
funding base, but also explains its difficulty in making substantial contribu-
tions to its cognate disciplines of sociology, political science, geography,
linguistics and so on.
We hope that these essays will challenge, provoke and, as they say in
German, irritieren (‘irritate’) readers. Whether or not one accepts systems
theory – and it certainly has strong critics within social science – it is a
rich and compelling theory of society, which deserves serious attention.
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And, as these essays show, it offers an extremely fruitful base from which
to challenge and critique otherwise accepted assumptions in migration
research.
II
Bommes studied sociology, philosophy and linguistics at the University of
Marburg, the University of Birmingham and the University of Osnabrück.
He continued his academic career specialising in linguistics and migration,
the topic of his 1990 PhD thesis defended at Osnabrück. His focus subse-
quently shifted to questions of migration and the national welfare state,
which was the subject of his 1999 habilitation (German professorial quali-
fication). He then had a stint as a professor at the Pädagogische Hoch-
schule Freiburg, before taking up the post at the University of Osnabrück
in 2003.
Bommes’ career was strongly bound up with the Institute for Migration
Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) at the University of Osnabrück.
As a member of IMIS from 1992 onwards, he served as a research assis-
tant in the university’s sociology department. In 2003, he became
Professor of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Migration Research at the
University of Osnabrück, a chair installed with the support of the Volks-
wagen Stiftung. From 2005 to 2009, he took over the directorship of IMIS
and established what was for Germany a unique interdisciplinary master’s
programme in migration studies. Bommes became Dean of Social Science
at the University of Osnabrück in 2006. He stepped down from this posi-
tion and as director of IMIS when he fell ill in 2009, although this may
have been the plan anyway as he had been invited to be a visiting profes-
sor in Toronto.
Bommes held an important place in German sociology, including chair-
ing the migration and ethnic minorities section of the German Sociological
Association. He was president of the German Migration Council, a group
of experts set up to critically follow and advise immigration and integration
policies, and he became a member of the Council of Experts of German
Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR). He was a member of the
Migration Research Group at the Hamburg Institute of International
Economics and a member of the board of directors of the European
Commission-funded IMISCOE Network of Excellence, for which he led a
research cluster on labour markets. He was also actively engaged in a num-
ber of international collaborations. In 1997 and 1998 he was Jean Monnet
Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, a research sabbati-
cal that spawned important collaborations with a number of scholars in the
United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States. As a visiting profes-
sor in the sociology department at the University of Trento in 2008, he
INTRODUCTION 17
helped create their migration study centre, the Scenari Migratori e
Mutamento Sociale (SMMS). He participated in several international col-
laborative research projects, including Political Economy of Migration in
an Integrating Europe (PEMINT) from 2002 to 2004; The Integration of
the European Second Generation (TIES) from 2006 to 2010; and, more re-
cently, Fundamental Rights Situation of Irregular Immigrants in the
European Union (FRIM) from 2009 to 2011.
Alongside his academic and teaching work, Bommes also made a signif-
icant contribution to migration policy. Although his work was highly theo-
retical, he had a great gift of communicating it in a way that made sense to
policymakers and practitioners. This was certainly the case with reports he
prepared for the German Migration Council, which made an important con-
tribution to policy thinking on integration: indeed, the council’s 2006 and
2008 reports are heavily imbued with concepts of social systems. Towards
the end of his life, he was involved in advising the Council of Europe on
issues of welfare states and immigrant integration, the inspiration for his
paper on whether welfare states are culturally discriminatory (chapter 4 in
this book).
Bommes was an inspiring – if demanding – teacher to his many stu-
dents. He had an impressive ability to quickly grasp and engage with al-
most any research topic, across a variety of disciplines. He was always
keen to apply his sharp theoretical mind to help develop a student’s or col-
league’s research ideas. Part of his gift was his unique style of expounding
an argument in seminars or conferences. He had a particular talent of being
able to develop a complex line of argument or theoretical idea in front of
his audience, giving listeners the impression that they were witnessing or
even contributing to the development of his thought. His passionate interest
in all aspects of immigration processes and research was infectious. It
made him an invaluable – and sadly missed – participant in academic de-
bate on migration research.
Note
1 A full-length PDF of this book can be downloaded from the OAPEN library; for a di-
rect link go to http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=401761.
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1 Migration in modern society
First published in 2003 as ‘Migration in der modernen Gesellschaft’ in
Geographische Revue 5 (2: pages 41-58)
Reprinted in 2011 in ‘Migration und Migrationsforschung in der modernen
Gesellschaft’ in IMIS-Beiträge 38 (pages 49-68)
Translation into English for this book by Anja Löbert
I
One of the key claims of mainstream migration research is that it is dealing
with significant social structural change which represents an empirical and
theoretical challenge for the social sciences. Clearly, migration research fo-
cuses its attention on problems of social integration and inequality and on
the resulting potential for conflict. It sees such problems as arising from
the cultural and social resources of migrants, from their opportunities to
participate, especially in labour markets, education systems, political and
legal systems of the welfare state, health and care facilities, and also from
urban housing conditions and the circumstances and living conditions
which these entail for migrants.
It can be noted, however, that the success which migration research has
achieved, in politics and also in science policy, is at the same time unable
to produce any real scholarly resonance. While warnings about potential
social conflict and disintegration do attract attention in the political sphere,
and are certainly able to mobilise resources for research, sub-disciplinary
and interdisciplinary research1 in the field of international migration
receives little attention either on an intradisciplinary or interdisciplinary
level, since its contribution to the general theoretical issues of the respec-
tive reference disciplines seems limited.
There is probably a simple reason for this: migration research tends to
greatly restrict the frame of reference for its inquiry. It focuses less on the
socio-structural prerequisites and consequences of international migration
on the various levels of modern society, and more on migrants and their
living conditions in those social contexts which are seen as significant, and
how these conditions result from the context of integration and the struc-
tures of social inequality. The basis for this is a limited concept of the
social structure which essentially includes the social relations of distribu-
tion and inequality. This limitation will not really become a problem for
migration research, however, as long as the implicit normative preference
for equality and social integration strikes a chord with its dual audience –
political and academic – to which migration research addresses its findings.
The double articulation of the terminology as scientific concepts, on the
one hand, and as more or less undeniable values on the other2 reinforces
these conceptual foundations and lends them intuitive plausibility.
This focus of migration research can quickly be illustrated by means of
a small number of examples.
1 While the migrant workers of the 1960s and 1970s (the so-called
Gastarbeiter or guest workers) were initially studied in terms of the struc-
tural consequences for the labour market and for the use of infrastructural
facilities in towns and communities (e.g. Körner 1976, summarised by
Herbert 2000: 191ff.), functionally orientated towards, in particular, cost-
benefit considerations, subsequent migration research in the social sciences
focused its analyses on how successful the social integration of the mi-
grants was, as established through criteria such as occupational position,
stability of employment conditions, income, social contacts and the like,
and the more or less problematic living conditions arising from these fac-
tors. True, Marxist analyses work on a model in which they identify the
structure of the relations of production as a causal context for international
migration, but fundamentally their analysis targets the resulting relations of
class and exploitation and the related problematic living conditions of mi-
grant workers as an internationalised reserve army (Castles & Kosack
1973; Castles 1987; Sassen 1988). More nuanced analyses thematise the
particular role of the bourgeois state in a basically unchanging overall strat-
egy (Dohse 1981). Despite differently applied analytical models, the stud-
ies of Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973) and Esser (1979, 1980), which have their
roots in mainstream sociology, also focus on the social relations of inequal-
ity resulting from migration – socio-structural change through migration is
then registered in the form of the neo-feudalisation of relations of stratifica-
tion. Essentially what is at issue here are the effects of the more or less
successful integration of migrants on their living conditions and on the so-
cial relations of inequality.
2 With regard to the second generation, numerous analyses focus their
attention on the education system. The main concern here is the cultural
prerequisites of the migrants or their children (Schrader, Nikles & Griese
1976) for participation in the education system and their educational suc-
cess, measured by the types of school attended, the school-leaving qualifi-
cations gained and the numbers entering training. The education system is
expected to foster socio-structural change, mainly from a normative
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perspective, in the direction of models of intercultural education; the crite-
rion here is the desired equality of migrant children (see e.g. Auernheimer
2003).
3 For about the last twenty years, internationally orientated research
on the position of migrants in the political system has been comparing the
politico-legal positions of various categories of migrant in civic, political
and social respects, and their position in the various welfare-state security
systems (Hammar 1985; Miles & Thränhardt 1994; Faist 1995; Bommes &
Halfmann 1998; Bommes & Geddes 2000). These are based on models in
which equality for migrants is the desired outcome. Comparable results
could be shown for the areas of housing, health and sport.
4 This perspective in migration research has not been disrupted by
more recent approaches in so-called transnationalism, since these ap-
proaches see the main deficiency of migration research as being the limited
nation state frame of reference for the analysis of processes of integration
and assimilation. Transnationalism argues that these processes are now dif-
ferently structured and play out in the frame of reference of so-called
transnational social spaces. One does find studies here which thematise
the consequences of international or transnational migrations and related
social structural developments, taking the political system or the emergence
of new industries and labour markets as examples (e.g. Hunger 2000;
Levitt 2001). Here too, however, attention is focused on whether the condi-
tions for integration and assimilation have changed with transnational mi-
grations. Furthermore, the largely opaque phrase ‘transnational social
spaces’ – from a theoretical point of view – merely indicates the need to
extend the analysis of the socio-structural prerequisites and consequences
of migration beyond the established frame of reference with its focus on in-
tegration, social inequality and the resulting potential for conflict, without
actually being able to offer a sustainable alternative.3
This focus in migration research on questions of social integration and
inequality has impacted on scholarship in two ways.4 For one thing, as in
the case of youth studies and inequality studies, migrants were long con-
sidered a special case, with no general socio-structural evidential value,
and were thus initially left in the hands of migration researchers, and
largely excluded from the theoretical and empirical research taking place in
these sub-disciplines. It was not until the 1990s that they began to feature
regularly in youth and inequality studies, and to be included in survey
studies. Migration – this much now seems clear – has consequences for the
socio-structural relations of distribution and alters the stratification and
class structure and the conditions in which young people grow up. There
are few signs, however, that this belated inclusion, which is probably based
on a shared normative orientation,5 is taking place in other sub-disciplinary
fields.
MIGRATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 21
Migration researchers are interested in education from the point of view
of migrants’ educational success, but are educational sociologists interested
in international migration? Migration researchers are interested in the posi-
tion of migrants in labour markets and in workplaces, but are labour mar-
ket researchers and organisational sociologists interested in international
migration? Migration researchers are interested in the political and legal
position of migrants, but are political sociologists, sociologists of law,
political scientists or legal scholars interested in international migration? In
all these cases, and the list could easily be extended, the answer would
have to be the same: hardly. Why should they be interested in migrants or
in international migration? The reason for this lack of interest in the issues
investigated by migration researchers is the limited concept of social struc-
ture which migration research has hitherto taken as its basis – a concept in-
volving the conceptual exclusion of key socio-structural prerequisites and
consequences of migration, as reflected in various areas of society – the
economy, law, politics, education,6 health, religion and sport – and in the
associated organisations and the forms of interaction. Migration, insofar as
it is socially significant, has an impact not only or primarily in terms of mi-
grants’ access to work, money, rights, education and health, but finds its
prerequisites and its effects, where applicable, in the structure of markets
and businesses, in political constitutions and administrations, in organisa-
tions of the welfare state, in schools and training organisations, in hospitals
and doctors’ surgeries, in sporting and religious organisations. But what do
we know about the significance of migration for the structural development
of businesses, local body administrations, schools, training organisations or
hospitals? In other words: if migration is important for the structure of so-
ciety – a claim which, on the one hand, goes unopposed but, on the other
hand, is widely ignored in many potential fields of research for which it
should be relevant – then this must not only or primarily affect the living
conditions of migrants, but also the differentiated social structures of mod-
ern society, in which migrants like all other individuals also appear socially
as members of organisations and as addressees for political, legal, econom-
ic, educational or health-related issues. It is the manner in which they ap-
pear here, and the related structural consequences for markets, rights and
law enforcement, political decisions, membership roles in organisations or
forms of communication in the education and health systems, which make
migration and migrants visible as socially relevant facts. This implies for
one thing that migration research is not always or predominantly about mi-
grants. It also means, however, that the position of migrants can only be
adequately understood if the specific significance of international relations
of migration and the inclusion or exclusion of migrants are examined sys-
tematically for these differentiated sub-contexts, i.e. with regard to their
economic, legal, political and educational issues and the connected ‘proc-
esses of organising’ (Weick 1985).
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Migration research can only establish an academically productive rela-
tionship with the other social science disciplines or sub-disciplines and
their theoretical and empirical questions if it ceases to limit its area of
enquiry to the frame of reference of integration and inequality, as outlined
above, and expands its structural-theoretical repertoire in such a way that it
can analyse the whole range of structural consequences of migrations in
modern society. In other words: the limiting of the concept of social struc-
ture to the distribution structure of society and the connected social con-
stellations (traditionally contained in models of class and stratification)
must be given up in favour of a concept of social structure which seeks to
contain the differentiated social structures of modern society and the result-
ing relations of inequality. This encourages us to go beyond inequality
studies and connect to sociological differentiation theory as a frame of
reference for research. For this a conceptually elaborated version is already
available, in the sociological systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Here we
find not just a theory of modern society which covers the structure of the
differentiated subsections of this society and of its relations of organisation
and interaction, but a theory which at the same time allows us to under-
stand international migrations as part of the structural development of the
modern, functionally differentiated society and the connected social rela-
tions of mobility. This systematically includes the analysis of the social
relations of inequality and thus the question of how the reproduction of
structured social inequality is to be understood under conditions of func-
tional differentiation (Bommes 2001a, 2004).
In the following this is elucidated in three respects:7
1. Systems theory conceives of the relationship between individuals and
social systems as a system-environment relationship and thus describes
migration as a spatial form of mobility which reacts to the inclusion
structures of society.
2. The theory of functional differentiation allows us to impose theoretical
order on the forms of migration in modern (world) society. On this ba-
sis it becomes apparent that the problem of migration, such as it
presents itself to modern society, is based on the organisational form of
politics, the fact that the political system is internally differentiated into
nation states.
3. Systems theory describes modern society as the interrelation of system-
environment relationships which are differentiated in themselves. It en-
courages migration research to check system references when describ-
ing migration and the resulting social structures, and to understand such
structures as part of the reproduction of the types of system under ex-
amination in each case.
MIGRATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 23
II
From the point of view of systems theory, the conception of the relation-
ship between individuals and society as a problem of the social integration
of individuals (and thus also of migrants) is rejected for theoretical reasons
(see below for more on this) and is reconstructed differently as a relation-
ship of inclusion or socialisation (for more detail see Bommes 1999: 43ff.).
Thus, migrations are also described through the medium of the concept of
inclusion.8 This kind of approach is more easily understood if one first
notes the similarity with Marxist approaches in this respect. They interpret
labour migration in particular as a phenomenon which makes visible spe-
cific core structures of capitalist societies, in particular the characteristics
of the labour market compared to other commodity markets. Migration is
regarded as an occurrence which is pre-structured by social conditions and
thus as a form of mobility which reacts to the way capitalism utilises indi-
viduals in markets as commodities (labour).
Systems theory takes up this issue in the framework of the theory of
functional differentiation and radicalises it. The abstraction already identi-
fied in Marx’s theory, the utilisation of individuals in terms of ‘work’ and
the disregard for all other attributes, is identified by differentiation theory
as a general characteristic not only of the economy, but also of the other
function systems of modern society. In politics, in law, education, health,
etc., individuals are incorporated as voters, legal parties, students or pa-
tients, and utilised without regard for their other attributes. Conversely, in-
dividuals can only take up opportunities to participate if they respect these
abstractions as prerequisites for inclusion.
Systems theory generally conceives of the relationship between individu-
al and society as a reciprocal relationship between system and environ-
ment. In this context the distinction inclusion/exclusion is meaningful
mainly in terms of theoretical technique. It is not directly aimed at ‘social
problems’, as is the case for many migration research texts which use this
terminology. This distinction is used to describe the manner in which social
systems utilise individuals and the way this changes depending on the pri-
mary type of differentiation of society (Stichweh 1988; Luhmann 1989).
For modern society, primarily differentiated in terms of function,9 a core
thesis of Luhmann is as follows:
The individual can no longer belong to only one subsystem. […]
Since society […] is nothing other than the totality of its internal
system/environment relationships […], it no longer offers the indi-
vidual a place where he can exist as a ‘social being’. He can only
live outside society, only reproduce himself as a system of its own
kind in the environment of society, whereby society is a necessary
environment for him. The individual can no longer be defined
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through inclusion, but only through exclusion (Luhmann 1989:
158).
His social individuality consists of the history of his inclusions in and ex-
clusions from the function systems and their organisations. This conception
has various implications for (a) the issue of the integration of individuals
into society and (b) the question of social inequality.
A From the point of view of systems theory, individuals are not part of
society and therefore also not integrated or ‘incorporated’ into society. The
conception of the relationship between individual and society from the per-
spective of social systems as a relation of inclusion10 empiricises the ques-
tion of individuals’ opportunities and impediments to participation in the
function systems and their organisations and thus purges them of overly
strong assumptions about requirements, whether of society or of individu-
als, and also of normative premises. The questions considered are: what
are the structural prerequisites of the respective forms of differentiation of
social systems, and how do inclusion and exclusion then work? The inter-
play of social systems and individuals is not automatic: inclusion and ex-
clusion can fail, and social systems can come to a dead-end and collapse
on the basis of their form of differentiation. Social systems in modern soci-
ety are dependent on the participation of individuals, but not of any partic-
ular individual. Function systems and organisations develop specific modes
of inclusion which regulate the participation of individuals in the benefits
of the system and stipulate the conditions for exclusion. They work on the
assumption that individuals will exercise a certain self-discipline, they de-
mand system-specific skills from them, expect corresponding forms of
self-presentation from them and also arrange for their possible exclusion.
Conversely, individuals are reliant, for their mental and physical self-pres-
ervation, on participating in the communication processes of a multitude of
social systems.11 Depending on the extent and mode of the offers of inclu-
sion, threats of exclusion and dependencies which exist for them, this is
evidently able to mobilise them – even to covering large spatial distances
in order to take up such opportunities for participation. The social condi-
tions and forms of this mobilisation12 and its consequences for the struc-
tures of the function systems and their organisations are the subject of
migration research.
B Social inequality, insofar as migration research deals with this sub-
ject as a question of the integration of individuals, does not draw attention
to the efforts of migrants to take advantage of opportunities for participa-
tion and to their inclusion or exclusion in the different function systems
and organisations primarily in empirical terms of success or failure because
of the structural conditions of these social structures. It therefore also
hardly enquires into the structural consequences of the modes of inclusion
and of exclusion of migrants for these social systems. Instead, as shown in
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the introduction, in many cases it directly translates the results of these
modes into problems of inequality, which it considers to be signs of inte-
gration problems. Yet problems of inclusion and exclusion indicate sub-
issues of the reproduction of social systems and do not directly indicate
problems of the individuals involved. Connectivity (Anschlussfähigkeit)
determines the inclusion or exclusion of individuals, and therefore also of
migrants. Their utilisation is subject to one criterion: will it ensure that the
system-specific activity can be continued? Problem situations occurring in
organisations and function systems, and their management, are not directly
and primarily problems of inequality. By approaching migration via the
analysis of the relations of inclusion of social systems the problem of in-
equality is not made to disappear, but it is reintroduced differently in the
framework of theory. The investigation focuses on how forms of differen-
tiation, structures of inclusion in functional and organisational systems,
and structures of distribution are connected to each other. Inequality can
then turn out to be a condition for migrants’ opportunities for inclusion
(Bommes 1999: 198ff., 2004), as is shown at present by so-called illegal
migrants, whose specific chances of inclusion in various labour markets
are based not least on their limited capacity for conflict, the resulting will-
ingness to provide services for relatively low pay, and a demand which de-
velops on this basis.
To sum up: from the point of view of systems theory the primary form
of differentiation and the related forms of inclusion of a society structure
individuals’ opportunities for social mobility and therefore also migration
as a spatial form of mobility offering chances for inclusion. The theory can
show that migrations and forms of migration in modern society have as
their prerequisites the exclusion of individuals (their freedom from prior
commitments13 and their equality in the sense of a disregard for particular
characteristics) and at the same time the universalism of inclusion of the
function systems and organisations (anyone who fulfils the system-specific
prerequisites for inclusion is admitted) and are induced by them. This is
immediately clear for labour migration, educational migration, sports mi-
gration or the migration of the sick. But it can equally be shown for family
migration, where the right to access to the family is exercised, and through
this, chances for inclusion in other function systems are gained, and it can
also be shown, finally, for refugee migration on the basis of international
refugee law, which repairs the breaches in the universalism of inclusion
committed by states.
With this in mind it becomes clear at the same time that migration
research typically deals with issues which are the result of migration as a
quest for access to organisations and function systems and from the struc-
turing of this quest through its conditions of inclusion. It is characteristic
of migration research that it takes an interest in the consequences arising
from such attempts for the migrants, the immigration and emigration
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contexts, and the newly developing social structures. This explains the fact
that it does not usually deal with other forms of spatial mobility such as
tourism or the migration of individuals as members of organisations (e.g.
managers). This does not imply a judgement about the social significance
of such forms of spatial mobility. But if one formulates the frame of refer-
ence of migration research in terms of its typical issues, it becomes super-
fluous to introduce the sociology of migration by means of a list of the var-
ious kinds of spatial mobility, and limit this list based on those features
relevant to the migration being examined (e.g. Treibel 1999: 18ff.). The
starting point should be the social structures which facilitate spatial forms
of mobility. The latter, even when they bear similarities, as for example
with commuter migration and tourism, do not in every case constitute mi-
gration as it is understood by a branch of research which is concerned with
an academic problem, and not one established by empirical characteristics
of spatial mobility.14
III
Regardless of their individual motivation, migrants must follow the social,
i.e. communicative, opportunities for connection which are offered by
function systems and their organisations.15 The political treatment of the
conditions of their immigration is of central importance for the manner in
which they achieve this connection – be it as labour or educational mi-
grants, as citizens or refugees.
With the theory of functional differentiation it is possible to reveal a
social contradiction in modern society in relation to this. Here migration is,
on the one hand, probable as an attempt to take advantage of opportunities
for inclusion. In terms of the economy, the law, education or health, and of
modern organisations, migration is something individuals can be expected
to do to adjust to the forms of inclusion on offer to them. Migration is
therefore part of the normal, i.e. socially expected mobility in modern soci-
ety, which has historically been implemented, for example, with the institu-
tionalisation of labour markets. The case of internal migrations within
states’ territories makes this clear. They are part of normal events that
hardly mobilise social attention. Migration is, on the other hand, manifestly
treated as improbable and as a problem, particularly in those countries with
fully developed nation states and welfare states, when migration crossing
state boundaries is involved.
Thus, migration only becomes a problem when viewed in terms of poli-
tics. This draws attention to a characteristic of this function system in com-
parison to the other function systems, a characteristic which underlies the
specific manner in which politics monitors migration. The function system
of politics is internally characterised by a segmental internal differentiation
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into modern national welfare states. Despite all its structural problems, this
statehood has been until now and will remain into the foreseeable future
the more or less indispensable form of organisation of the function system
of politics for the production of collectively binding decisions. An essential
structural consequence of this internal differentiation is the specific form of
inclusion of national citizenship, which is, unlike the other forms of inclu-
sion, exclusive, permanent and immediate. The related particular universal-
ism envisages the inclusion of every individual into one, but only one
state. The form of inclusion of citizenship provides the historic foundation
for what is, in principle, a lifelong relationship of service and loyalty be-
tween the state and its citizens, which is institutionalised in the national
welfare state and which obliges the state, when making its political deci-
sions, to be guided by the community (Gemeinschaft) of the citizens and
their claim to equality as members of the people or nation (Volk).
International migration calls into question the political division of the
world population into state populations, and places migrants in a structur-
ally precarious relationship with national welfare states in the dimensions
of loyalty and service. The relationship between national welfare states and
migration and migrants can be deciphered in these two dimensions. The
state, as a nation state, monitors migrants in terms of their political loyalty.
The state as a welfare state, i.e. as a mechanism for achieving internal so-
cial balance, erects a barrier of inequality toward the exterior, which is
crossed by migrants. Socially, this provokes the question of their relation-
ship to the services of the welfare state. The national welfare state therefore
intervenes in the forms of migration in modern society with a view to
upholding the relationship of loyalty and service to the community of citi-
zens. Based on this criterion, it becomes the filter for migrants’ attempts to
take advantage of opportunities for inclusion in the function systems and
their organisations by means of geographical mobility. At the same time,
with this and with the creation of differentiated categories of immigrant, it
establishes a frame of reference in which national or ethnic semantics of
community can evolve for expressing and carrying on conflicts about
migration.
With Europe’s development into one of the major immigration regions
of the world, however, the historical improbability of a congruence be-
tween people and population (Volk and Bevölkerung) in the national wel-
fare state becomes more obvious (for more on the following see Bommes
2003b). The difference between the state’s ‘core population’, the citizens
as the people (Volk), and the ‘residual population’ of migrants becomes the
norm, and this makes the distinction itself precarious. States must, on the
one hand, redefine their territorial sovereignty in relation to supranational
and international ties; on the other hand, international migration articulates
a context in which social processes in the areas of the economy, law,
education and training, scholarship, sport, health, but also family are still
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indexed to state territory, but not limited to this. The erosion of the division
of the world population into state populations by means of international
migration expresses this fact and thus undermines the difference between
people and population (Volk and Bevölkerung). This distinction always also
meant the establishment of territorial barriers of inequality by states.
International migration is not only an expression of the successful over-
coming of these welfare-state barriers of inequality by migrants. It is simul-
taneously part of an inner restructuring of the relations of distribution and
inequality in welfare states themselves. This restructuring involves an in-
creased internal differentiation of the addressees of welfare-state policy and
the political semantics of the way they are addressed.
In conditions of globalisation of ‘competitive states’ and of considerable
problems of demographic structure, national welfare states are confronted
with political problems in the reorganisation of their social security sys-
tems, not least because of their limited enforcement capabilities with regard
to raising resources. Part of this reorganisation is the reconstruction of the
relationship between states and their populations, in which they, on the one
hand, take back the promise of service to their state population as ‘people’
or ‘nation’ (Volk), and establish an internal differentiation between a pro-
ductive and a less productive, peripheral population. Migrants fall into both
categories and thus point to a problem – the controversy over which crite-
ria should, in future, be taken as constitutive for the relationship of loyalty
and service between states and their populations, if states not only repel
migrants but at the same time court them, in order to increase the produc-
tive portion of their population.
IV
Migration research usually defines its object as the study of the consequen-
ces of migration in the immigration and emigration context. Systems
theory encourages us to make these contexts more specific with regard to
system references. For the study of migrants’ opportunities for inclusion
and of their careers as a cumulative result of the history of their inclusions,
this means not looking exclusively or primarily at the migrants’ attributes
as their individual prerequisites for inclusion, but examining the system-
specific structural conditions in which migration, or migrants and their re-
sources, make their impact.
Thus, for example, organisations as recursive decision-making contexts
each develop organisation-specific traditions. Hence there is a need to in-
vestigate in what way political administrations (see Bommes 2003c), or or-
ganisations in the education system have any leeway to determine what a
migrant is when dealing with their problems, what the relevant administra-
tive or educational problem is in each case, and what resources should be
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used in response, etc. Regardless of how such organisations use this lee-
way, what is systematically significant is that, in using this leeway, they
mainly solve their own problems. By passing on, postponing or solving
their own particular decision-making problems, they define what sort of a
problem migration is, what the resulting political or educational conse-
quences are, how migrants are to be dealt with against this background,
what positions are assigned to them, and whether they can participate or
not.
Finally, two implications of the above should be pointed out:
1 Socially, migration does not designate a kind of ‘compact event’
which manifests itself in social effects on the social structures of society.
The reality of migrants’ lives is determined, like that of all other individu-
als, by participation – which must, in a sense, be secured anew every day
– in the differentiated structures of society, something which is obscured if
the problem is formulated as ‘social integration into society’. Migration
and social participation succeed or fail politically, economically, legally,
and in terms of education and health, etc., in different ways, lead in various
combinations to different results, and are connected with different issues
and modes of reaction and processing in the various areas. If, as set out
above, one understands international migration in modern society in formal
terms as a form of social mobility to take advantage of opportunities for
participation in the areas of modern society which are relevant for one’s
lifestyle, then migrants succeed in taking up these opportunities to differing
extents, dependent on their individual prerequisites and on the reception
structures of society, which are differentiated politically, legally, economi-
cally, educationally, religiously, etc. In these various areas – in quite differ-
ent ways – decisions are made in the course of migration processes about
what kind of issues migration involves, in political, legal, economic, etc.,
terms, and how these are to be dealt with. Generally speaking, it is impor-
tant to examine the varying social options for migrants to participate in the
differentiated social structures of society, and the various forms of combi-
nation, in terms of their effects both on these social structures and on the
course of migrants’ careers of social inclusion.
2 Starting at this point, the issue of integration can at the same time be
taken up again in a different way. Research on the integration and assimila-
tion of migrants has shown that the penetration of migrants into the distri-
bution structures of modern society and the connected structured relations
of inequality, which are still, in the richer countries, strongly indexed to
the nation state, has a largely regular structure, and that the relations of
assimilation are therefore relatively firmly coupled or integrated: in the
course of its history, migration research has not always ascribed exactly
the same meaning to assimilation. In general, however, it has assumed a
more or less close correspondence between the dimensions of assimilation
which it distinguishes.16
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More recent research in transnationalism can essentially17 be understood
as an empirical questioning of the nation state’s role in mediating the strict
coupling or integration between the various forms of assimilation. Through
claiming that transnational relationships are expanding, this research sug-
gests that the social systems in which individuals participate are not con-
fined to the nation state.18 Accordingly, the lifestyle of individuals can also
be oriented towards a more or less constant crossing of state boundaries:
again this can affect a wide variety of areas such as family, education,
health, economy or politics. As an example: migrants can work in their
place of immigration, in order to invest the money in their context of ori-
gin, to provide for their families, and to get involved in local or national
political projects there. As successful migrants, they can invest money in
the region of origin and build up relevant industries, as in the case of
Indian IT specialists. These transnational forms of lifestyle occur in differ-
ent combinations on the basis of the different resources available to mi-
grants, and in different social contexts (see e.g. Hunger 2000; Levitt 2001;
Müller-Mahn 2000; Singhanetra-Renard 1992). Against this background
the central message of transnationalism is basically this: empirically, in the
process of progressive globalisation and in conditions of transnationalism,
a decoupling or even disintegration of the various forms of assimilation
can be observed, and new possible variations between them are emerging.
The nation state frame of reference is becoming less important for integra-
tion, i.e. there is less limitation of the room for variation in the forms of
assimilation. In systems theory terms this controversy can be conceptual-
ised as an enquiry into the connection between the differentiated structural
development of the various subsystems of modern society and the more or
less strong integration of migrants’ careers of inclusion in these systems as
well as the access to social resources which is mediated through this.
Overall, then, the analytical potential of systems theory allows us to
study migrations as social phenomena in a differentiated way, with regard
to the social systems in which they become relevant. It is therefore neces-
sary to specify whether empirical analyses of migration and its consequen-
ces are situated on the level of function systems, organisations or interac-
tions. Instead of studying migration as a ‘shift into another society’
(Treibel 1999: 21), distinguishing system references makes it possible to
research migration in world society on various levels: the attempts of mi-
grants to take up opportunities for inclusion in function systems and their
organisations by means of geographical mobility; the differentiated eco-
nomic, political, legal or educational consequences of each of these
attempts; the organisations which are created in regions of origin and target
regions as a result; and finally, the changes in structures of interaction
which, attached to the observation of discrepant forms of communication
and structures of expectation, are registered in migration research as a cul-
tural difference or as a problem of intercultural relations.
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Notes
1 At the same time migration research claims to have an interdisciplinary orientation.
Yet in many cases it remains unclear what on the one hand constitutes its specific
contribution to each discipline, and what exactly, on the other hand, the ‘inter’ is re-
ferring to. What seems to play a defining role is the widely shared normative agree-
ment about the (political) significance of the problems of integration, inequality and
conflict.
2 It is therefore not necessary, in the light of their nature as values, to define with any
great precision what is meant, in each case, by social integration and inequality.
3 Beyond the plausibility of everyday examples, it is not clear what social structure a
social space designates in practical terms, why this should be thought to generate a
suitable, general frame of reference for the analysis of migration and its socio-struc-
tural implications (instead of a concept of society based on the nation state), and
precisely what, in analytical terms, is distinguished by the ‘four dimensions of socio-
spatial incorporation’ (economic, social, cultural, political), beyond the claim to com-
plete originality and novelty; cf. Pries 2003. For a more detailed treatment of this
see Bommes (2003a [chapter 5 in this volume]).
4 The political aspect is not taken into consideration here; it is striking, however, that
the frequently encountered preference among migration researchers for integration
and equality has met with a certain political impatience in recent years (for this see
Luft 2003). There are many reasons for this, not all to be found in the scientific
practice of the migration researchers; some can certainly be sought in the fact that
researchers have often failed to clearly distinguish between scientific statements and
politically normative ones.
5 For inequality studies Geißler (1996) recalled this normative framework of inequal-
ity studies in a discussion of the debate on so-called new inequalities – and the posi-
tion of migrants in the relations of distribution in Germany then becomes a sys-
tematic indication of increased relations of inequality, if it can no longer be regarded
as transitory.
6 It was left to the PISA study to point out that the success of migrant children in the
education system is heavily dependent on the structure of the respective national
forms of organisation. Opinions differ on what conclusions are to be drawn from
this in educational and migration research, but in any case it draws attention to the
connection between migration, forms of organisation in the education system, and
their social effects.
7 What follows is the expanded and revised version of a text which appeared in the
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (Swiss Journal for Political Science)
(Bommes 2001b).
8 This is not so much a question of terminological differences, but the systematic
meaning of conceptual distinctions. The manner in which the problem of integra-
tion and assimilation is conceived in the work of authors who argue on the basis of
assimilation theory or with reference to new transnational conditions of integration,
and their differences and points of agreement, can be systematically made transpar-
ent in the frame of reference which is about to be explained; cf. Bommes 2003a.
9 In principle, all structures of action or communication are to be regarded as societal
structures, as long as every action or communication with its specific characteristics
is also always the implementation, the process of society, and linked with this, the
establishment of an expectation with regard to what might happen next. In sociol-
ogy, however, the designation ‘social structure of society’ usually means more, i.e.
the identification of primary structures or differences which make possible and limit
the development of further structures or differences. From a differentiation theory
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perspective, the term ‘form of differentiation’ has designated these primary struc-
tures since Marx, Weber and Durckheim (Schimank 1996). In competition with this
is a concept which takes as its basis the distribution structure of a society and the re-
sulting social structures (classes or strata) as the primary form of differentiation
(Schwinn 1998). For the related problems and a more precise treatment of the lim-
itations of the social structure concept of inequality research, also with reference to
its own questions, cf. Bommes 2001a.
10 From the perspective of individuals this is about socialisation, the structural develop-
ment of psychological systems through participation in communication.
11 In this sense, none of the individuals in modern society has any alternative to
assimilation.
12 This includes, for example, the expansion of modern media of dissemination and
the worldwide consolidation of a low-cost transport network, the emergence of com-
munication networks by means of chain migrations and resultant changes in expec-
tations about how individuals can legitimately be utilised. These individuals are thus
confronted with migration as an unreasonable expectation (e.g. ensuring the liveli-
hood of their families by taking up unfamiliar opportunities for inclusion in distant
labour markets) and as an opportunity (to thereby escape utilization by their fa-
milies). For the ambivalences triggered by this cf. Thomas & Znaniecki 1958 (1918/
21).
13 Migrations are to be found in all societies, but are differently structured depending
on the primary form of differentiation. In estate-based societies the individuals and
their social options for inclusion are defined by estate affiliation determined by des-
cent. This also regulates their options for migration as tradesmen, students or pil-
grims and, precisely for this reason, turns the migration of the excluded, the poor,
beggars and vagabonds, into a threat (Bommes 1999: 58ff.).
14 One can show using the politically topical example of the so-called (German) Green
Card and its supposed failure that the international migration of computer special-
ists largely occurs as migration on the basis of membership of organisations. It indi-
cates a problematic aspect of the possibility of deploying personnel flexibly in glob-
ally operating businesses and is therefore also largely unrelated to the usual pro-
blems which migration research examines as problems of social integration, since
these businesses make it possible for their personnel to be flexible by providing cor-
responding social conditions such as access of family members to education, health-
care, etc. This form of international migration on the basis of organization member-
ship can be understood here as part of the globalisation of businesses in the specific
conditions of the training and recruitment of personnel in the IT field; for a closer
treatment see Kolb 2003; Kolb & Hunger 2003.
15 Every asylum seeker knows this; if he wants to get through the administrative proce-
dure for checking his asylum claim, he must carefully separate the communicated
motives from other possible motives, with regard to their connectivity.
16 Cognitive, structural, social and identificative assimilation; cf. Esser 1980, following
Gordon. This is plausible at first glance: someone who brings more cognitive prere-
quisites will be able to fulfil more differentiated role requirements. Someone who
has a secure and more or less well paid occupational position will have easier access
to health, education, law and politics, will meet with more social recognition and
will be better placed to enter into social contacts in this environment. And someone
who moves in these kinds of social context can in turn build up corresponding cog-
nitive structures, etc. The opposite also applies: it appears unlikely that one would
gain, in a narrow ethnic milieu, the cognitive prerequisites needed to fulfil the re-
quirements of school or to be professionally successful and thus be recruited for at-
tractive, well-paid positions in organisations. Working on this assumption, it is also
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improbable that one would gain access to corresponding social networks, friend-
ships or clubs or that one would feel one belonged in other contexts than one’s own
narrow milieu. Both the successful assimilation to the expectations of social systems
and the failure to assimilate seem to have a highly self-stabilising character.
17 And beyond its theoretical obscurities.
18 The theory of functional differentiation works on this assumption anyway, and is
therefore conceived as a theory of world society (Stichweh 2000).
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2 National welfare state, biography and migration
Labour migrants, ethnic Germans and
the re-ascription of welfare state membership
First published in 2000 by Routledge as a chapter in Welfare and immigration:
Challenging the borders of the welfare state (pages 90-108), edited by Michael
Bommes and Andrew Geddes
Introduction
In modern society individuals are not ‘members of society’. The chances
to become included in different social realms – the economy, law, politics,
education, health and the family – are no longer based on descent, or be-
longing to a social strata, or to an ethnic or religious group. It is individu-
als themselves that principally achieve inclusion in these different social
realms and the risks of failure are high. Consequently, if we understand
modern national welfare states as organisational complexes which try to
heighten the chances of inclusion and minimise risks of exclusion for their
citizens, then one central structural form of providing inclusion has been
the institutionalisation of the modern life course (Kohli 1985). In this chap-
ter, I discuss the reasons why this institutionalisation of the life course and
the safeguard within it of individuals with a structured biography have be-
come central for the mode of operation of welfare states. I then show that
migrations that transgress state borders highlight some very specific social
preconditions of these arrangements for inclusion. If biographies are under-
stood as the result of a sequential process in which chances for social par-
ticipation, supported by welfare states, are accumulated, then migrants are
likely to be structurally poor because of their specific relation to national
welfare states.
The chapter then develops these core observations with a case study of
the immigration of ethnic Germans and labour migrants in Germany. It
demonstrates that migration makes some of the structural preconditions of
the modern life course regime visible. It also shows that migration can be
taken as part of a process that erodes the classical arrangement by which
welfare states provide an ordered life course for the members of the nation-
al community, i.e. for their citizens, in exchange for political loyalty.
The ‘social construction’ of biographies through organisations
The participation of individuals in modern society is no longer based on a
unitary principle of inclusion and exclusion. The social conditions of inclu-
sion, i.e. the mode by which individuals become engaged, are defined by
the differentiated social systems of society: the economy, the law, politics,
education or health. If individuals fulfil the functionally specific require-
ments of these systems then they are included. Individuals are perceived in
relation to their relevance to these social systems, everything else is left
out of account. This means that social inclusion in modern society presup-
poses the exclusion of individuals as ‘totalities’ from society in the sense
that they are not predefined by social bonds or some principle of belonging
(Luhmann 1989, 1995). Instead, in modern society, individuals become so-
cially defined by their personal histories of inclusion and exclusion in dif-
ferent social realms.
Inclusion occurs as a result of their biographies. These are an invention
unknown to former societies differentiated by strata, which defined individ-
uals by inclusion and social belonging. A central point is that if traditional-
ly it was social belonging that defined the social options of the individuals,
then in modern society it is biographically accumulated social options that
define social belonging. The definition of an individual becomes self-
referential in that the individual is what he or she has become. The identifi-
cation of individuals thus changes from the observation of social belonging
to a temporal form of observation that can be characterised as the develop-
ment of the individual in time (Hahn 1988). As an effect of this shift, the
past of individuals – their biographies – carry the information, which al-
lows the building of expectations about their future options. For instance,
whether or not an individual is suited for future inclusion in economic, ed-
ucational, scientific or legal processes.
An early historical experience of modern society was the high risk of
failure of social participation connected with these new structural condi-
tions of inclusion. There was no automatic inclusion of individuals in soci-
ety. Pre-modern stratified orders of inclusion had ascribed the individuals
to the strata of society and dealt with the poor, i.e. the ‘fallen’ individuals
who were seen as a constant threat to social order, by a mixture of mercy
and violent repression (Fuchs 1997). The breakdown of this order and of
the corresponding local poor relief systems provided historically one of the
most relevant contexts for the expansion of the modern nation state which
eventually sought to deal with the political mediation of the socially re-
structured chances of inclusion and exclusion (De Swaan 1988; Bommes
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1999). The effect was that national welfare states became the worldwide
institutionalised form of organisation of the political system and, with their
emergence, they have evolved as international ‘thresholds of inequality’
(Stichweh 1998). This means that they have provided for the internal loy-
alty of their citizens by a welfare policy that promotes chances for inclu-
sion based on external closure and exclusion. Historically, welfare state
organisations have been established as a reaction to the political claim for
not only formal, but also substantial equality for all members of the nation-
al community. This claim was founded in the political form of member-
ship, i.e. of citizenship (Marshall 1950). Since then, however, the political
semantics of solidarity and substantial equality have been eroded.
Empirically, it is clear that social differentiation and individualisation proc-
esses rather than equality have been promoted by welfare states (Pierson
1993, 1995).
A central part of this promotion of differentiation and individualisation –
as a precondition and as a result – was the institutionalisation and safe-
guard of a modern life course, of individual biographies and, related to
this, the concept of a ‘career’. These social forms permitted observation of
the personal past that was then usable for building expectations about the
future. When exclusion and the freedom from inherited social bonds be-
comes the precondition for inclusion in functional systems and organisa-
tions, then security of expectations in relation to individuals and their be-
haviour can no longer be gained from their social descent and belonging. It
can only be gained from their lived sequences of inclusions. This can be
conceptualised as the life course with related social biographies and identi-
ties. Biographies can be told and individuals are expected to present them-
selves and their identities in a biographical form.1 This institutionalisation
of the life course, of individual biographies and careers, is a result of the
way in which modern organisations recruit members and of the moderation
of these organisational processes of social inclusion and exclusion through
the welfare state.
Finding employment in modern society involves offering competence
and specific services to an organisation in exchange for payment and other
rewards. As a particular type of social system, organisations rely on the
formal definition of membership that distinguishes between members and
non-members. By engaging individuals as members, organisations distrib-
ute conditions and chances for the inclusion and exclusion in other social
spheres. For instance, the recruitment of personnel and the allocation to
them of positions and careers in organisations are linked with the distribu-
tion of money, reputation and influence or – in the words of Bourdieu –
economic, cultural and social capital. Organisational memberships that are
based on careers open up and mediate differential chances for individuals
to receive services and resources as, for instance, consumers, patients, cli-
ents, pupils and electors. These organisational ways of allocating positions
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and incomes form one central frame of reference for welfare state policies,
which aim to increase and, especially, secure the transferability of chances.
That is, to seek to ensure that organisational membership equips individu-
als with the necessary means and rights to provide options for participation
in the differentiated social realms of the economy, education, law, health,
politics and the family.2
One main form to secure this transferability was the institutionalisation
of the life course. The life course can be understood as a complex of social
rules that order the time dimension of an individual life viewed as a sequen-
tial programme (Kohli 1986). ‘Biography’ and ‘career’, both of which are
central elements of the social concept of a life course, are historically
formed by the interplay of modern organisations recruiting members, and
the welfare state establishing social preconditions for the possibility to find
and recruit members with an expectable life course.3 The introduction of
social insurance schemes had the effect of organising around the employ-
ment of individuals in organisations the temporal accumulation of social en-
titlements. This depended to a large extent on the duration of employment,
changes in the conditions of employment and dismissal, the institutionalisa-
tion of public education, the provision of family and education allowances.
All these welfare state measures can be understood as structural elements
of the institutionalisation process of the life course. From this perspective it
becomes clear that life becomes socially conceptualised as a sequential pro-
gramme partitioned into three general stages: childhood/education, founda-
tion of a family and working life, and retirement. Related to this structura-
tion of life, the family then takes on the form of the modern nuclear family.
Welfare state measures orient individuals towards the structures of a life
cycle. The core institutions of the welfare state are structured in a way that
implies the expectation that individuals are prepared and willing to prepare
themselves for a biographically ordered sequence of inclusions in different
social realms and their organisations. The enforcement of this expectation
is historically successful since it provides social requirements for both or-
ganisations and individuals.
For organisations the welfare state creates the social preconditions allow-
ing individuals that fulfil the necessary requirements to then be observable
in the form of a ‘career’ (Corsi 1993). The welfare state backs up the like-
lihood that careers can be built. The ‘career’ maintained by organisations
relies on the assumption that a ‘normal biography’ can be realised. This
means participation and access to education, work, the family, as well as to
economic, legal, political and health resources. Participation in each single
context implies the fulfilment of certain preconditions that are provided
elsewhere. For example, education presupposes that pupils have families,
have access to economic means to fulfil their needs (through their parents),
have a right to be educated and are healthy. Moreover, the education sys-
tem has gained universal competence for this task and the specification of
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educational problems. The same is valid for other realms such as the econ-
omy,4 law and health, which rely on the assumption that different problems
are dealt with in other social contexts. The less this is empirically the case,
the more likely it is that there will be exclusionary chain reactions. Modern
welfare states can be understood as institutional arrangements attempting
to intervene in this kind of ‘spillover’ effect5 by establishing and accompa-
nying the life course in order to provide the necessary conditions for the
chance to build an ordered course of life.
For individuals the social expectation that they lead their lives oriented
to a biographical order structured by the social conditions of inclusion and
related welfare state programmes, offers the chance of social continuity
and orientation. The duty to be an individual with a specifiable and person-
al biography and identity (see also Strauss 1959) is equipped with a social
form. In this way, welfare organisations not only constitute the life course
as a social form, they provide a structure for the lifelong relation between
the state and the individual. This relation is founded in the specific inclu-
sion form of the political system, which is national citizenship. National
citizenship designates a relation between the individual and the state which
is exclusive, immediate and permanent (Grawert 1984). A core element of
the successful establishment of state sovereignty over the population on
their territory – circumscribed as a national community – has been the ac-
knowledgement of state responsibility for the assurance and structuration
of the chances to lead a life as a member of that community.6 The institu-
tionalisation of the life course and its variations in different welfare states
can be taken as the result of the specific historical formation of the relation
between each state and its citizens.
What effects does international migration have on an arrangement in
which national welfare states provide chances for their citizens to realise an
ordered life course? Recent migration research has concentrated on the
question of whether migration undermines the capacity of national welfare
states to control their territory and to maintain levels of provision. In this
context, the ways in which political and legal restrictions seek to reduce the
capacity of migrants to collect social entitlements has been analysed (Miles
and Thränhardt 1995). This chapter’s focus on the relation between the wel-
fare state, biography and migration addresses three questions. First, what
kind of positions do migrants have in the life course regimes of welfare
states? Second, what kind of effects does immigration have on the structure
of institutionalisation of the life course provided by national welfare states?
Third, does immigration change the relation between the welfare state and
the collectivity that has been historically constructed as the national com-
munity of legitimate welfare receivers? Before we shift to the empirical ex-
ample of the immigration of labour migrants and ethnic Germans
(Aussiedler) in Germany, it is necessary to provide a more general consider-
ation on the relation between migration, biography and the welfare state.
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Welfare states and the ‘social deviation’ of migrants
The constitution of biographies and their moderation by the welfare state
makes the deviation of the biographies of migrants very likely. Deviation
means that their life courses and biographies do not fulfil the institutional-
ised expectations of normality. Consequently, migration puts in view some
of the social preconditions of the relation between differentiation and the
individual biography/career as a social form. If we understand biographies
and related careers as the accumulation of structural participation chances,
then migrations make this precondition visible since migrants are presum-
ably structurally poor or deprived and it cannot be assumed that careers
with the required elements have been built. Consequently, those things that
under ‘normal conditions’ are treated as given can no longer be presup-
posed. In other words, established abstractions need revision. This becomes
obvious if one looks at some common deviations of migrants in three bio-
graphically central dimensions: education, labour, and participation in pen-
sion schemes.
– Education: migrant children have access to schools in many countries
even when they do not have a residence permit. This permits analysis
of the legal and political conditions of education and the education sys-
tem’s assumption that families of children are settled. Migrant children
(with or without legal status) may not speak the official language and,
in this way, question institutionalised assumptions about normal social-
isation processes, as well as linguistic and cultural competencies as cen-
tral preconditions for the ability to learn something. Moreover, careers
of migrant children built at school in their countries of origin may not
be accepted by the education system in the immigration country. This
may close important paths of educational success and increase the like-
lihood of failure.
– Employment: labour migrants are less likely to be able to offer socially
established biographies and careers of education and work. This ex-
cludes them from competition in large segments of the labour market.
It should be noted, however, that the absence of careers and related so-
cial claims were in many respects the precondition for the immigration
of labour to western European countries during the post-war period. In
this case the absence of a career provided the chances of social inclu-
sion for labour immigrants on those market segments which were in
need of unqualified workers. The same holds true for major parts of il-
legal immigration.
– Retirement: migrants can access welfare entitlements even if they are
not citizens. Older migrants, however, are likely to have low pension
incomes since many have not been included long enough in pension in-
surance funds to accumulate adequate entitlements.7 For those reasons
it is likely that many will rely on public assistance.
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These three brief examples go to show that the modes by which migrant
biographies may deviate from expectations guaranteed by welfare states,
and the social meanings and consequences this may have, cannot be purely
theoretically derived. The social observation of deviation and its conse-
quences depends upon the various kinds of expectations of normality sup-
ported by different types of welfare state. Moreover, immigration takes on
different forms in immigration countries and migrants have varying legal
status and welfare entitlements linked to their immigration path. Finally, as
a result of the different histories of immigration in the various national
welfare states we find specific combinations of welfare and immigration
regimes.
To illustrate these points, the discussion moves on to an empirical exam-
ple of the immigration of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler, literally ‘outsettlers’
or ‘resettlers’) after the Second World War and to compare their structural
position in the German welfare state with the position of the labour immi-
grants of the Gastarbeiter period. Are both groups included in the provi-
sions of the German welfare state to an extent that allows these migrants to
develop some security of expectation concerning their future life course?
This is found not to be the case, which means that differences and explana-
tions for the different paths of immigration and the social conditions linked
to them need to be accounted for. One effect of these different positionings
of migrants has been the rearrangement of the political community defined
as legitimate welfare receivers. This case study does not allow for simple
generalisations about the relation between migration, welfare state and bio-
graphy, but throws light on the specific relation of migrants to the welfare
state and the established life course regime and on the structural effects of
migration on this regime. Further comparative research could discuss simi-
larities and differences in other countries in order to build on a more gener-
al theory on the relation between migration, welfare and biography.
Ethnic German immigration and changing welfare state positions
Ethnic German (EG) immigration became a subject of general migration
research following the collapse of the socialist countries and increased im-
migration of EGs to Germany since the late 1980s. EGs have been immi-
grating to Germany continuously since the Second World War, but until
the late 1980s they were mainly the subjects of historical studies or social
policy-oriented research on social integration (Bade 1987), the reasons for
which are assessed later.
We commence from the observation that the structural position of EGs
in the German welfare state has changed dramatically since 1990. They
have been the targets of major expenditure reductions and lost many of
their former social entitlements. The extent of these reductions will not be
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the focus here, rather the shift of the structural position of EGs in the wel-
fare system linked to these reductions will be examined. In order to under-
stand this shift it is important to clarify the position of EGs in the German
welfare state before 1989. This category does not include refugees and ex-
pellees who came to West Germany after 1945, but does include the immi-
gration of Germans from Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary and Rumania
after 1950, legally defined as EGs (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). This
group is then divided into those who came before and those who came
after 1988.
The post-Second World War immigration of expelled persons, refugees
and EGs in Germany was a result of highly conflictual state building proc-
esses in central and eastern Europe since the nineteenth century. The at-
tempt of Germans since 1945 to migrate8 from eastern European countries
to Germany resulted from enduring internal national conflicts in their coun-
tries of origin and from sovereignty claims by the German state which,
since the end of the nineteenth century, regarded them as part of the
German nation. The end of the Second World War, the resultant division of
Germany, and the forced migration of refugees and expellees formed the
peak of these nationality and state building conflicts (Lemberg 1950).
The post-1988 immigration of EGs is a late outcome of this historical
constellation.
The reinvention of citizenship in West Germany based on the principle
of ius sanguinis (‘blood’ descent) was a reaction to the post-war situation.
West Germany as one part of the diminished and divided former Germany
claimed to be the only legal and legitimate successor of the former German
Reich. The new German state’s introduction of citizenship based on the ius
sanguinis principle and the category of the German Volkszugehörigkeit
(‘belonging to the people’) happened in order to maintain access to citizen-
ship for German refugees from East European countries. The country was
diminished and divided, and a large part of the population of the former
state was living outside the territory of both German states. In the immedi-
ate post-war context, politically there existed no real alternative to the prin-
ciple of ius sanguinis.
EGs were defined as German Volkszugehörige (‘members of the people’)
affected by ‘a fate of expulsion’ (Vertreibungsschicksal) as a consequence
of the Third Reich and the war. The ‘Law on the Affairs of Expellees and
Refugees’ (the so-called ‘Federal Expellee Law’) in 1953 and the subse-
quent ‘Federal Law for the Regulation of State Membership Questions’ in
1955 (Heinelt and Lohmann 1992: 55ff.) included EGs into the category of
Volkszugehörige even if they lived in countries like the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia or Rumania, i.e. outside the borders of the territory of the
German state in 1937.9 In this way access to German citizenship for the
EGs was secured.
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Table 2.1 Immigration of ethnic Germans 1950-88
Year Total numbers Main countries of origin
Poland Rumania Soviet Union
1950 47,165 31,761 13 -
1951 21,067 10,791 1,031 1,721
1952 5,537 194 26 63
1953 8,296 147 15 -
1954 10,390 662 8 18
1955 13,202 860 44 154
1956 25,302 15,674 176 1,016
1957 107,690 98,290 384 923
1958 129,660 117,550 1,383 4,122
1959 27,136 16,252 374 5,563
1960 18,171 7,739 2,124 3,272
1961 16,414 9,303 3,303 345
1962 15,733 9,657 1,675 894
1963 14,869 9,522 1,321 209
1964 20,099 13,611 818 234
1965 23,867 14,644 2,715 366
1966 27,813 17,315 609 1,245
1967 26,227 10,856 440 1,092
1968 23,201 8,435 614 598
1969 29,873 9,536 2,675 316
1970 18,590 5,624 6,519 342
1971 33,272 25,241 2,848 1,145
1972 23,580 13,476 4,374 3,426
1973 22,732 8,902 7,577 4,494
1974 24,315 7,825 8,484 6,541
1975 19,327 7,040 5,077 5,985
1976 44,248 29,366 3,764 9,704
1977 54,169 32,861 10,989 9,274
1978 58,062 36,102 12,120 8,455
1979 54,802 36,274 7,226 9,663
1980 51,984 26,637 15,767 6,954
1981 69,336 50,983 12,031 3,773
1982 47,993 30,355 12,972 2,071
1983 37,844 19,122 15,501 1,447
1984 36,387 17,455 16,553 913
1985 38,905 22,075 14,924 460
1986 42,729 27,188 13,130 753
1987 78,488 48,419 13,990 14,488
1988 202,673 140,226 12,902 47,572
Source: Bundesausgleichsamt Registrierverfahren (Federal Office for Social Compensation,
Procedure of Registration 3/1989); quoted in Blaschke 1989: 238; Reichling 1995: 41ff.
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The granting of citizenship to EGs was a political reaction to the outcomes
of the Second World War when, in reaction to the nationalist war politics
of the German state, Germans living in East European countries were sub-
ject to all kinds of discrimination. This was especially the case in the
Soviet Union, where many EGs were deported to the eastern parts of the
country. The inclusion of EGs in the national refugee policy of the 1950s
was, therefore, viewed publicly as an act of national solidarity with those
who had to suffer from the disastrous politics of the German state. The
laws of 1953 and 1955 granted access not only to citizenship for these
groups but also to a range of social rights, services and supports which had
been set up as part of the so-called ‘compensation for burden’ suffered by
refugees, expellees and EGs alike. In the early 1950s, when the devastating
effects of the war were still present and unemployment was high, the ‘com-
pensation for burden’ was politically legitimised as an act of national bur-
den-sharing and solidarity. The inclusion of EGs was seen as part of this
act.
Between 1950 and 1988 around 1.6 million EGs immigrated to West
Germany. During this period the numbers of immigrants varied between
around 20,000 and 40,000 per year, with the exceptions of 1957/58 and
1977-1982 when numbers were considerably higher (see Table 2.1). These
relatively low numbers of immigrants were the effect of the Cold War and
the denial of freedom of movement for individuals in the socialist coun-
tries. But this is only half the story. The immigration of EGs became
Figure 2.1 Immigration of refugees and expellees (Flüchtlinge) from East
European countries and refugees from the former GDR (Übersiedler)
1946-1960
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possible only as a result of political bargaining processes between states
principally dissenting about the national belonging of certain parts of the
population. Countries like Poland, Rumania or the Soviet Union never ac-
knowledged any right of the EGs to live in Germany. They allowed the
emigration of EGs depending on their political interests in improving bilat-
eral relations or receiving economic support. Until 1989 Germany was an
incomplete nation state10 and was engaged in these kinds of negotiations
and conflicts about the legitimacy of competing sovereignty claims over
parts of state populations. These kinds of political dissent are once again
observable between numerous eastern European states (Brubaker 1994).
The rapidly growing number of EGs immigrating to Germany since
1987 was both part of and an indicator of a major change of social context
in which this type of migration was situated. The collapse of socialist re-
gimes eroded the former constellation of dissent about national belonging
between Germany and eastern European states. The establishment of free-
dom of movement in eastern Europe allowed EGs to leave their countries
if they wished to do so. ‘Belonging to the German people’ became a privi-
leged option of migration in the countries of origin. The entitlement to en-
ter the German state territory and to claim citizenship was widely used and
soon met with immigration restrictions introduced by the German state.
The so-called ‘social integration’ of EGs in the period of the post-war
history until the end of the 1980s was politically and socially a big success
which (only seemingly paradoxically) made the EGs socially invisible as
an immigration group. After the war until the end of the 1950s, research
was politically funded and conducted to monitor the ways in which refu-
gees and expellees were socially included, and the potential for conflict
with the indigenous population (see Lemberg and Edding 1959). In the
context of the ‘economic miracle’ (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s these
fears proved to be wrong. Refugees and EGs lost their political and scien-
tific attraction as a major research topic. Subsequent migration research in
Germany since the 1960s concentrated on labour migration, and few stud-
ies on EGs were conducted. The main result of these studies on social inte-
gration was that EGs were successful in terms of education, income,
employment and property and that they did not differ significantly from
the indigenous population in socio-structural terms.11 This success is best
summarised in the observation that until the end of the 1980s no ‘second
generation’ of EGs appeared socially in Germany. By the beginning of the
1980s, immigration of EGs was viewed as a politically manageable process
(Zurhausen 1983). This was in stark contrast to the intensive public debates
about settlement by labour migrant families, their possibly restricted ca-
pacity for ‘social integration’, and the political invention of the ‘problem
of the Turks’ (Thränhardt 1988).
For an interpretation of this result, a closer look at the welfare pro-
grammes for EGs established in the 1950s and, with certain modifications,
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valid until the end of the 1980s is illuminating. The central structural pro-
visions of these programmes entailed:
– An unemployment insurance system that included the EGs immediately
after their immigration as though they had spent their whole former
working life in Germany. An EG claiming to be a skilled worker was,
for example, entitled to receive the amount of financial support equiva-
lent to an unemployed indigenous skilled worker. Parallel occupational
integration programmes then secured the (re-)adaptation of skills of
these immigrants.
– The inclusion of EGs in the pension schemes as if they had contributed
to these funds during their working lives.
– Direct access for EGs to health insurance systems.
– Added to these inclusions into the general social insurance systems of
the welfare state were: extended language training programmes, general
educational programmes, specific compensatory educational pro-
grammes for pupils, increased grants for children in school and univer-
sity, reduced taxes, preferential consideration of self-employed EGs for
public contracts, public housing programmes for EGs, provision of the
means for purchase of household equipment, compensation for lost
property, cheap credit with low or zero interest rates.12
This overview makes the working principle of welfare for EGs and its
mode of securing their chances of social participation visible. EGs who im-
migrated until the end of the 1980s were treated as if they had spent their
whole life in Germany, i.e. as if they had accumulated biographically the
chances of inclusion which made further social inclusions likely. The wel-
fare state ‘repaired’ the deviating biographies of the EGs by simulating and
ascribing the structurally required elements for social participation. The
effect of the additional compensatory welfare programmes was the equip-
ment of the immigrating EGs with attributes, capacities and material means
which enabled them to fulfil competently the social roles open to them as a
result of the biographies ascribed to them by the welfare state. The treat-
ment of the EGs in this way corresponded to the principles and traditions
of the conservative corporatist German welfare state, which aims at the
maintenance of the standard of living of different social status groups. EGs
were provided with the resources to participate in the way of life of the so-
cial status group they claimed to belong to.
I have argued that modern welfare states can be understood as an institu-
tional arrangement of organisations trying among other things to avoid
chain reactions of exclusion by establishing and accompanying the life
course to provide the conditions for an ordered course of life. This life
course regime then structures the lifelong relation between the state and
the individual citizens. The structural fundament of this relation is the spe-
cific political form of inclusion: national citizenship. The result of the
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political and legal ascription of membership in the national community to
the immigration category of EGs was that EG immigrants acquired the
structural qualifications and properties for participation and membership in
the various social realms and organisations. Equipped by the German state
with the necessary elements of a biography and a life course attached to
their self-descriptions, they could then be observed as competent persons.
This involved both formal entitlements and the substantial sense of compe-
tencies and means for fulfilling the roles connected with these biogra-
phies.13 Since EGs were defined as members of the nation they were
treated as if their relation with the state had existed for their whole life.
This description outlines the conditions of immigration for the EGs until
the end of the 1980s, when the character of the immigration process of EGs
changed rapidly. Following the collapse of the socialist countries, most of
the political restrictions upon the freedom of movement were suspended.
The effects were dramatic. Between 1988 and 1993 about 1.6 million EGs
immigrated to Germany (see Table 2.2). The German state reacted promptly
by introducing means of control that are well-known in immigration coun-
tries. In 1990, a legal procedure for the immigration of EGs was installed.
EGs were no longer allowed to enter the state territory unrestricted and to
claim their ‘belonging to the German people’ in Germany. They had to en-
ter a formal procedure in their countries of origin in order to be accepted as
Germans. Only after their official acceptance as Germans did they receive
immigration permission. By the end of 1992, as part of the asylum compro-
mise, the number of EGs allowed to enter the country was limited to
220,000 per year. A newly introduced legal status of Spätaussiedler (‘late
resettler’) restricted access to those persons born before 1 January 1993 and
who could prove that they either had been affected by measures of expul-
sion themselves or were descendants of such families. The family members
of these ‘late resettlers’ were excluded from this status if they were not ‘late
Table 2.2 Immigration of ethnic Germans 1988-95
Year Total numbers Main countries of origin
Poland Rumania Soviet Union
1988 202,645 140,226 12,902 47,572
1989 377,036 250,340 23,387 98,134
1990 397,073 133,872 111,150 147,950
1991 221,924 40,129 32,178 147,320
1992 230,565 17,742 16,146 195,576
1993 218,888 5,431 5,811 207,347
1994 222,591 - - -
1995 217,898 - - -
Source: Bundesausgleichsamt (Federal Office for Social Compensation 1993; quoted in
Nuscheler 1995: 123); figures of 1994/95 in Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, No. 75,
January 1996, p. 3.
NATIONAL WELFARE STATE, BIOGRAPHY AND MIGRATION 49
resettlers’ themselves. Since then, a large number of them have immigrated
as ‘foreigners’.14
This legal amendment indicates that the entrance of EGs had become
politically perceived as immigration and that it was to be dealt with as
such. Parallel to this legal shift in their status and immigration rights, the
attendant welfare programmes for EGs, i.e. their social rights, were heavily
reduced (Bommes 1996). The decisive changes were the exclusion of EGs
from unemployment benefits, reduced responsibilities for the labour admin-
istration, and the cessation of a number of the compensatory welfare pro-
grammes. Step by step, entitlements were reduced. Since 1993, EGs have
relied on public assistance paid by local governments if they cannot find a
job. Language training programmes were heavily reduced. The professional
qualifications of EGs were in many cases no longer regarded as equivalent
to German job definitions. Simultaneously, the budgets for occupational
training were drastically cut and, in many cases, local governments had to
pay for them. The unbalanced distribution within Germany of immigrating
EGs during the first half of the 1990s and their concentration in certain
areas of Germany led to public complaints from a number of local govern-
ments about their exploding social budgets. In reaction to this the 1996 res-
idence assignment law (Wohnortzuweisungsgesetz) reduced the freedom of
movement of EGs’ for three years after arrival in case they became de-
pendent on public assistance. EGs are no longer allowed to reside in places
of their choice but are tied to the place of residence assigned to them by
the administration.15
Ethnic Germans, labour migrants and changing relations between
the state and community of welfare receivers
In stark contrast to the situation between the 1960s and the 1980s, EGs
have a high unemployment risk (Bommes 1996: 224; Thränhardt 1998:
34ff.). They have also become an immigrant group of major political and
scientific concern. The political and scientific ‘integration-discourse’ has
again taken notice of the EGs. Political and scientific observers have dis-
covered the so-called second generation of EGs as a target group (e.g.
Auernheimer 1995).
The empirical long-term development is difficult to assess, but this chap-
ter’s focus is on the potentially systematic effects of these recent develop-
ments on the relation between migration and the welfare state. An interest-
ing starting point for a theoretical interpretation is the public ‘silence’ over
the most relevant reductions of the welfare entitlements of EGs. These po-
litical decisions had been taken as part of general budget restrictions during
the early 1990s. The public debates about these restrictions concentrated
on the general topics concerning the amount of unemployment benefits
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and the conditions of reception. In comparison to these publicly intensive
debates, the decisions affecting the EGs were taken rather silently in the
neo-corporatist negotiation systems where bits and pieces for reduction
were collected that were acceptable to the parties participating in the incre-
mental mode of decision finding. The administrative details of these kinds
of decisions were of no major public interest and the EGs themselves
formed no relevant pressure group participating in the decision game.
In the 1950s, the inclusion of the EGs in welfare schemes had been
viewed as a political requirement of national solidarity. EGs were seen as
part of the nation and its ‘fate’, the catastrophe of the Second World War
and its burdens had to be shared in a solidaristic manner by the whole na-
tion. At the end of the 1980s, however, even in the context of the German
unification process, national semantics of this type no longer possessed
their former mobilising potential. The devalorisation of ethnic and national
semantics in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s (Bommes 1995) pro-
vided the background against which the welfare rights of EGs could be
reduced in the corporatist systems of the German welfare state without
being publicly debated (Bommes 1996). The exclusion of immigrating
EGs from core provisions of the welfare state mobilised almost no public
concern about the legitimacy of treating German citizens in nearly the
same way as foreign immigrants. Rather, this became an explicit demand
within certain factions of the Social Democratic and the Green Party. EGs
have become an immigrant group which, for historical reasons, possesses a
right to citizenship and to enter the territory, but which at the same time is
deprived of central welfare state provisions.
The meaning and relevance of this change can best be assessed by com-
paring the situation of the recent German immigrants with the conditions
for labour migration of the 1960s and 1970s. The immigration of the
Gastarbeiter was initiated as part of a labour-market policy of the national
welfare state. As in other European countries, the state still acted like the
sovereign supervisor of the national economy and its labour market
(Scharpf 1996). Part of this supervision was the legal inclusion of migrants
in the welfare regulations of the labour market. After some 30 years of em-
ployment in specific segments of the labour market, labour migrants had
by the end of the 1990s accumulated social rights which guaranteed them
a living standard on a low, but fairly secure level (Thränhardt, Dieregs-
weiler and Santel 1994; Seifert 1995). In this sense, the labour migration
of the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent settlement of the migrant fami-
lies have been part of the immigration history of a successful national wel-
fare state. Once their immigration proved to be irreversible, the political
frame of reference became the ‘integration paradigm’. Migrants were to be
‘integrated into society’ by means of the national welfare state and in the
end to become ‘its members’.
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Labour migrants differ from the pre-1990 EGs because welfare activities
for labour migrants were mainly defined by their position in the labour
market, i.e. as a structural outcome of the German welfare state structure
centred around employment. The main differences between the EGs and
the labour migrants become visible in view of, first, the fact that in socio-
structural terms most of the labour migrants are part of the lower strata of
Germany’s social structure (Geißler 1996). The history of their immigration
and its political preconditions seem to tie them to this position. They have
not disappeared as a category in the general social structure like the EGs.
Second, labour migrants were different from the EG migrants because they
were not supported by a similar commitment by the educational and voca-
tional system to the success of their children. Welfare programmes for EGs
were targeted at all age groups and were committed to substitute for the
missing lifelong relationship between the individual and the national wel-
fare state. In contrast, a large number of the children of labour immigrants
failed to reach educational levels that could open attractive career perspec-
tives for them. Labour migrants are heavily under-represented in the dual
vocational training system, and their fathers (and partly their mothers) have
only, to a very limited degree, gained positions at their workplaces allow-
ing them to open access to memberships in factories (Faist 1995).
Unemployment among immigrant youth is therefore extremely high
(Thränhardt 1998). The limited and ‘retarded’ commitment of the welfare
state to labour migrants seems to affect mainly certain strands of their
children.
Nevertheless, it remains true that the welfare state aimed at integrating
the immigrants ‘into society’ and that missing that target was and is seen
as a political failure. The national welfare state of the 1970s and 1980s had
become responsible for the chances of labour immigrants to lead a decent
life and to legitimately claim certain social rights and expectations. Violent
attacks of right-wing political groups were, therefore, almost unilaterally
rejected in German politics. By the end of the 1980s, the former national
community of West Germany of the 1950s had changed into the commun-
ity of legitimate welfare receivers which included the major part of
Germany’s substantial foreign population.
Against this background, immigrating EGs, even if their right to enter
was seldom publicly denied after 1989, were no longer perceived as legiti-
mate welfare receivers since they had not contributed to the GNP. After
1989, the federal government legitimised changed welfare programmes by
arguing that there should be no privileges for EGs. What had been origi-
nally conceptualised as compensation for the forceful separation and exclu-
sion from the national community came to be seen as an illegitimate ad-
vantage. In the changed context of the early 1990s, the new community of
welfare receivers provided legitimacy for the welfare state to get rid of so-
cial responsibility for newly arriving immigrants. This legitimacy no longer
52 MICHAEL BOMMES
relied on national rhetorics, but nevertheless affirmed the undissolvable ba-
sis of the welfare state: closure and the maintenance of a threshold of
inequality.
Conclusion
Analysing the comparative positions of EGs and the former ‘Gastarbeiter’
in the German welfare state demonstrates how the ways that different im-
migrant groups are included in the life course regime of the welfare state
have long-term effects for their socio-structural position and their chances
of social inclusion. The labour migrants of the 1960s and 1970s were
included in the structural provisions of the welfare state mediated by the
political form of recruitment for the labour market. After thirty years they
were able to accumulate a certain amount of entitlements and to develop
slowly a career structure which allowed them to reach a living standard on
a low, but fairly secure level. The EGs of the 1990s immigrated into
Germany on the basis of their political status. Whether they manage to
enter the labour market and the welfare provisions centred on employment
remains to be seen given that their ‘deviant’ careers are no longer repaired
by the welfare state through the substitute ascription of a complete
biography.
Analysing the comparative position of labour migrants and EGs also al-
lows us to view the reconstruction of the community of legitimate welfare
receivers. In the 1950s belonging to the nation still defined this commun-
ity; by the end of the 1980s it was more or less composed of those who
had contributed to the GNP. This includes the foreign population of the
labour migrants and excludes to different degrees asylum seekers, refugees,
contract labourers and EGs (even the East Germans in the view of a large
part of West Germans). One can summarise this by saying that the welfare
state redefines its addressee in relation to its technical purposes. To do this
it substitutes the national frame of reference by the criteria of legal resi-
dence and participation in the labour market. In the case of Germany, this
becomes visible in the changing welfare positions of German and foreign
immigrants.
Since 1989, migration policies in Germany have been generally charac-
terised by the effort to strictly limit the right of access to and settlement in
the state territory for newly arriving migrants. The state seeks to allow only
time-limited and reversible labour immigration under severely restricted
conditions, for example, contract labour. It also seeks to reduce welfare
provisions for those who are in a legal position to acquire permanent resi-
dence permits. For these migrants, including the EGs, the welfare state ac-
cepts only restricted responsibility. It provides the means of subsistence,
but to a much lesser extent, the social conditions of beginning a career,
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entering a structured life course and accumulating elements for an account-
able biography. Further research will have to clarify if immigration after
1989 can also be interpreted as part of a general ‘de-institutionalisation of
the life course’.
Does the case of the EGs merely reflect a specificity of Germany with
no relevance for other countries with differently organised welfare states?
The case not only makes visible the specific mode in which the close rela-
tion between national welfare states and their citizens has been structured
through the institutionalisation of a life course regime, but also throws light
on the erosion of this arrangement through immigration. The relevance of
the case needs further clarification through comparative research that anal-
yses the position of different immigrant groups in the life course regimes
of the different types of welfare states. This will provide the basis for a
more solid answer to the question of if, and in what sense, different forms
of immigration in Europe may be part of a general de-institutionalisation
of the life course. That is, a process which erodes the historically estab-
lished arrangement by which the welfare state took over the responsibility
in relation to its citizens for the assurance that a structured life course
linked with biographical expectations and prospects could be realised. One
result of the restrictions of sovereignty of the national welfare states by so-
called globalisation is the evolution of more groups who can no longer rely
on the welfare state as an institutionalised safeguard of the social precondi-
tions for an ordered and expectable life course. Migrants are likely to be
among these groups.
Notes
1 “This is why ‘identity’ and ‘self-realisation’ become a problem […] one cannot know
who one is but has to find out if one’s own projections do find social acceptance”
(Luhmann 1997: 627).
2 Residualistic welfare states perceive the safeguard of transferabilities only in a lim-
ited sense as a political duty. The ‘conservative’ type of welfare states however aims
at the maintenance of the standard of living, whereas the ‘social democratic’ type is
based on the concept of ‘social citizenship’ as interpreted by Marshall (see Esping-
Anderson 1990).
3 This ‘interplay’ would need more sociological specification concerning the different
forms of power created by organisations and the political system which cannot be
done in this paper. Organisations gain power based on positive sanctions, since they
offer income for labour to individuals who depend on this payment because of their
‘risk of unprovidedness’ (Weber 1972); the power of states is based on negative sanc-
tions, on the monopolisation of the means of physical violence, the ultimate founda-
tion of their capacity to produce collectively binding decisions (Easton 1968). The re-
lation between states and organisations circumscribes a field of tension between the
indispensable organisational power, on the one hand resulting from the form of
membership, and the state power on the other hand relying on this modern form of
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organisation itself but intervening for welfare reasons in organisational power by
modifying preconditions and consequences of organisational decision processes.
4 Marx’s argument about the commodification of the labour power was precisely an
argument about social abstraction.
5 If inclusion cannot be secured, welfare states create secondary orders of exclusion
by providing scripts of failure (defined for instance by the rules of insurances) and
organisations, e.g. of social work which deal with the social accountability of exclu-
sions (Bommes and Scherr 1996).
6 It remains the central insight of Marshall (1950) that the form ‘citizenship’ estab-
lishes the expectation as legitimate that politics has to further and increase the
chances of inclusion of their citizens.
7 Most pension insurance funds in European welfare states make entitlements depen-
dent on the time period spent on state territory and/or the time period of employ-
ment and contribution (Dörr and Faist 1997). This demonstrates the life course or-
iented relation between the welfare state and its citizens.
8 The immigration of EG is politically defined as ‘remigration’, ‘an effort of Germans
to come home’.
9 The constitution of 1949 defined those as Germans who belonged to the German
people and lived inside these borders of 1937. The main difference between refu-
gees, expellees and EG, the ‘Aussiedler’, exists between their places of origin: refu-
gees and expellees were defined by their ‘belonging to the people’ and their place of
origin laying inside the borders of Germany on 31 December 1937; EGs were as-
sumed to be German and to be affected by measures of expulsion because of their
‘belonging to the German people’.
10 1989, the subsequent unification process and the treaties with various countries es-
tablished for the first time the identity of territory and population which the
German state claims sovereignty about.
11 See Bade (1987), Lüttinger (1986,1989) and for a summary of the results of this re-
search see Bommes, Castles and Wihtol de Wenden et al. (1999: 78f.).
12 This is an incomplete list. For a more detailed overview see Otto (1990) and
Bommes and Rotthoff (1994).
13 Looking at education it made a striking difference that the assumption of the indivi-
dual ability to learn and to participate in education was the basis for the decision to
put the children of EGs through the equivalent school level they had been visiting in
their countries of origin. The presupposition of competence was backed up by addi-
tional education. In contrast, the starting assumption for the education of Turkish
pupils was the expectation of major social problems and minor cultural and cogni-
tive abilities to assimilate (e.g. Schrader, Nikles and Griese 1976). As one EG put it
in an interview: ‘I came here as a pupil 12 years old and spoke no German. They
put me in a gymnasium, taught me German and then I made the Abitur. I can’t
speak Polish anymore.’ The ascription of cultural belonging or difference and the ex-
pectations of success or failure obviously define in a crucial manner the starting
social conditions for individual chances to accumulate the required elements of a
successful social career.
14 This change can be seen as part of the readjustment of the German concept of citi-
zenship. In 1990, 1993 and 1999 amendments of the foreigner and citizenship laws
had installed legal access for labour migrants and their children to German citizen-
ship. The restrictions of the legal status of EG can be interpreted as part of the
strengthening of territoriality as a criterion for the granting of citizenship and of the
weakening of the ius sanguinis tradition. This is another indicator that this tradition
is best understood against the historical background of the German state building
process ending in 1989.
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15 It appears ironic that the immigration of members of the ‘national community’ pro-
vides the occasion for reintroducing elements of the traditional ‘Heimatrecht’ (‘home
law’) of local governments. This traditional law was abandoned by the Prussian state
in 1842 in order to undercut the local governments’ refusal of immigrants whom
they suspected of being ill equipped to care for themselves and to rely on poor relief.
The abolition of the ‘Heimatrecht’ and the introduction of a poor relief system
through the central state can be regarded as one major step of the development of
the modern welfare state (Reidegeld 1998; Halfmann and Bommes 1998). It is cer-
tainly not exaggerated to regard the introduction of the residence assignment law in
1996 as symptomatic for the structural effects of migration on the welfare state.
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Introduction
Differentiated subdisciplines of sociology mediate their relationship to gen-
eral sociological problems of theory and problems of social theory in terms
of the preservation of their own core issues. This is the case for the sociol-
ogy of the family, industrial sociology, the sociology of social conflicts,
the sociology of migration, and also for the sociology of social inequality
and the associated analysis of social structure. The sociology of social in-
equality, previously the sociology of class and stratification, has always, in
its more sophisticated variants, claimed a central position for the descrip-
tion of modern society and the theoretical understanding thereof. A major
role is played here by attempts at explaining inequality with a traditional,
social-theory orientation. In keeping with this, there is a tendency to avoid
theoretical traditions which do not accord the issue of social inequality a
sufficiently central position, in the sense of considering social inequality
the immediately obvious starting point for the development of sociological
theory. The individualization debate in the 1980s, however, has eroded the
claims of inequality studies. One of its results was the gradual disintegra-
tion of a theoretical concept of inequality. The procedures for measuring
inequality, increasingly elaborate in their methodology, reflected the diver-
sification of inequalities and the extent to which the observation and de-
scription thereof depended on context.
Given this background, anyone wishing to bring sociological systems
theory – of all theories – into play must demonstrate plausibly that issues
in inequality studies can be adequately dealt with even when inequality no
longer forms the immediate starting point for the development of sociologi-
cal theory. It is possible, with certain modifications, to make Luhmann’s
theory of functional differentiation productive for the analysis of social re-
lations of distribution and corresponding semantics of inequality. This
theory shows that modern society has a problem of distribution and equal-
ity, precisely because there is no structural provision for solutions to this
within its primary form of differentiation. In terms of functional differentia-
tion, questions of distribution and inequality constitute secondary issues
which nonetheless require resolution. These solutions are not, however,
generated in the individual function systems, but in organizations. This will
be shown in the first part (sections 2 and 3). The aim is to demonstrate that
the connection between distribution, inequality and the structures of inclu-
sion and exclusion in modern society can be understood as the result of the
interplay of organizations in the various function systems and the modern
welfare state. This interplay gives rise to organizationally and semantically
elaborated orders of distribution and of inclusion and exclusion. A key ad-
vantage of systems theory here is that it has, within the frame of reference
of its theory of modern society, at the same time elaborated a theory of or-
ganization, and that the conceptual significance of this theory has, I be-
lieve, hardly been used for inequality studies so far. The second part (sec-
tion 4) aims to demonstrate, using as an example the ethnic inequality
which has formed in the wake of labour migration in Germany, that this
form of inequality can be understood well within the framework of in-
equality studies if this discipline is conceived in the manner proposed.1
Functional differentiation and the problem of the distribution of
social resources
What can inequality studies gain for its core issues by making greater
reference to the theory of functional differentiation, as formulated in socio-
logical systems theory, particularly by Luhmann? In order to answer this it
is necessary to admit the possibility that the issue of inequality in modern
society can be appropriately understood even if one does not see inequality
as a primary or the primary issue in sociology – as did Kreckel (1992) or,
before him, Dahrendorf – and if one does not consider it as the starting
point for the development of theory.
From the point of view of differentiation theory, it can be shown that
equality gains a central significance in modern society because of the spe-
cific structure of the inclusion of individuals in social systems.2 The ‘dou-
ble freedom’ and equality of individuals, already seen by Marx – in his
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terms the prerequisite for their utilization as the commodity ‘labour’ in la-
bour markets – denotes a general structural prerequisite for the utilization
of individuals by the function systems of modern society. The favourably
viewed ‘freedom of the individual’ stands for the freedom from prior com-
mitments, and for the possibility, willingness, and capability of individuals
to take advantage of specific opportunities to participate in social systems.
‘Equality’ overrules particularistic access restrictions; the conditions for in-
clusion are theoretically the same for everyone. In the function systems
and organizations of modern society, inclusions come about in the terms
valid there; the freedom and equality of individuals release them from the
necessity of taking into account prior commitments. The condition for indi-
viduals’ participation in society is therefore their detachment, their exclu-
sion as whole entities (Luhmann 1989).
This formal equality, which constitutes a social prerequisite for individu-
als’ participation in modern society, has as yet little to do with the core
issue of inequality research. The modern demand for more substantial
social equality of individuals in relation to fundamental opportunities for
participation and opportunities in life has its structural anchoring point in
the political form of organization which is the nation state, and in the asso-
ciated form of inclusion, citizenship. Historically and structurally, belong-
ing to the nation as a citizen is the basis for the claim to substantial equal-
ity, as Marshall (1992 [1950]) already observed. This particular form of in-
clusion is itself based on the particular form of differentiation of politics,
its segmentary internal differentiation into nation states (Bommes 1999).
The social semantics of equality as a form of observation and evaluation of
the distribution of resources has its structural foundations here.
The distinction between equality/inequality as a social semantics of the
observation and evaluation of distribution and also of distribution itself al-
so makes visible the fact that problems of distribution become problematic
in modern society because there is no longer – and cannot be – a solution
to this which is systematically anchored in society’s primary form of differ-
entiation, functional differentiation.
Modes of inclusion and exclusion in social systems are, depending on
the type of society, more or less closely linked with structures of distribu-
tion of social resources. Thus, for example, income poverty in present-day
society is in many cases a consequence of unemployment, i.e. of unsuc-
cessful inclusion in positions which provide an income. Questions of inclu-
sion and exclusion are not, however, to be equated with questions of distri-
bution. Distributions are not automatically regulated along with the utiliza-
tion of individuals. Taking up duties as a doctor, nurse, engineer, scholar,
caretaker, tennis pro or social worker does not necessarily determine, in
functional terms, at what level salaries, prestige and social recognition
should be set, and how the financial and social resources of organizations
should therefore be distributed.3 The emergence and consolidation of
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income distributions are not regulated by the structure of functional differ-
entiation. It is characteristic of the form of differentiation of modern soci-
ety that questions of inclusion/exclusion and of the distribution of benefits
systematically move apart. Its relations of distribution, and the fact that the
obvious discrepancies in distribution can no longer be justified in the frame
of reference of an estate-based order of inclusion, thus also first become
reflexive in the concept of class, which treats these discrepancies as a scan-
dal against the background of a generalized claim to equality (Luhmann
1985).
Modern society knows no comprehensive rule, structurally anchored in
its form of differentiation, for questions of distribution. The inclusion of in-
dividuals occurs in the respective function systems and the organizations
associated with them, in each case in line with their requirements for com-
munication. When it comes to participation in the law, politics, education,
family, academia and even the economy, the primary issue is not problems
of distribution, but the mobilization of individuals for the function-specific
communications required in each case and the securing of their continu-
ability. Individuals are needed for the dispensation of justice, the produc-
tion of political decisions, the making of investments or the development
of theories. The processes of justice, education, investment or political de-
cision-making mean that, even in cases where distribution is an immediate
concern, the distributions of education and training, income, political influ-
ence, scholarly reputation and healthcare must be dealt with under the
premises of individual function systems as a prerequisite from which legal
decisions, educational measures or political decisions can only follow on.
One can try, using political means, to improve the labour market prospects
of disadvantaged young people through occupational support measures, but
one cannot grant them the relevant qualifications by political means. One
can try by means of education to increase the future chances of children
from low-income families, but one cannot – in this context – supply them
directly with money. The law can enjoin the welfare state, on the basis of
social security law, to pay higher benefits to needy individuals. But it can
neither intervene directly in economic relations of distribution nor pass
laws determining welfare-state benefits.
In conditions of functional differentiation, there can be no comprehen-
sive regulation of distribution for the multitude of inclusions and exclu-
sions, and therefore also no regulation which can be anchored structurally
in the primary form of differentiation itself. This would override the func-
tional form of differentiation itself. In modern society, problems of distri-
bution and social inequality thus have their basis in the fact that, on the
one hand, society has no general solution for these problems and that, on
the other hand, solutions for distributions obviously do nonetheless repeat-
edly arise and become established and lead to phenomena of stratification
and of social registration of structured inequality, which are then
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thematized in inequality studies. Such more or less stable solutions cannot
be understood as the direct result of the primary structural characteristics
of modern society, of its form of differentiation. Nonetheless, secondary
structural formations of distribution, i.e. the structured inequality identified
by inequality studies, occur in the function systems and organizations.
They are secondary because such structural formations are not already logi-
cally inherent in the primary structure of differentiation, but develop within
its frame of reference.4
On the production of secondary orders of distribution and social
inequality by organizations and welfare states
In modern society the conditions and opportunities for inclusion and exclu-
sion in the function systems and regulation of distributions are largely
mediated and related to each other by organizations. Function systems are
fundamentally open for the inclusion of all individuals as persons within
the function-specific terms which define these systems: structurally – and
also normatively, as a value – universalism of inclusion applies. As citi-
zens, legal persons, buyers or sellers, students, patients or viewers, every-
one is supposed to have access to politics, the law, the economy, education,
sport or the mass media, as long as they fulfil the system-specific condi-
tions. But this does not guarantee participation, it merely states that this is
possible in principle. Socially, many prerequisites must be fulfilled before
the universalism of inclusion of the function systems can become reality,
and the difficulties of empirical implementation require the welfare state to
act as a political mediator of the relations of inclusion in modern society
(Bommes 1999). It focuses, for reasons which will be explained below, on
organizations, and takes their modes of inclusion as the basis for mediating
individuals’ social opportunities for participation.
Organizations utilize individuals for formal membership roles and spec-
ify in this form the conditions for entry and exit (Luhmann 1964: 39ff.).
They are able to utilize people in this way because the assumption of serv-
ice roles in organizations is the prerequisite for individuals to receive an
income. The required willingness to work includes them in the economy
and thus provides organizations with a medium of inclusion, work, for the
successful utilization of individuals for ever more improbable, highly
specified service roles in organizations (cf. Bommes & Tacke 2001). The
welfare state follows on from this cumulative relationship between the
economy and organizations in which the available incomes are distributed.
The connection between distribution, inequality and the structures of inclu-
sion and exclusion can therefore be reconstructed, in the affluent regions
of the world society, as the result of the interplay of organizations in func-
tion systems and modern welfare states – as will be demonstrated below.
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It is obvious where in modern society the distributions which are signifi-
cant for the lifestyle of individuals are carried out: conditions and opportu-
nities for inclusion and exclusion in function systems and the regulation of
distributions are primarily mediated and related to each other by organiza-
tions.5 Organizations are social systems which regulate the participation of
individuals in specific manners which have consequences for their chances
of inclusion elsewhere. On the one hand, they utilize individuals as mem-
bers for service roles. For this they specify the conditions for entry and
exit, for example as an assembly-line worker, a fitter, an accountant, a
business economist, doctor, academic assistant, doorman or personnel man-
ager. The form of such membership roles in organizations and the associ-
ated expectations for their competent fulfilment constitute the prerequisites
for inclusion in service roles to which the majority of people in modern
society must gain access in order to receive an income. On the other hand,
organizations include individuals in service-receiving roles, e.g. as audi-
ence, customers, patients, clients or students, and they thus offer access to
the services of the function systems of politics, the economy, the law,
health or education. Organizations thus doubly mediate the conditions and
opportunities for inclusion and exclusion in function systems.
Organizations include persons in formal membership roles (or exclude
them) in terms of the procurement of resources and the creation of solu-
tions to problems. They admit persons into positions in terms of their ex-
pectable current and future aptitude or competence. They generally detect
this aptitude and competence from individuals’ life course and career. The
prerequisite for this form of observation of individuals is that the paralleli-
zation between form of differentiation and form of inclusion has disinte-
grated. With the transition from stratificatory to modern society, social
affiliation and the attendant options and expectations for individuals are no
longer fixed. Their inclusion or exclusion is thus orientated towards their
personal past, their biography as a history of inclusion or exclusion.6 With
the ‘institutionalization of the life course’ (Kohli 1985; Meyer 1986) a per-
son’s past becomes a piece of information upon which expectations about
the future can be based.
The observation and identification of individuals on the basis of their
biography means transposing this observation from the social to the tempo-
ral dimension (Hahn 1988; Luhmann 1989). This transposition is consoli-
dated structurally in the relations of inclusion and distribution of modern
society, on the basis of its connectivity for organizations, individuals and
welfare states. For organizations it makes the problem of the inclusion of
individuals and of the regulation of standards of inclusion soluble; welfare
states, by focusing on individuals’ life courses, gain a classification scheme
on which they can base the political mediation of the relations of inclusion;
individuals, finally, gain opportunities for orientation which at the same
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time align them with the conditions of inclusion of the function systems
and organizations.
Life course and career constitute social forms. They provide organiza-
tions and individuals with an order of social inclusion which can offer ori-
entation, and with this the problem of the distribution of individuals across
membership positions gains a form of solution. It becomes possible to ob-
serve individuals with regard to whether their past, documented as life
course and career, makes it probable or improbable that they will fulfil the
requirements of membership roles.
Further expectations can then be added. Careers formulate claims for in-
clusion in two directions: careers in education and training, as well as the
work experiences which follow, make it possible to expect that individuals
can be utilized for highly specified membership roles on the basis of their
qualifications and skills, and therefore also the communication of corre-
sponding expectations of performance. Conversely, such expectations form
the basis for demands with regard to workplace furnishing and equipment,
the position in the organization, and related decision-making powers,
income level, prestige, etc. Orders of distribution can therefore be formed
by way of these expectations. Organizations thus gain the opportunity to
utilize individuals to cope with an uncertain future and for related expecta-
tions of performance which cannot be fixed in advance, because they
promise them a career and thus continuability and security thereof.
On the one hand: the less the satisfiability of the requirements associated
with a membership role is attributed to the individual bearers of this role
and their specific background, the lower the career value of this member-
ship, the attendant specifiability of performance expectations – and con-
versely the chances of making demands for rewards. Clusters of tasks
which can be carried out by any number of people make the individual
easy to replace. On the other hand these kinds of chances to make and
enforce demands can themselves be increased by organization: associations
such as trade unions and professional associations are organizations which
form reflexively on the basis of the conditions of inclusion in organiza-
tions, the criteria for access, the performance expectations and the associ-
ated distributions of income, power and prestige. With their formation they
aim at the stabilization and securing of achieved conditions of inclusion,
by bundling, formalizing and standardizing careers in occupations and at-
tached rights. This has been a central theme of occupational sociology
since Max Weber.7
National welfare states form the central context for the way in which or-
ganizations focus on life courses and careers when including individuals,
and distribute positions and incomes, and also for the formation and estab-
lishment of organizations which deal reflexively with the conditions of
membership in organizations. Modern welfare states are, for all their differ-
ences, characterized in their organizational infrastructure by their reflexive
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relationship to modern society’s form of inclusion/exclusion; this consti-
tutes their common ground. Inclusion and exclusion in the social systems
of modern society prove to involve many prerequisites and risks. Welfare
states seek to mediate these conditions of inclusion and exclusion politi-
cally with their decisions. Historically they have focused their attention, in
the first instance, on dealing with the risks of exclusion in the labour mar-
ket, and have gradually expanded their focus to include the risks of exclu-
sion in the education, legal, political and health systems, and in family
systems.
To mediate these risks, welfare states begin with the cumulative relation-
ship between the economy and organizations. The recruitment of person-
nel, the allocation of positions and careers in organizations are connected
to the allocation of money, reputation and influence, and also to economic,
cultural and social capital. These allocations have been a central point of
reference for welfare states from the beginning. The form of membership
and the conditions for the successful utilization of individuals for this
membership open up and mediate very differently distributed opportunities
for services in organizational and functional contexts, in which individuals
do not occupy service roles, but complementary or service-receiving roles
(Stichweh 1988) as consumers, voters, clients, laypeople, patients, audi-
ence or students. In the case of consumption, this is obvious. But health
opportunities, too, and the capacity to enter into legal conflicts, success in
educational organizations or the chances of gaining influence in politics
are regulated in varied ways by organizational career patterns and the dis-
tributions of money, status, influence and contacts which are mediated
through them. By attempting, in focusing on conditions of inclusion in
organizations, to create opportunities and willingness for inclusion, and by
dealing with the consequences of exclusion, welfare states aim to increase
the above-mentioned, organizationally mediated opportunities for participa-
tion, and above all to make them transferable.
The central framework for the organization of this kind of increase and
transferability is constituted by the institutionalization of the life course, a
way of imposing order on the lifelong relationship of loyalty and service
between national welfare states and their citizens. The lives of individuals
are temporally structured here by a cluster of regulations as a sequential
programme of social inclusion and exclusion. Modern organizations can
rely on the life course and career as social ways of observing individuals,
not least because welfare states create central prerequisites for individuals
to be able to fulfil corresponding expectations. With the introduction of
forms of intervention which are organized on the one hand with reference
to families and on the other hand in line with the ways individuals are em-
ployed in organizations, with the temporal accumulation of rights and enti-
tlements which are dependent on length of employment, and with the inter-
vention in the conditions of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. through
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protection against dismissal, accident regulations, collective bargaining
law), the welfare state establishes the social concept of the life course as a
sequential programme (Kohli 1985). The welfare state thus produces essen-
tial prerequisites for organizations to be able to order inclusions and exclu-
sions of individuals on the basis of career, by increasing the probability
that careers can actually be achieved.
It is not difficult to see that social orders which are found for conditions
of inclusion and exclusion in organizations, for the distribution of social
resources such as money, power, influence and status and for opportunities
to participate in the various function areas, are formed in parallel to the
institutionalization of the life course and following the associated structural
specifications. When defining occupations, formulating the conditions in
which they can be pursued, making claims for income and social security,
refusing unreasonable expectations for inclusion8 or monopolizing skills,
organizations such as trade unions, entrepreneurs’ associations, professio-
nal associations or chambers invoke criteria such as education and training,
qualification, professional career, family status, age or gender, and combine
them in such a way that their claims can in each case be defended and jus-
tified. For organizations, such specifications not only make the question of
the inclusion or exclusion of individuals decidable, or make decisions
which have already been taken explainable,9 but also provide representable
criteria for the allocation of social resources such as income, power, status
and influence. Organizations in different functional areas such as the econ-
omy, politics, mass media, health and academia deal with these criteria in
manifestly diverse ways. An important factor here is whether organizations
obtain money on a political basis or through the market, whether they are
organizations pursuing ideological aims or organizations which offer ‘ex-
traordinariness’ as a service, as for example in sport. Nonetheless such cri-
teria help to formulate comprehensive and general points of orientation for
decision-making, which make questions of inclusion and distribution man-
ageable and thus make organizations which deviate greatly from this
observable.10
The resulting orders of inclusion/exclusion and distribution differ con-
siderably from one national welfare state to the next (Esping-Andersen
1990, 1996), depending on their structure, and the shape of the institution-
alized life-course patterns and the focus of the welfare-state mediation of
the relations of inclusion differ accordingly.11 As a result different orders
of inclusion and distribution emerge from country to country, connected in
each case with different risk structures in relation to inclusion and exclu-
sion and to the more or less restricted access to social resources. These
orders become visible as social structures:12 as structured social inequality,
as registered by inequality studies with the subsumption of individuals in
categories of stratification; as differentially distributed labour market op-
portunities dependent on qualification, stage in life and gender; as more or
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less extended periods of income poverty, which vary in ways specific to
stratum, phase in life, and gender (Leibfried et al. 1995; Leisering &
Leibfried 1999); as the probability or improbability of re-inclusion in work
and income or as the codification of the organized need for help in differ-
ent types of welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1996; Ganßmann & Haas
1999; Goodin et al. 1999).
The achievement of the orders of inclusion/exclusion and of distribution,
such as they result from the interplay of organizations and welfare states
described here, and of the corresponding semantics in the functionally dif-
ferentiated society, consists in the fact that questions of inclusion and dis-
tribution receive an ordering structure which encompasses the function sys-
tems and organizations and has its impact in the organizations of the vari-
ous function systems, in a manner specific to each context. Such a
structure, for the duration of its validity, removes the burden of finding
new answers to questions of inclusion and distribution, specific to each or-
ganization and function. The effects of such an order are ambivalent: its
relative stability gives organizations and function systems space for the
process of differentiation, since the stabilization of expectations of inclu-
sion and distribution means that individuals can be utilized for quite im-
probable and uncertain tasks. Welfare states have therefore, beyond their
self-description, encouraged social differentiation more than social equality
(Halfmann & Bommes 1998). On the other hand, however, orders of distri-
bution can tie up or overtax the resource potential of organizations. If their
options for development are too severely restricted or even destroyed, such
orders erode. They can also, however, lose a part of their binding force be-
cause of the loss of sovereignty of welfare states.13
On the production of ethnic inequality in organizations, based on
the example of the “Gastarbeiter” in Germany
At the end of the 1980s there was a debate in the Zeitschrift für Soziologie
between Hartmut Esser (1988), Reinhard Kreckel (1989) and Armin
Nassehi (1990) about whether the renewed relevance of ethnicity in the
wake of migration processes and conflicts over regionalism, and related
discussions about inequality and discrimination, were test cases for the
kinds of social theory exemplified by systems theory, test cases which
these theories would barely be able to survive. Against this background it
is widely taken as read that there is little to be gained from this field for re-
search into ethnic inequality. In the light of the largely unchanged state of
this discussion, I would like to sketch below, using the example of the ear-
lier “Gastarbeiter” (literally “guest workers”), how one can use the reflec-
tions presented to understand more precisely what positions of distribution
these migrant workers of the 1960s and 1970s and their descendants have
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attained, and in what way these distributions are ethnically structured or
are registered as ethnic inequality by those involved.14
What inclusions and thus what access to resources migrants can empiri-
cally achieve depends, for them too, on the observation and processing of
their careers in organizations themselves. The absence of continuous ca-
reers of inclusion and associated expectations of qualifications and income
is not a problem for organizations in all circumstances. Welfare states me-
diate the conditions of inclusion of organizations and function systems,
and the chances of migrants, through prohibitions, permissions, and serv-
ices. With the structure of their way of operating they stipulate orders
which reward various types of seamlessly positive careers of inclusion,
and, as a complement to this, formulate orders of exclusion for those indi-
viduals who are “deficient” in diverse respects. But inclusion is carried out
in organizations which, in focusing on the state’s specifications or trying to
circumvent them, initially and primarily solve their own problems.
If one wishes to clarify the relationship of migrants to organizations and
the attendant opportunities for inclusion and distribution, then it is neces-
sary to specify in which respects, in their attempts to access organizations
as members in service roles, particular characteristics which have their
roots in their migrant status and the attendant structural consequences come
into play in comparison to other individuals. This is discussed below in
three steps: I. If the careers of migrants diverge from the normal expecta-
tions institutionalized in the welfare state, this has differentiated conse-
quences for their chances of inclusion and the related access to resources
in organizations, and does not necessarily mean exclusion or discrimina-
tion. On the contrary, for a relevant portion of migrants there is a correla-
tion between the lack of a career of inclusion on which demands might be
based, low expectations of income, and resulting chances of inclusion. II.
Inclusion in organizations is not exclusively dependent on career. Careers
formulate prerequisites for inclusion, but whether they actually ensure en-
try depends largely on the recruitment structures in organizations and the
kind of access one has to those making decisions about recruitment. The
positions in organizations which are attained and attainable as a continuing
process at the beginning of a migration process and in the course of its es-
tablishment are, in contexts of inclusion mediated by the welfare state, the
determining factor for the chances for inclusion and access of subsequent
migrants and of the children of migrants, the so-called second and third
generations. III. State categories of immigration correspond to self-attribu-
tions and attributions by others of ethnic or national characteristics and
qualities which express the legitimacy or illegitimacy of residence and ben-
efit claims, and also expectations about the so-called capacity for integra-
tion. Such attributions and expectations are socially valorized in various
communicative contexts (Bommes 1994). They gain relevance in organiza-
tions as migrants are included in both service and service-receiving roles,
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and they find their way into the organizations’ decision-making pro-
grammes, if such distinctions are able to be used for the solution of deci-
sion-making problems.
I
In modern society, migrant workers’ chances for inclusion in labour mar-
kets have historically been based on their willingness to provide a greater
work output for lower income expectations than those workers already
present. In other words: migration as geographical mobility to take advant-
age of opportunities for inclusion in organizations, for the purpose of
achieving income, is made possible and induced by inequality in the sense
of different structures of inclusion and distribution in the region of origin
and the target region. After the implementation of freedom of movement in
the internal labour market, the modern nation state, now expanded into a
welfare state, intervened in migrant workers’ willingness to be mobile, in-
sofar as they were foreigners, by controlling access to the local labour mar-
ket to protect the standards of inclusion for domestic workers (standards
politically mediated by the welfare state) against competition from outside.
If migration is based on chances for inclusion which arise from a different
context of inclusion and distribution, then welfare states, by institutionaliz-
ing a barrier of inequality towards the exterior, create incentives to cross-
border migration, structurally and permanently, while at the same time try-
ing to make the possibilities for achieving this dependent on their own
premises (Bommes 1999).
In this way, the European states have attempted to regulate labour migra-
tion. In doing so they have focused their efforts to control access to the
state-defined labour market on criteria concerned with providing a suffi-
cient supply of labour for the “national economy” and with the employ-
ment and privileging of their citizens. With the process of labour migration
after World War II, which was given various kinds of administrative sup-
port in the individual countries, these states offered interested businesses –
on the premise of the “Inländerprimat” (preferential treatment of nationals)
– access to individuals from other states, young and eager for inclusion.
The attractiveness of these individuals for the businesses, despite or also
because the migrant workers were included in the general compulsory
social insurance scheme, consisted not only in their high general productiv-
ity, which was assured by corresponding selection procedures, but also in
their “careerlessness”. They were able to be deployed, mainly in the manu-
facturing industry, in workplaces demanding high levels of physical labour,
as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in low wage brackets. Orientated
towards the relations of inclusion, distribution and income of their regions
of origin, they had a high willingness to work and perform and, in compar-
ison to the domestic workers, lower pay expectations.
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The inequality of the migrant workers of the first generation was the
starting point from which they were able to grow into relatively stable rela-
tions of employment in the areas of production for which they had been
recruited and, connected with the conditions of their employment related to
social-security law, into the status of “denizen” (Hammar) with permanent
residence and comprehensive rights to the benefits of the welfare state. In
settling here, they developed into a population which was able to maintain
its position in its own specific labour markets – to varying extents – from
the early 1980s to the mid-1990s.15 Their fields of activity were affected
by constant processes of rationalization and restructuring, due to interna-
tional economic developments; this largely explains a phenomenon observ-
able in almost all countries, the high proportion of migrant workers among
the unemployed in comparison to each country’s nationals.
However different the political reactions to the circumstances of the mi-
grant workers and their families were and are in the different countries, it
was only as they grew into the role of “denizens” that “integration” be-
came the focus of their treatment by the welfare state. With the attainment
of permanent residence and entitlement to the benefits of the welfare state,
they were gradually inserted into its frame of reference of “equality”, the
community of legitimate beneficiaries. The desired “equality” in the sense
of “integration” also meant assimilation to the relations of inclusion and
the lifestyle of the nationals.
It was only with the shift to “integration” and thus to “equality” that the
specific structure of inclusions of the migrant workers and the associated
distributions, the potentially discriminatory regulations of their conditions
of immigration and residence, and their structurally weaker position in rela-
tion to the compensatory mechanisms of the welfare state became a norma-
tive problem in terms of their inequality-producing character in comparison
to the relations of inclusion of the nationals. This problem was exacerbated
in the 1990s, particularly in relation to that part of the second and third
generation which had grown up in this welfare-state frame of orientation
favouring equality as the condition for better opportunities for participation
in other functional contexts and organizations, without being able to over-
come existing barriers to inclusion in workplaces with higher income and
greater employment security.
II
In summary, for a large part of foreign migrants the opportunities for ac-
cess to organizations as members in service roles and the attendant oppor-
tunities for inclusion and distribution have arisen from their inequality with
regard to career assets and welfare-state safeguards in comparison to na-
tionals. The assets and safeguards connected to their migrant status initially
form the basis for their opportunities for inclusion and income. With the
SYSTEMS THEORY AND THE ‘ETHNIC INEQUALITY’ OF MIGRANT WORKERS 71
inclusion of migrants into the welfare-state programme of integration, how-
ever, migrants and the children who come after them run into considerable
barriers to mobility and difficulties gaining access to organizations. The
obvious disadvantaging of “integrated migrants” in the labour market raises
the question of peculiarities in their relationship with organizations which
hamper their efforts to enter into the “normal working conditions” of the
nationals. This phenomenon can be found in all countries. It is reproduced
in organizations in various ways, depending not least on the different
modes of welfare-state mediation of their structures of inclusion, but also
on the history of immigration. It points to the mechanisms in organizations
themselves, which reproduce their membership structure in different ways
by granting their members opportunities to keep their positions, control ac-
cess within networks, and exclude third parties. The following section will
demonstrate, using the example of the barriers to mobility encountered by
migrant workers in organizations in Germany, and the obvious difficulties
of second-generation migrants in accessing on-the-job training positions,
some of these kinds of structures of inclusion in organizations, which make
it difficult for migrant workers to take on better paid service roles with
more potential for the future, and which largely limit them to a lifestyle
conditioned by restricted opportunities for inclusion.16
In Germany, where unemployment rates were slightly lower than in
France or the Netherlands (Werner 1994), but also rising sharply
(Thränhardt 1998), migrant workers achieved no significant improvements
by the beginning of the 1990s, but did manage to secure their positions
within companies or in occupations. Hardly any, however, make the shift
into the service industry; they thus remain largely excluded from this
worldwide trend towards a restructuring of employment conditions. Both
within and outside the workplace, foreign nationals were and are con-
fronted with considerable barriers to mobility, correspondingly lower chan-
ces of income and greater risks of redundancy (see for example
Thränhardt, Dieregsweiler & Santel 1994; Seifert 1995; Thränhardt 1998).
The securing of their membership mentioned above is, above and be-
yond the consolidation of their situation in relation to social law, an indica-
tion of their productivity in the positions they occupy. If they display
restricted mobility from these positions, this is in the first instance because
of their unequal career assets, outlined above, which originally provided
the basis for their chances of inclusion. When it comes to orienting their
lifestyle towards equality in the sense set out above, this under-endowment
with formal career characteristics as part of the order of inclusion mediated
by the welfare state is an obstacle to mobility. Studies on internal and ex-
ternal mobility in the labour market17 show, however, that foreign migrant
workers always had and have fewer chances than local workers with the
same career assets of leaving their positions to take up jobs associated with
more skills, lighter work, and a higher income. This phenomenon cannot
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be explained by different orientations towards mobility, since it applies to
migrants of both the first and the second generation. Furthermore, occupa-
tional processes of upward and downward mobility show that migrant
workers experience much less upward mobility and more often experience
downward mobility than their German colleagues, who also move more
successfully into white-collar occupations in the tertiary sector (Seifert
1995: 166ff.; Schäfer 1994: 143f.).
Of central significance is the fact that the principle of seniority, institu-
tionalized in the industrial production sector, according to which the length
of service to the company constitutes the main criterion for the selection of
individuals for internal processes of mobility (Windolf & Hohn 1984), is
applied only to a limited extent in the area of the employment of foreign-
ers. While the whole spectrum of possible improvements is open to local
workers, largely independent of their initial qualification, and the risk of
their career being confined to areas of activity with fewer skills, harder
work, and low income is far lower, the spectrum of options for advance-
ment is highly restricted for foreign migrant workers, differentiated inter-
nally by nationality. The principle of seniority only applies for them within
this spectrum. In this way particular national groups remain largely in the
segments of the workplace in which they were first employed (Biller
1989).
The decisive factor for these different opportunities is the chance to par-
ticipate in internal social networks in which decisions about recruitment,
further qualifications and promotions are made, or the access to members
of such networks of decision-makers or decision-preparers (Dohse 1982;
Schäfer 1985; Gillmeister, Kurthen & Fijalkowski 1989). Due to the dura-
tion of their period of service, and their memberships in trade unions and
works committees, foreign migrant workers are not cut off from internal
decision-making networks. They have considerable influence on decision-
makers as the personnel-related premises for recruitment decisions and
have established, for their workplace domains of employment, the expecta-
tion that when jobs are available, considerable weight will be accorded to
their advocacy or kinship relationships to them in the recruitment decision.
Despite declared efforts on the part of unions (Kühne, Öztürk & West
1994), they are not, however, involved in the same way in networks of
communication about opportunities for transfer and promotion, and thus
are mainly taken into consideration in those distributions which pertain to
the spectrum of mobility and career which they are recognized as having
within their workplace. This process by which migrant workers become
fixed in the positions held also draws on their formal career assets as a ba-
sis for decisions. In this way the non-consideration of migrants in decisions
about qualifications becomes communicable as an expectation that they
will have a limited capacity for further training, which is in turn attributed
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to ethnic-cultural barriers, and is then representable as part of the approved
order of inclusion and exclusion.
Once established, such structures of communication acquire a self-rein-
forcing character on the basis of the “self-recruitment” of the migrant
workers for the workplace positions which are predominantly occupied by
them, since they reproduce the networks of groups distinguished by ethnic-
ity or nationality, as the case may be, the expectations institutionalized
within the workplace regarding the career options of such groups and thus
the complex of workplace networks, in which distributions are organized
along the structure of mobility outlined above. In this way, in the manner
in which members are recruited internally and assumptions are made about
career scope, social processes of distribution and closure crystallize, and
are reproduced and supported, as well as in some cases ethnically marked,
in social networks of communication.
With criteria for the opening and closing of careers which are institution-
alized in this way in the workplace processes of communication, migrant
workers are largely bound to the inclusion structures and the associated
distributions and horizons of possibilities which initially made possible
their entry and thus their migration. The relations of inclusion and distribu-
tion within organizations established with labour migration have been diffi-
cult for migrant workers to break through to this day, partly because the
networks which allocate the places to them, and they themselves in their
perception of the options open to them, reproduce the structural context in
which the limiting of their horizon of possibilities is institutionalized.
Evidently, social networks or their members in organizations are not easily
impressed by general appeals to integration and equality when it comes to
taking advantage of opportunities on the paths of the orders of inclusion
which are open to them and which they reproduce, individually or in com-
bination with all the others, for the production of decisions about positions
and distributions.
At the same time the manner in which migrant workers also participate
in the reproduction of the orders of inclusion and distribution makes it
clear why the external horizon of mobility, improving one’s situation by
changing workplace, is limited for them. The external recruitment of mem-
bers for available positions is also largely mediated via social networks
(Windolf & Hohn 1984; Sengenberger 1987), because the scope for inde-
terminacy and uncertainty which decisions about recruitment and allocation
have to absorb is limited by such networks18 and for this very reason
opens up decision-makers to the expectations which members address to
them. Insofar as migrant workers are, here too, dependent on access to the
networks which they can reach, they are obviously not getting anywhere.
This constitutes at the same time the central mechanism by means of which
a large part of the second generation of migrants succeed their fathers
when taking up membership positions.
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Where second- or third-generation migrants compete with young
Germans for apprenticeships, on the basis of the same school-leaving qual-
ifications,19 social networks again prove to be the deciding factor for the
allocation of places in businesses. In recruiting young people for appren-
ticeships, staff are capable of making their expectations the basis for deci-
sions, and in this way reserving access mainly for their own children, rela-
tives, and other participants in their social networks (Bommes 1996; Faist
1995: 110ff.). True, migrant workers also take part in this as members of
staff. But because of the significance of such networks the parts of the
business to which they have no access as members prove to be closed to
their children as well.
The effect of this is that migrant workers “bequeath” to their children, in
a modified form, the structures of inclusion, distribution, and horizons of
possibilities to which they are structurally confined within their organiza-
tions, against the background of the history of their recruitment. They at-
tempt successfully to offer access to membership positions in the area of
unskilled or semi-skilled activities to young people who are unable to enter
training positions due to a lack of school-leaving qualifications. In many
cases they can use the channels of their networks to place those young
people who fulfil the academic prerequisites in training positions. Because
migrant workers are predominantly employed in industrial production, this
means that the young people mainly become qualified in occupations
which often have poor prospects for the future, given the constant proc-
esses of restructuring in industrial production. Furthermore, because of the
tight control exercised by bodies of workers over young people’s access to
training positions, migrant youths who are looking for an apprenticeship
are largely relegated to the less attractive apprenticeships in manual work,
and those with less future potential for subsequent careers.
These opportunities for migrant youths to access on-the-job training and
the attendant future chances of inclusion and income are the result of the
interplay of the orders of inclusion in organizations and the way they are
mediated by the welfare state. In Germany a part of the organization of oc-
cupational training is the neocorporative arrangement by which companies
have repeatedly committed themselves to providing enough apprenticeships
for young people – resulting in relatively low (in international terms) youth
unemployment (Faist 1995). The structures of inclusion in organizations,
however, on the basis of this welfare-state arrangement, regulate access to
the available apprenticeships in a way which largely steers migrant youth
into the paths of inclusion, the career prospects, and the related chances of
income of their parents. The positions in organizations which were attained
and attainable by them with their migration thus turn out, in contexts of in-
clusion mediated by the welfare state, to be a significant prestructuring for
the chances of inclusion and opportunities for access of the following gen-
erations. The initial disadvantage of the parents, which was originally their
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advantage, sets in motion a non-random formation of order, in which a
considerable portion of the children are also included, and which leads to
stabilization of initial disadvantages across various functional areas in the
sense of reduced opportunities for participation and capacities for using op-
portunities. Inequality studies describe this, summarizing the cumulative
effects statistically, by assigning them to the lowest division of a stratifica-
tion model (Geißler 2002).
III
Part of this kind of formation of order is the development of lifestyles
which allow the integration of the typical clusters of opportunities for inte-
gration into structured situations in life, as well as the use and condensa-
tion of descriptions which allocate a meaning to those lifestyles. In the case
of migrants, these attributions of meaning, particularly the attribution of
characteristics and qualities to those leading such lifestyles, are embedded
in ethnic or national semantics and closely related to the state immigration
categories (“foreign national”, “asylum applicant”, “Aussiedler” [person of
German descent returning to Germany from Eastern Europe]), which indi-
cate the extent to which conditions apply to their residence, and the more
or less limited legitimacy of their relationship to the welfare state. Such de-
scriptions of self and other are part of the fixing of orders of inclusion and
their social evaluations. They make individuals socially distinguishable and
observable with regard to whether they can be considered for inclusions
and associated distributions, and if so, for which ones.
In theories of ethnic conflicts and discrimination, such processes of attri-
bution are mainly described as part of disputes between individuals or col-
lectives over resources for the satisfaction of material needs and for social
recognition. Ethnic or national distinctions are undoubtedly also made rele-
vant in communication processes, when attempts are made to discriminate
against or to improve the position of individuals or collectives in disputes
over distribution. But insofar as this is meant to acquire meaning for the
chances of participating in distributions, such distinctions must above all
take effect and attain connectivity in the communication processes of or-
ganizations, because it is here than the relevant inclusions and distributions
occur. The reference to organizations redirects attention to their process of
reproduction. The connectivity of distinctions which contribute, in their
communicative effects, to the integration of migrants’ opportunities for
inclusion and distribution, can be measured here by their reusability in pro-
ducing decisions. What is questionable is how and in what way organiza-
tions resort to ethnic or national semantics and distinctions made by the
state for the description of migrants to solve their decision-making prob-
lems, and what consequences this has for migrants’ chances of inclusion in
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service or service-receiving roles, and their related chances of access to
material and symbolic benefits.
For the inclusion of migrants in service roles, it is obvious that, where
their willingness to be included is no longer based on an orientation
towards the advantage of inequality, the concept of career as a form of ob-
serving order opens up the possibility of describing their career assets as
deficient in various respects. Here it is possible to evoke not only formal
educational requirements, but also assumptions about culturally different
lifestyles, associated mentalities, etc. Such forms of description reduce the
scope for indeterminacy and uncertainty which has to be absorbed by deci-
sions about recruitment and allocation, and in some cases find reinforce-
ment both in the self-presentation of the migrants and in descriptions of
migrants found in educational contexts, politics or academia. Whether busi-
nesses resort to such descriptions depends on their internal organizational
history, the positions filled by migrants in them, the role of the works com-
mittees and unions, and the structure of the internal social networks.20
Because of the orders of inclusion mediated corporatively by the welfare
state, however, it is no coincidence that in Germany – unlike the USA,
where the relevance of ethnic distinctions is politically fixed by “affirma-
tive action” programmes – ethnic disputes have hardly featured in those
workplaces regulated by “industrial relations”. The formal, career-related
orders of inclusion, in combination with the above-described forms of
workplace recruitment, stabilize the established structures of inclusion and
distribution and the related systematic impediments to inclusion of migrant
workers and their children, without recourse to an elaborate, explicitly eth-
nic repertoire of attributions. Conversely, this on the one hand does not ex-
clude the possibility that those affected by such forms of distribution will
withdraw into ethnic networks and lifestyles, but makes this outcome likely
(Esser 1985). On the other hand, patterns of explanation and legitimation
which ascribe these disadvantages to ethnic-cultural backgrounds are be-
coming more relevant. With the current shift in “industrial relations”
(Streeck 1998), moreover, the expansion of a service industry for low-paid
activities unregulated by the welfare state, an industry which is also differ-
entiated in ethnic terms, has increased and with it the significance of the
use of such distinctions for the allocation of opportunities for inclusion.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the production and the
presentation of social inequality. The production of the social positions of
inequality of the Gastarbeiter and their children can largely be understood
as, in the first instance, the result of organizational decisions embedded in
the welfare state, which rely on more or less established and semantically
straightforward routines for the recruitment of members by internal net-
works. To the extent that ethnic semantics find their way into the social
registration of this inequality, its causes and its consequences, both among
those affected and those observing them in decision-making positions, in
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welfare-state administrations and other relevant areas of life, these seman-
tics will be a part of the reproduction of this inequality.
Conclusion
The first section of the text proposes that we understand orders of distribu-
tion and the related semantics as the combined result of the solutions
which organizations find for their structural problems, and of the related
political forms of regulation of the welfare state which thereby solve its
problems. It follows from this proposal that inequality studies should focus
more on organizations in function systems as a type of social system and
their form of reproduction, since the structure of the distribution of social
resources is part of the reproduction of organizations. Previous inequality
studies, with their preference for individual and collective actors, have
largely ignored this connection. The second part shows, using as an exam-
ple the career of the “Gastarbeiter” and their children in the labour market,
and the resulting inequality, frequently understood as ethnic, that this form
of inequality has also formed around the structures of the functionally dif-
ferentiated society, and that it can largely be understood as the result of the
interplay between decisions about recruitment and distribution in organiza-
tions, and the way these are embedded in the welfare state.
Notes
1 The text makes extensive use of two other pieces of work: an essay which, in dialo-
gue with inequality research, explains in more detail why it could be worthwhile
connecting with systems theory in this field (Bommes 2001), and excerpts from
chapter 6.3 in Bommes (1999).
2 The value of equality is, of course, already present in Christianity, for example, but
it is only in modern society that it becomes anchored in society’s structure of
differentiation.
3 This was evoked early on to counter the functional theory of stratification of Davis
and Moore (1940).
4 The thesis of the primacy of functional differentiation does not imply that one must
choose between analysis of differentiation and analysis of social inequality (Schwinn
1998: 15). The thesis of the primacy of the form of differentiation states that struc-
tures of social inequality are more or less closely coupled with a society’s particular
form of differentiation and rest on this. In this sense structures of distribution and
the social ways of registering issues of inequality presuppose the particular form of
differentiation: they shape themselves around this, are limited by it and conversely
have reciprocal effects on the structural development of society – as is easily observa-
ble in the emergence of welfare states in modern society.
5 More than 90 per cent of all those in paid employment derive their income from as-
suming service roles in organizations. More than 90 per cent of the adult resident
population in the wealthier countries (Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan) derive
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their income from paid employment, welfare-state transfer income, or familial
support.
6 Historically this transition becomes apparent in, for example, the increasing impor-
tance of the career in modern state administration, with this criterion eventually tak-
ing the place of that of descent, thus overriding the previously privileged access of
the aristocracy.
7 Cf. for example Beck, Brater & Daheim 1980; we leave aside here the interesting
fact that, beyond these debates, occupations and professions must primarily be un-
derstood, following Parsons, as the result of a mutual cumulative relationship be-
tween the education system and organizations: from qualifications and occupations,
organizations derive orientation for defining positions and associated expectations of
skills; the education system and its organizations align their provision of certificates
and qualifications with the job market and the expectations of organizations (Stock
2002). The success of the education system, in providing services which can be ta-
ken up by other systems, then obviously has consequences for the distribution of re-
sources, concerning both the flow of money into the area of training and also the so-
cial status which can be attained there.
8 Such as: “On Saturdays Dad belongs to me.”
9 Such criteria make the awarding of positions representable, but in many cases not
decidable, because there is no clear relationship between positions and individuals
who could potentially occupy them. In numerous organizations there are highly for-
malized application procedures which make recruitment from both within and out-
side the organization representable and immunize against accusations of arbitrari-
ness and patronage. The actual determining factors are then, however, criteria such
as relationship, neighbourhood or other network affiliations which staff successfully
use as criteria to influence the decision-makers. Social networks develop around the
internal recruitment of members and, based on this, social processes of distribution
and closure. Such networks support the established criteria for the judgement of ca-
reers, since these criteria are used as socially legitimate descriptive patterns for the
representation of the awarding of positions. We will return to this in the third sec-
tion about ethnic inequality.
10 Thus for example when it comes to paying their staff in hospitals or kindergartens
churches cannot deviate greatly from the standards in other comparable institutions
by citing the religious requirement for charity. And the salaries of sportspeople and
media stars attract attention not least in terms of deviation – extraordinariness, in a
word.
11 E.g. focusing on the “male average wage-earner” as in Germany or on the compat-
ibility of paid employment and family, as in Sweden.
12 We should not overlook here the fact that the distribution of social resources also oc-
curs to a considerable extent outside such orders. One might consider for example
drug-dealing, prostitution, crime, the so-called shadow economy, illegal migration
etc. Such distributions are seen in part as illegitimate and/or illegal and they are op-
portunities to reclaim the legitimate order. They largely fall outside the models used
in inequality studies to describe the social structure.
13 Discussions about the waning power of welfare states in the context of globalization,
about the destructuring of social inequality, the erosion of ‘normal employment’, the
breaking away of the demographic foundations of the social security systems indi-
cate the current processes of erosion affecting such orders. But current processes of
change are occurring under the auspices of the restructuring of the orders of inclu-
sion and distribution, not of their disintegration. Also affected by this are the struc-
ture of welfare states, the organizational conditions for the enforcement of demands,
the semantics of inclusion/exclusion and of distribution. But falling incomes,
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reduced services from welfare states and reduced social security are not to be equa-
ted with the disintegration of order.
14 A distinction should be made between statistically describable structures of distribu-
tion – here differences in dimensions of distribution such as income, education, oc-
cupational position, etc. which are significant for national or ethnic groups can be
demonstrated regularly – and the social perception and handling of such structures
as differences which are rooted in or can be justified by ethnicity or nationality.
15 Cf. the comparative studies of Werner (1994); Seifert (2000) and for Germany
Thränhardt, Dieregsweiler & Santel (1994); Seifert (1995).
16 Thus, this is not about explaining the inequality of migrants, but about showing
how some central mechanisms of its production can be made transparent in the the-
oretical frame of reference detailed above.
17 For this cf. Thränhardt, Dieregsweiler & Santel (1994): 66ff.; Seifert (1995): 165ff.;
Gillmeister, Kurthen & Fijalkowski (1989); Biller (1989), the relevant articles in
Kühne, Öztürk & West (1994).
18 For a concept of networks elaborated in systems-theory terms, and shedding struc-
tural-theoretical light on the solidification of networks around the opportunities to
make decisions about personnel recruitment, cf. Tacke (2000).
19 For a discussion of the educational success of migrant children or their educational
disadvantage (which we do not go into here) see Hunger & Thränhardt (2003).
20 It is also necessary to distinguish between on the one hand the way members of an
organization present a decision in studies of their hiring behaviour, and the seman-
tics which they resort to in the process (as in Gillmeister, Kurthen & Fijalkowski
1989), and on the other hand the production of a decision which can generally rely
on communicatively straightforward agreements and routines.
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4 Welfare systems and migrant minorities
The cultural dimension of social policies and
its discriminatory potential
First published in 2008 by the Council of Europe as a chapter (pages 129-
158) in Reconciling migrants’ well-being and the common interest: Economy,
welfare state and citizenship in transition (Trends in social cohesion 19), edited
by Europarat
Reprinted in 2011 in ‘Migration und Migrationsforschung in der modernen
Gesellschaft’ in IMIS-Beiträge 38 (pages 221-246)
The histories of welfare states and international migration in Europe after
the Second World War are closely interlinked. The phase of expansion and
consolidation of these welfare states from the 1950s until the 1970s was
also the major period of post-colonial immigration and active recruitment
of labour migrants, which constituted the main paths for subsequent migra-
tions to Europe. The recent efforts of European welfare states to adapt their
welfare systems to the challenges of increasing competition in globalised
markets are connected internally with policies of migration and integration;
they try to restrict access to state territories for migrants seen as insuffi-
ciently competitive on the one hand and, on the other, to enforce the social
integration of long-term resident migrants as an integral, programmatic part
of activating welfare policies. The infrastructure and policy designs of
European welfare states still differ, and therefore so do the modes of wel-
fare inclusion and participation of migrants. A shared experience, however,
is that large parts of the migrant populations in each country belong to the
most disadvantaged groups in terms of access to the labour market, occu-
pational positions and income, educational achievement, housing and
health. European welfare states are, however, seen – to a varying extent –
as institutions that should provide all individuals living permanently on
their territory with the means to overcome disadvantages and gain access
to resources that will allow them to share in a commonly accepted standard
of living.
The fact, however, that many immigrants in European welfare states re-
main disadvantaged compared with the indigenous population provides the
basis for assumptions that this may be due to unequal treatment – quite a
challenge for European welfare states, which claim to be guided by consti-
tutionally embedded universalism and equal and non-discriminatory treat-
ment. Since one of the effects of immigration is cultural and ethnic plural-
isation and the formation of ethnic minorities, it is proclaimed that social
disadvantages and inequality may well be the outcome of cultural or ethnic
discrimination built into the structure of national welfare states.
This chapter deals precisely with this question. Are European welfare
states and their social policies impregnated by implicit or explicit cultural
models, and do they have discriminatory effects on ethnic minorities con-
cerning their access to welfare provisions and social security? In order to
answer this question, a number of conceptual clarifications are needed: (a)
the introduction of a concept of welfare and welfare states and the related
social policies; (b) a clarification of what is meant by cultural models im-
plied in the provisions of welfare states; (c) a definition of minorities; and
(d) a discussion if there are systematic structural reasons for the discrimina-
tion of ethnic minorities involved in the cultural models implied in welfare
states. The argument is developed in four steps:
1. a conceptual understanding of the welfare state is introduced
2. the question is discussed of whether welfare states represent different
welfare cultures and if this provides the basis for cultural discrimina-
tion, a concept defined in this context
3. the relationship between migrants and welfare states is analysed in or-
der to clarify whether there are structural reasons for cultural discrimi-
nation due to this relationship itself
4. the systematic reason for structural welfare disadvantages experienced
by migrants is discussed, and finally it will be concluded that cultural
discrimination occurs when welfare states use particularity and cultural
differences as an internal principle for the organisation and provision of
welfare.
Modern Welfare Systems
Despite the many political disputes about the appropriate form and extent
of social security provided by welfare states, only rarely is the point put in
a straightforward way1 that the best welfare state would be no welfare
state. The reason for this seems to be that social order itself is based on a
risky model of social inclusion. With the arrival of modern (world) society,
the participation of individuals in society is no longer based on any unitary
principle of inclusion. There seems to be so much discussion about and in-
sistence on individual rights of participation and social inclusion precisely
because both are not guaranteed but risky or even unlikely.
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The early historical experience of modern society is that there is a high
risk of failure of social participation. There was and is no automatic inclu-
sion of individuals in society.2 The social conditions of inclusion in mod-
ern society, that is, the mode by which individuals become engaged, are
defined by the differentiated social systems of society, such as the econo-
my, the law, education or health. If individuals fulfil the functionally spe-
cific requirements of these systems (as workers, claimants, pupils or
patients, respectively), then they may be included. Individuals are per-
ceived in relation to their relevance to these social systems: everything else
is left out of the account.3
In reaction to the breakdown of pre-modern stratified orders of inclu-
sion, the modern state has sought to deal with the political mediation of
the chances of inclusion and exclusion (Bommes 1999). The modern
nation-state is defined by the execution of sovereignty over a territory and
a population. This was, right from the start, linked with the emergence of
the welfare state (Swaan 1988). By providing chances for participation in
the social realms of the economy, law, health or education – that is, as a
welfare state – the nation-state created the social preconditions for a proc-
ess in which former subjects became political citizens. This was a process
in which the inclusion of the whole population into the political system as
individual citizens, and the claim of political sovereignty over them, could
gain political legitimacy and universal validity. The welfare state left be-
hind its former role as a polizey and became the central instance in modern
society moderating relations between the principle of universal access4 to
and inclusion in the social realms of the economy, the law, education,
health or politics and the empirical reality of social exclusion.
The effect was that national welfare states became the worldwide institu-
tionalised form of organisation of the political system in world society and,
with their emergence, they have evolved as international “thresholds of in-
equality” (Stichweh 1998). This means that they have provided for the “in-
ternal loyalty” of their citizens by a welfare policy that promotes chances
for inclusion based on external closure and exclusion. From the beginning,
welfare provided by the nation-state had a territorial index. The provisions
of welfare states were initially addressing only citizens, that is, those indi-
viduals that were accepted by the state as belonging to its own territory.
Nation-building in Europe took place as a process by which a population
was transformed into a unitary nation, a people (Volk) on a politically
defined territory (Koselleck 1992; Brubaker 1992). The nation may have
been defined in either ethno-cultural terms (such as Germany) or political
terms (such as France), but in the historical context of competitive state-
building processes in Europe, the common welfare of the people of the
nation – as “the community of national citizens” – evolved as the general
frame of reference for the state (Bommes 1999). This involved the political
claim for not only formal, but also substantial equality for all members of
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the national community, a claim founded on the political form of member-
ship, that is, of citizenship (Marshall 1950).
In a most general sense we may say that national welfare states care for
their citizens by trying:
– to open or alleviate access to the relevant social systems (the economy,
law, education, family or health) and to reduce the risks of exclusion
– to stabilise these systems and their capacities of inclusion (labour mar-
kets, families, education, health, etc.)
– to equip individuals to fulfil the conditions for social participation
– to compensate for the social consequences of failing access.
In order to achieve these objectives, states basically rely on law as a means
of assigning rights and duties, the political redistribution of money and the
symbolic dimension of civic duties. The result of these efforts of states is
their highly differentiated welfare infrastructures, involving social security
systems dealing with the modern core risks of accident, disease, age and
unemployment, social benefits for families, programmes to increase access
to education, social benefit payments for the long-term excluded and poor
and various public provisions of social services, etc.
National welfare states differ tremendously, especially in Europe, and it
seems that this will remain true in the near future, even with the progres-
sion of globalisation and European integration and some, although limited,
processes of model mixing and assimilation (Obinger et al. 2006). This dif-
ference is a result of the various histories of state building by European
nation-states, and their welfare structures are the outcome of the accumu-
lated political decisions in a history of designing welfare in nationally spe-
cific ways. It is, however, possible to build groups of welfare states by cat-
egorising them as different types. According to Esping-Andersen (1990)
we find three such types: the liberal, the conservative and the social demo-
cratic type of welfare state. Welfare states differ according to this model
concerning:
– their extent of de-commodification, that is, the extent to which income
and social security is made dependent on participation in the labour
market
– the role and amount of residual spending, that is, national assistance as
a percentage of social spending
– their redistributive aims and capacity
– their corporatist structure, that is, the differentiation of social security
systems according to different occupational and status groups
– the amount of private spending for health and pension systems
– their conceptual assumption about the main provider of welfare, that is,
the market, the family or the state.
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Along these lines, welfare states vary largely according to their guidance
by different welfare orientations, which can be distinguished as individual-
istic versus corporatist versus universalist. Examples of the liberal individ-
ualistic type are the UK and the United States; the conservative-corporatist
type Germany, Austria, Italy and (less so) France; and of the social demo-
cratic-universalist type, the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden and
Denmark (Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmid 2002; Opielka 2004).5 During
the last ten or fifteen years there have been extensive discussions about the
adaptive capacity of these different types of welfare state to cope with new
constellations as a consequence of the challenges of globalisation.6
Welfare Cultures – the Basis of Cultural Discrimination?
To what extent do different welfare state types also represent different wel-
fare cultures? The answer to this question is evidently relevant for the
guiding question of this chapter: whether or not welfare states tend to dis-
criminate migrants or ethnic minorities, and if this is due to cultural models
underlying their social policies and infrastructure of welfare provision. In
this context, cultural discrimination would refer to social practices that use
cultural (or ethnic) differences, implicitly or explicitly, as differentiating or-
ganising principles; these regulate the access to social rights and the provi-
sion of welfare linked with these rights in a way that systematically causes
serious advantages for certain parts of the population and serious disadvan-
tages for others, especially migrants or minorities, concerning their social
welfare.
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to distinguish between
discrimination that may affect ethnic minorities due to other reasons (we
will return to this point below) and that due to cultural models inscribed in
the welfare state infrastructures themselves. This is relevant since welfare
states in Europe are constitutionally embedded states and claim to follow
the rules of equal treatment and non-discrimination for reasons of gender,
descent, race, language, origin, beliefs, political or religious views, that is,
of non-discrimination also for cultural reasons.
It is obvious that the bundles of organisations, regulations and institu-
tions referred to as welfare states are deeply culturally impregnated.
Conceptions of security and insecurity, assumptions about responsibilities
for the provision of welfare, the limits of welfare and the extent of individ-
ual self-responsibility are contingent and not self-evident. There are always
alternative ways and it is certainly possible to organise welfare differently
– at least in principle. This becomes evident from the comparison of differ-
ent types of welfare states. Each of them is based on assumptions about
what states should do and to what extent they should intervene, about the
meaning and foundations of freedom, about the main institutions and
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foundations of society, etc. Different welfare states are therefore centred
around those institutions in different ways:
– individual freedom in markets (liberty and private welfare, liberal indi-
vidualistic welfare states)
– families/communities (reproduction of the communitarian foundations
of society, conservative-corporatist welfare states)
– the state (social equality in labour market society, social democratic-
universalist welfare states).
The outcome is fairly different welfare cultures in each of these states. But
this insight does not get very far concerning the answer to the question if,
and to what extent, national welfare states also care in a non-discriminatory
and more specifically, culturally non-discriminatory manner for migrants or
ethnic minorities.
Different welfare models are certainly contested, but this does not imme-
diately imply discrimination of minorities for several reasons: in demo-
cratic states, those models are principally the outcome of democratic deci-
sion-making processes and embedded in universalistic liberal constitutions
that strongly restrict any option of open discrimination. Many welfare pro-
grammes include all individuals in the same way and modes of privileging
or de-privileging are usually legitimised by the effort to compensate for
structural or historical disadvantages, that is, positive or negative discrimi-
nation guided by universal criteria. In other words: even restrictive welfare
models like liberal welfare states may be criticised for their limited effort
to protect the poor – but this affects all individuals living in these countries
in the same way if they experience poverty. And if welfare programmes
and organisational practices contradict the rules of equal treatment, there is
a good chance of de-legitimising these models.7 A first conclusion may
therefore be that there are good reasons to assume that modern welfare
states embedded in universalistic liberal constitutions are built in such a
way that provides some strong barriers against discrimination of any kind.
But this seems to be too easy an answer in the light of complaints of many
minorities, who experience not only general, but particularly cultural
discrimination.
Is Cultural Discrimination Inscribed in the Structural Relation
between Migrants and European Welfare States?
In order to approach the question of potential discrimination of migrants or
minorities on cultural grounds a distinction needs to be made between al-
lochthonic and autochthonic minorities, that is, minorities resulting from
processes of migration on the one hand, and minorities who are constituted
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historically in the process of nation-state building on the other. The follow-
ing text concentrates on migrant minorities.
Migrants in Europe after the Second World War differ from autochthonic
minorities since they entered complete nation-states with already existing
institutions.8 International migration means geographical mobility in search
of chances for social inclusion (Bommes 1999). It implies the readiness to
adapt to the social conditions existing in the destination countries, espe-
cially as regards markets, legal and political systems, education, health,
mass media, the public and religion.9 Autochthonic minorities are the result
of historical state building processes. Their political and cultural rights are
the outcome of political struggles concerning the extent of autonomy of
those minorities (Therborn 1995).
In order to understand the position of migrants in welfare states and to
tackle the question of potential cultural discrimination, we need to clarify
some of the structural specificities of the relation between international mi-
grants and national welfare states. It will be demonstrated (see points A to
G below) that, in a peculiar way, European national welfare states prove to
be inclusive and non-discriminatory for long-term resident migrants pre-
cisely because of their legal embeddedness, even if they have emerged as
institutions of closure and thresholds of inequality for outsiders:
A The provisions of welfare states initially only addressed citizens,
that is, those individuals that were accepted by the state as belonging to its
own territory. The implication of this was and is, ‘the institutionalisation of
a threshold of inequality’ aiming to give privileges to existing citizens and
to exclude outsiders from these privileges (see above). Part of the institu-
tionalisation and establishment of national welfare states since the late 19th
century was a “history of closure” – this has not been the case since the
middle of the 1970s and has been increasingly challenged by various glob-
alisation processes.
B Generally speaking, international migration is an outcome of the ex-
pectation of the institutionalised form of mobility in ‘modern world
society’, that is, to move where relevant social resources for an autono-
mous life are accessible. International migration means precisely the effort
of realising the chance of a better life by means of geographical mobility.
This implies no structural problem per se for those social systems primarily
affected, such as labour markets, education systems or families.10
Nevertheless, most international migration is confronted with all kinds of
legal and political intervention.
C The structural basis for such intervention is the organisational form
of politics in modern society – the nation-state. Political and legal interven-
tion in international migration happens regularly and not just by historical
chance. The intervention articulates an ‘internal structural contradiction’ of
world society: the permanent production of motives for international mi-
gration – due mainly to the demand of labour markets and the options of
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education systems, the institutionalisation of the nuclear family, the world-
wide communication of options by the mass media and the accessibility of
transport (just to name the most important factors) – and the constant polit-
ical effort to restrict these migrations11 and to reduce motives for migration
due to the specific structure of the political system, that is, its internal seg-
mentary differentiation into nation-states (Stichweh 1998).
D One strong implication of the worldwide institutionalisation of na-
tional welfare states has been the partition of the world population into
‘state populations’ (Halfmann 2005). International migrations have always
questioned this division by crossing borders in search of chances of social
participation. The reactions of nation-states to these migrations are medi-
ated by the two constitutive dimensions defining the relation between states
and their populations. There are: (a) the dimension of loyalty, referring to
the requirement of obedience to the political decisions of states by citizens
and all other people residing on the territory, as a fundamental condition
for the reproduction of state sovereignty; and (b) the dimension of ‘provi-
sion’, which refers to the obligation of the state to provide legal, political
and social security in exchange for loyalty, summarised in the concept of
the welfare state (Marshall 1950). Nearly all political modes of regulating
international migration are guided by aspects concerning one or both of
these aspects of loyalty and provision (Bommes 1999). Current examples
are, on the one hand, the public linkages between migration and terrorism
in recent years, thereby questioning the loyalty of migrants and, on the oth-
er, the frequent debates in nearly all European welfare states concerning
the effects of international migration on the capacity of welfare-state provi-
sion (Bade & Bommes 2004).
E International migrations have therefore never been just the unwanted
outcome of societal mobility structures, but have rather, to a large extent,
been induced by the nation-states themselves (Bade 2003). States allow for
international migration depending on their expectation that it will contrib-
ute to economic growth, the reduction of structural supply deficiencies in
labour markets, the compensation of demographic problems, etc. Europe is
a case in point, where most of the northern and western states have ‘ac-
tively attracted’ migrants from the 1950s until the middle of the 1970s.12
This has been the take-off point for the emergence of Europe as one of the
main regions of immigration in the world, and many of the current immi-
gration flows in Europe are still, to a large extent, structurally based on
these early immigrations (Bade 2003; Castles & Miller 2003).
F The emergence of Europe as one of the main regions of immigration
in the world was an unintended political outcome of the policies of differ-
ent national welfare states in Europe. But these states, coming from differ-
ent starting points and building Europe from the 1950s on, have gone
through an uneven process of mutual adaptation linked with a successive
‘normalisation’ of immigration and settlement processes. They had to
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realise that most of the immigrants of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s had
gained access to civil and social rights, which had formerly been seen as
privileges reserved for citizens (Brubaker 1989; Hollifield 1992; Soysal
1994), and in this way had become ‘denizens’ (Hammar 1989). The irre-
versibility of this constellation had become clear by 1989, at the latest.
During the 1990s, most European states normalised their ‘denizens’ by of-
fering easier legal access to naturalisation and citizenship (Weinbach
2005). In parallel with this, they harmonised and tightened their different
migration regimes concerning selection and control of access to the
European territory. It needs to be noted, however, that until the 1990s,
European national welfare states were rather inclusive, even if unintention-
ally so, and the surprising result was that the architecture of constitutional-
ly embedded welfare states provided access to social rights even for non-
citizens. The longer migrants resided in the country of destination, the
more rights they were able to accumulate (Bommes 1997; Joppke 1998),
and in this way, it was the architecture of European welfare states that
proved to be non-discriminatory, even if this was not always appreciated
politically.
G The reverse of welfare inclusion and the alleviation of legal natural-
isation opportunities has been both the increase of migration control and
the closure of Europe on the one hand and, seemingly paradoxically, the
introduction of regular integration programmes for migrants on the other.
These integration programmes13 are part of the reorganisation of migration
and integration policies relating to recent reforms of welfare states in
Europe that fall under the heading of the ‘activating welfare state’ (Esping-
Andersen 2002). ‘Social integration’ refers to a mode of addressing mi-
grants who are residing legally in a country, which puts them in a similar
relationship to the welfare state as all other clients. ‘Activation’ means a
reorganisation of the relation between the welfare state and welfare re-
ceivers, in a way that welfare rights are made more and more dependent
on duties and on means testing.
All receivers of welfare are confronted with the expectation that they
must adjust their way of life to self-responsibility and employment, in or-
der to become independent of welfare support as far as possible. This ad-
justment particularly affects the less competitive sections of the population,
independent of their nationality. Therefore, the difference between citizens
and foreigners loses even more of its former relevance. From the perspec-
tive of welfare states who have, since the 1990s, reorganised their welfare
programmes by reducing the capacity for provision, national citizenship
loses much of its capacity to preserve social privileges, since all clients are
treated equally, and treated only as being potentially competitive or non-
competitive (Bommes 2003). All individuals are expected to strive for
competitiveness and, from this perspective, options of migration and natu-
ralisation are made dependent on the effort of ‘social integration’, which
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should be achieved by migrants themselves. The report of the former
Independent Commission for Migration in Germany, headed by Rita
Süßmuth, stated: ‘Integration is a social process that involves everyone in
any society. Willingness to integrate is indispensable: it manifests itself if
each individual takes the initiative to make an effort towards social integra-
tion. This applies to the domestic population and to immigrants alike’
(Süßmuth Commission 2001: 196). There remains, however, a decisive dif-
ference between citizens and foreign migrants: the latter are judged by their
potential risk of ‘integration failure’, and on this basis they may either be
denied access to the territory at all14 or their residence status may be
restricted.15 In other words, the acquirement of citizenship, as a full politi-
cal inclusion, is made conditional upon the ability and willingness to inte-
grate socially, that is, to have access to the economic, cultural and social
competencies and resources necessary for autonomous participation in the
central realms of society, especially the labour market and education. Seen
from the perspective of activating welfare states, the ability of integration
needs to be created and enforced among those migrants already residing le-
gally on the territory and among those constantly (and unavoidably) arriv-
ing, based on the principle of ‘rights and duties’, that is, offering support
and demanding the active effort of social integration.
One surprising result of the migration policies of ‘activating welfare
states’ in Europe, that is, the combination of increasing external control
with internal social integration policies, is the continuously diminishing
relevance of the difference in social rights between citizens and legally res-
ident foreign migrants. The outcome of the recent reforms of welfare
states, trying to cope with their reduced capacity of provision in the context
of globalisation since the 1990s, has not been an increasing exclusion of
migrants, but rather a further levelling of the difference between foreign
migrants and citizens, the former, generally speaking, on a lower level of
welfare provision.
H However, one may be tempted to suspect that there is an element of
cultural discrimination implied in this policy, since the stress on ‘social in-
tegration’ seems to imply the ‘return of assimilation’ (Brubaker 2001) – an
enforced cultural assimilation policy. But this return would be misread if it
were understood as the re-invention of former assimilation policies, which
had been characteristic during the period of nation-state building in Europe
up to the middle of the 20th century (Therborn 1995). The focus of social
integration policies is the active mobilisation of individuals in order to ori-
ent them to the conditions of inclusion, primarily into labour markets and
education. This does not imply assimilation in terms of cultural homogeni-
sation. Obligatory language courses and citizenship classes, the core ele-
ments of many integration programmes, do not question cultural and lin-
guistic pluralisation,16 even if they are not based on multiculturalist poli-
cies aiming to support ethnic minorities and their cultures.17 The obligation
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to learn the language is based on the expectation that successful inclusion
in education and labour markets will require some knowledge of the local
language of intercourse. It is not based on any ‘thick notion’ of language
interpreted as the foundation of the national community (Maas 2007).
Instead, activating welfare states seem rather to be ‘deregulating’ cultural
orientations and identities, corresponding to the general tendency to replace
the classical promise of the national welfare state, as described by T.H.
Marshall – to offer each citizen full membership in the national community18
– by the reduced promise of resources for basic needs. Competitiveness
in terms of education and labour market success provides the basis for le-
gitimate claims on the income and supportive politics of the state, whereas
the reference to citizenship and national belonging provides less and less
legitimacy for such claims (Bommes 2003); in other words, the semantics
of national solidarity has lost much of its meaning.
To sum up: the analysis of the structural relation between national welfare
states and international migrants and the review of the position of migrants
in European welfare states leads to the following conclusions:
A. National welfare states create international ‘thresholds of inequality’
through which they aim to privilege their citizens in comparison to for-
eigners/migrants. This is one foundation for the insistence of states to
maintain control over access to their territory.19 The current regimes of
European welfare states are even trying to increase this control over ac-
cess in relation to all categories of unwanted migrants.20
B. These same welfare states have turned out to be rather inclusive in rela-
tion to their major migrant categories since the Second World War.
This inclusiveness was not the original intention, but was a structural
outcome of the way welfare functions in constitutionally embedded lib-
eral states. The ‘thresholds of inequality’ cannot be kept up internally
on the basis of the difference between citizens and foreigners.
C. The effect of welfare state reforms under the heading of activation since
the 1990s, as a consequence of their reduced capacity of welfare provi-
sion, has been a further levelling of the status of citizens and migrants
with legal residence status, as clients of the welfare state. The main cri-
terion for the position of individuals in welfare states is competitive-
ness, and national belonging is losing relevance.
Structural Reasons for Disadvantages of Migrants in Welfare
States
In order to answer the question posed in this chapter, whether welfare
states tend to discriminate against minorities in cultural terms, two tasks re-
main to be solved: firstly, it needs to be clarified whether there are
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structural and not only cultural reasons why migrants are faced with higher
risks of inequality in terms of welfare provision due to the very fact of mi-
gration itself, which may place them in a weaker position than that of life-
long citizens. It will be argued that this is due to the fact that the relation
between welfare states and their citizens is conceptualised as a lifelong
relationship. The risk of failing to be included in modern society is ad-
dressed by welfare programmes, which accompany individuals from early
childhood onwards, through to pension age and death – with some effects
on the position of migrants in welfare states. Secondly, it may be suspected
that structurally based cultural discrimination can be found in welfare
states, less because of their specific cultural models of welfare (see para-
graph B above), but rather that discrimination for cultural reasons may be
found in welfare states which use particularity and cultural differences as
an internal principle for the organisation and provision of welfare.
a Welfare, Life Course Regimes and the Position of Migrants
Welfare states organise their welfare programmes around the ‘biography’
and career of individuals from their birth and early childhood onwards un-
til their death.21 The institutionalisation of the modern ‘life course regime’
has been the result of the emergence of welfare states. The life course can
be understood as complex social rules that order the time dimension of an
individual life, viewed as a sequential programme (Kohli 1986).
‘Biography’ and ‘career’, both of which are central elements of the social
concept of a life course, are historically formed by the interplay of the
modern labour market recruiting individuals and the welfare state establish-
ing social preconditions for the possibility to find and recruit individuals
with an expectable life course. The introduction of social insurance
schemes had the effect of organising the temporal accumulation of social
entitlements around the employment of individuals in organisations. This
accumulation therefore depends, to a large extent, on the duration of em-
ployment, changes in the conditions of employment and dismissal, the in-
stitutionalisation of public education and the provision of family and edu-
cation allowances.
The implementation of welfare-state measures can be understood as the
successive introduction of the structural elements which make up the insti-
tutionalisation of the life course. Life becomes socially conceptualised as a
sequential programme, partitioned into three general stages: childhood/edu-
cation, foundation of family and working life, and retirement. Welfare state
measures orient individuals towards the structure of a life cycle and the ex-
pectation of a career.22 The core institutions of the welfare state – the fam-
ily, education, unemployment, illness, accidents, retirement – are structured
in a way that implies the expectation that individuals are equipped and
willing to prepare themselves for a biographically ordered sequence of
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inclusions in different social realms and organisations, especially the edu-
cation system and labour market. The institutionalisation of the life course
and its variations in different welfare states can be taken to be the result of
the specific historical formation of the relation between each state and its
citizens. It is obvious, however, that the relation between state and its citi-
zens is conceptualised in this way as a lifelong relationship.
The constitution of biographies and their regulation by the welfare state
make it very likely that the biographies of migrants will deviate from the
standard pattern. Deviation means that their life courses and biographies
do not fulfil the institutionalised expectations of normality valid in each
welfare state. Biographies and related careers refer to the accumulation of
chances for structural participation. International migrants are presumed to
be poor or deprived, since it cannot be assumed that they have built their
careers with the required elements. Consequently, those things that under
‘normal conditions’ are treated as given can no longer be presupposed.
This becomes obvious if one looks at certain common deviations of mi-
grants in three biographically important areas: education, labour and partic-
ipation in pension schemes.
Education
Migrant children have access to schools in many countries even when they
do not have a residence permit. The normal expectations of education sys-
tems rely on the assumption that families of children are settled. But mi-
grant children (with or without legal status) may not speak the official lan-
guage and, in this way, question institutionalised assumptions about normal
socialisation processes, as well as linguistic and cultural competencies, as
central preconditions for the ability to learn something. Moreover, careers
of migrant children that were built at school in their countries of origin
may not be accepted by the education system in the destination country.
This may block important paths of educational success and increase the
likelihood of failure. This does not immediately justify easy assumptions
about cultural discrimination, since immigrant children certainly need to
learn the language of the destination country23 and have to face the chal-
lenge of second-language acquisition. It refers, however, to two serious
problems: their potential comparative disadvantage of competition in rela-
tion to the indigenous pupils; and that schools use cultural and linguistic
backgrounds as a means of discrimination because this allows them to
solve everyday problems of organising education, to avoid adequate adap-
tation to the challenges of education linked with ongoing immigration and
to take educational decisions (Gomolla & Radtke 2004).
Of course, this type of potential cultural discrimination has no structural
foundation in the principles of modern education systems of welfare states,
since they are based on universalism, that is, the right to education for
every child; but rather – and in practical and empirical terms this may be
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highly relevant24 – in the capability of the education system’s everyday
routines to handle the challenges of migration and its institutional barriers
to carrying out the necessary adaptations to the conditions of immigration.
It becomes, however, a case of structurally based cultural discrimination if
education systems fail to adapt to immigration, which involves the task of
educating bilingual or even multilingual children, socialised in families that
use a language other than the language of the destination country on a daily
basis. In other words, if the institutionalised assumptions about normal so-
cialisation processes, including linguistic and cultural competencies, as cen-
tral preconditions for the ability to learn something are not revised with re-
spect to immigrants, even second- or third-generation children will remain
affected, in a culturally discriminatory manner, by institutionalised expecta-
tions concerning the normality or deviation of individual biographies.
Employment
Migrants are less likely to be able to offer socially established biographies
and careers of education and work. This excludes them from competing in
large segments of the labour market.25 It should be noted, however, that
the absence of careers and related social claims was, in many respects, the
precondition for the immigration of labour to western European countries
during the post-war period, and this is still the case today. For many mi-
grants, it is paradoxically the absence of a career at the start that provides
chances for social inclusion in those labour market segments in need of un-
qualified workers. The same holds true for much illegal immigration and
explains its ongoing dynamics (Bommes 2006).
Retirement
Migrants can usually obtain welfare entitlements even if they are not citi-
zens. Older migrants, however, are likely to have low pension incomes
since many have not been included in pension insurance funds long
enough to accumulate adequate entitlements.26 For this reason, it is likely
that many may have to rely on public assistance.
These three brief examples show the ways in which migrant biographies
may deviate from the expectations guaranteed by welfare states. The social
consequences of this cannot be extrapolated theoretically. Deviation and its
consequences depend upon the various kinds of expectations of normality
supported by different types of welfare state. Moreover, immigration takes
different forms in different countries and migrants have varying legal and
welfare entitlements linked to their immigration path. In the context of this
chapter, they serve to demonstrate that migrants are usually faced with a
higher risk of exclusion and reduced access to welfare provision, due to
their varying life course regimes, which deviate from that institutionalised
in welfare states. If we assume that, for demographic and other reasons,
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immigration will be an enduring phenomenon in Europe, it is worth stress-
ing that it may be the time dimension, less than the cultural dimension,
which proves to be relevant for the discriminatory effects of welfare states;
at least if it cannot be presupposed that a relevant and potentially increas-
ing section of the population in Europe – migrants – has a lifelong relation-
ship with the welfare state, an implicit assumption built into their organisa-
tional structure.
b Cultural Discrimination as a Potential Effect of Corporatist
Welfare
Does this allow the conclusion that cultural discrimination of migrants,
which may be found in school systems, employment27 or housing markets,
among others, has no structural foundation in the design of modern welfare
states themselves and that, on the whole, cultural discrimination proves to
be irrelevant in welfare states? It seems that structurally based cultural dis-
crimination can be found in welfare states less because of their general cul-
tural models of welfare (see section 2 above), but because some welfare
states use particularity and cultural differences as internal principles for the
organisation and provision of welfare. This has some surprising effects,
depending on the way in which these differences are made relevant. Two
complementary examples, which demonstrate this point, are the
Netherlands and Germany.
The Netherlands has been famous for a multicultural policy based on the
early recognition of ethnic minorities, which was seen as the outcome of
post-colonial and labour migration in the 1960s and 1970s. The political
aim of this policy has been to provide social inclusion and equality for mi-
grants by means of a policy that addressed ethnic communities, while
assuming that social inclusion and equality are the effective and efficient
mediators of social opportunities for migrants. The model for this approach
was ‘pillarisation’, that is, the building of state and society on top of the
relevant societal pillars (Catholics, Protestants, liberal) allowing each of
them to create their own institutions. Ethnic minority policy was concep-
tualised in this tradition, allowing immigrants to develop their own institu-
tions (Entzinger 1998). Pillarisation had, however, already lost much of its
relevance for the indigenous population due to the expansion and modern-
isation of the Dutch welfare state during the 1960s and 1970s. The ironic
effect of this welfare policy for migrants based on the cultural recognition
of minorities was that it effectively excluded large parts of the immigrant
population from the labour market, at the precise moment when the Dutch
‘employment miracle’ of the 1990s attracted much attention in a Europe
struggling with high unemployment rates. This caused a policy shift away
from the ethnic minority approach to a policy of social integration address-
ing individual migrants and aiming to improve their labour-market
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performance. It turned out that the very European country that had long
been referred to as having a model example of a successful multicultural
policy based on its acceptance of the outcomes of immigration (the emer-
gence of ethnic minorities) not only did much worse in terms of labour
market inclusion of their immigrants, it also allowed for the far-reaching
cultural isolation of some sections of immigrants, due to the reliance on
the pillarisation model. The unintended outcome of ‘positive cultural and
ethnic discrimination’ has been structural discrimination, that is, that large
parts of the immigrant population, especially those of Moroccan and
Turkish origin, found only restricted access to the labour market and failed
in educational terms (Koopmans 2003; Böcker & Thränhardt 2003).
The surprising result of recent comparisons between the Netherlands and
Germany has been that immigrants in Germany, a country long reluctant to
accept the fact of immigration, have done much better in terms of employ-
ment and social security. Seen in this way, the organisational model of the
German welfare state proved to be much more inclusive than the Dutch
model (Böcker & Thränhardt 2003). Nevertheless, even after the reform of
the naturalisation law in 2000 and the recent implementation of an immi-
gration law in 2005, signifying political acceptance of being a factual im-
migration country, Germany turns out to be an interesting case of a welfare
state with some potential for ‘cultural discrimination’. This is not due to
any ‘minority policy’ but to the organisational structure of the welfare state
itself. Germany has been described as a conservative-corporatist welfare
state. An important element of this model is the so-called ‘principle of sub-
sidiarity’, that is, the secondary liability of the state, which takes over
responsibility only in cases where welfare cannot be provided by the rele-
vant responsible groups and institutions (such as the family and religious
or non-religious communities). The effect of this has been that large parts
of the German welfare system are organised by Protestant and Catholic
churches and religious and secular charities, which are subsidised by the
state.28 Kindergartens, schools, hospitals and old people’s homes are run,
to a large extent, by the Christian churches or religious charities. This has
discriminatory effects in cultural terms in two directions.
Firstly, non-Christian and especially Muslim migrants often see them-
selves confronted with welfare infrastructures deeply impregnated by
Christian traditions, due to the strong position of the Christian churches in
the German state (Fetzer & Soper 2005). This does not mean that Christian
churches or charities and the organisations run by them exclude migrants
or explicitly discriminate against migrants. On the contrary, historically, the
churches have been at the forefront in defending migrants against discrimi-
nation and arguing for the expansion of their civil, political and social
rights. Muslim migrants in particular, however, struggle to have the same
rights as other religious communities – with some success. A current ex-
ample is the serious effort to institutionalise regular religious education of
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Muslim children in schools, by teachers trained in German universities,
supervised jointly by officially recognised Muslim communities and the
German authorities.29 It will certainly be one of the major future topics,
not only in Germany, to which extent Muslims should have the same rights
as other religious communities. One implication of this is that, in the light
of the arrival of Islam in Europe, many European states will need to read-
just their historical compromises concerning the differentiation between
politics, law and religion (Fetzer & Soper 2005; Klausen 2005; Søvik
2006).
Secondly, parents of non-immigrant children tend to send their children
to Christian schools in order to avoid schools with high numbers of immi-
grant children, especially those of Turkish origin. This ‘white flight’ is, to
a certain extent, based on the limited secularisation of the education sys-
tem. This type of educational segregation, which is an effect of the behav-
iour of the educated middle classes, may well be understood as cultural
discrimination, due to the specific structural design of the German welfare
state and the role of religion.30 To sum up: cultural discrimination seems to
become relevant not because of any open or hidden discrimination directly
affecting migrants, but because of the privileged position of religious com-
munities, due to their historical role in the state building process and the
emergence of the welfare state.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the question of whether the cultural models of
welfare inscribed in welfare states have a discriminatory effect on ethnic
minorities with respect to their access to welfare provision and social
security. Based on the fact that migrant minorities in many European coun-
tries experience disadvantages and have fewer social security provisions
than the indigenous population, it is often assumed that this is due to cul-
tural discrimination. The argument here is developed in three steps and
tests the assumption of cultural discrimination by looking at the cultural
models of welfare inscribed in European welfare states and by analysing
the relation between national welfare states and migrants. After clarifying
some structural and functional specificities of modern welfare states, it is
argued that the fact that European welfare states are based on different cul-
tural models of welfare does not prove systematic cultural discrimination.
The latter includes social practices that use cultural (or ethnic) differences,
implicitly or explicitly, as differentiating organising principles, which regu-
late access to social rights and the provision of welfare linked with these
rights in a way that brings advantages for certain parts of the population
and causes serious disadvantages for others, such as migrants, with regard
to their social welfare. As long as the different cultural models of welfare
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established in European welfare states are applied equally to the long-term
resident population of a state, this provides no basis for the assumption that
migrant minorities are culturally discriminated against, especially since
constitutionally embedded European welfare states operate based on uni-
versalistic rules.
The structural reason for the weaker position of migrants in welfare
states is instead to be found in the way welfare operates, that is, centred
around the biography of individuals via the institutionalisation of life
course regimes. Since the provision of welfare is based on the assumption
of a lifelong relationship between the state and welfare receivers, migrants
tend to be disadvantaged because of their deviating life course and time-
limited relationship with the country of destination. There is, however, cul-
tural discrimination to be found in those welfare states that use particularity
and cultural differences in a corporatist manner as internal principles for
the organisation and provision of welfare, be it via welfare policies aiming
to support ethnic minorities, or welfare policies based on the ‘principle of
subsidiarity’.
What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis? Migrants in Europe
experience, to a large extent, social disadvantages and restricted access to
the important spheres of life such as the labour market, education, health
or housing. Events like riots in France and Britain, the murder of Theo van
Gogh in the Netherlands, the involvement of young immigrants in terror-
ism in Britain, Germany or Spain, or less dramatically, the increase of
social segregation in many countries, all indicate that increasing social
inequalities and resulting social stratification are linked with severe conse-
quences, which are debated all over Europe under the headings of failing
social integration and endangered social cohesion. It seems, however, that
the social processes underlying these unintended outcomes are, to a large
extent, not well understood, if they are ascribed to processes of cultural
discrimination embedded in the structures of European welfare states. This
result of the analysis may be a relief in normative terms – however, it
leaves us with the unresolved constitutive puzzle of modern society – its
reflexive concern with problems of inequality and social inclusion pre-
cisely resulting from its structural potential to produce and to allow for
enormous differences, inequalities and exclusions.
Notes
1 Except for many economists, who believe in the superior rationality of markets but
seldom have to take political responsibility for any seriously proposed model of
Platonism.
2 The concepts of inclusion and exclusion are used here in a rather technical manner,
implying no normative assumptions: Inclusion formally speaking is the way in
which individuals are addressed in social contexts as relevant for actually ongoing
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social processes; exclusion correspondingly refers to the irrelevance of individuals –
and this does not always indicate a ‘social problem’, e.g. the irrelevance of an indivi-
dual for the health system means the individual is healthy and thus not a relevant
case for a doctor or hospital.
3 This means, on the other hand, that social inclusion in modern society presupposes
the exclusion of individuals as ‘totalities’ from society in the sense that they are not
predefined by social bonds or some principle of belonging (Luhmann 1989).
Instead, individuals become socially defined by their personal histories of inclusion
and exclusion in different social realms, i.e. their careers and biographies. This is
the basic reason for the central importance ascribed to biographies and careers in
modern society – formerly unknown – and for the increasing awareness that the
success of welfare or social policies depends to a large extent on their capacities to
allow individuals from childhood onwards to build up a career (Esping-Andersen
2002).
4 Universalism of inclusion in modern society means that nobody should be excluded
from claiming economic, legal or educational provisions if he or she can fulfil the
social preconditions for any of these claims (Luhmann 1989). For example, one can
participate in education if one is perceived as educable, one can participate in the
economy if one finds access to monetary means, and one can participate in law if
one knows how to act on behalf of one’s rights. At the same time, none of these
necessarily imply that inclusion always empirically succeeds – on the contrary it
rather often fails. But the valid institutionalisation of social expectations like the uni-
versalism of inclusion provides the basis for the perception of this failure as a pro-
blem in need of remedy, e.g. by means of welfare policy.
5 This modelling has been criticised in many respects. Some argue that there is a
fourth type in Europe, the so-called Mediterranean type (Ferrera 1998); some ques-
tion the empirical applicability of the model (Albers 2000). For a discussion see also
Kaufmann (2004); we cannot, however, go into any detail here.
6 See Esping-Andersen 1996, 2002; Ganßmann & Haas 1999; Goodin et al. 1999;
Alber 2000; Fligstein 2000; Kaufmann 2003; Leibfried & Zürn 2005. On a most
general level, the outcome of this discussion is that those welfare states that do best
manage to combine access to labour and the provision of welfare instead of provid-
ing welfare as a substitute for labour – a problem mainly for the conservative-cor-
poratist type of welfare states. The recent shift to so-called activating welfare policies
in many countries is a reaction to these problems. The integration policies in many
countries addressing migrants belong in this context.
7 Feminism and the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming are striking
examples.
8 This argument certainly needs more explanation. It is useful, however, in order to
note the main difference between migration in Europe and migration in classical
immigration countries. These countries, such as Canada, the USA, Australia or New
Zealand, have used immigration as a mechanism for state building, i.e. creating
their state populations by means of immigration. This is still present in many of
their current ways of dealing with immigration, which still differ to a large extent
from European migration policies. On the other hand, post-colonialism has been a
defining frame for the handling of migration in countries like the Netherlands, the
UK or France. And in Germany, the immigration of ethnic Germans, one major im-
migration strand accompanying most of its post-war history (Bade & Oltmer 2003),
was, until 1989, due to a turbulent and unfinished state building process.
9 A clarification in order to avoid any misunderstanding: They do not have to adapt to
any of the dominant or minority religions but to the institutionalised state of societal
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differentiation, i.e. the differentiation between religion and the other societal realms,
especially politics, law, education, health, the mass media and the economy.
10 Geographical mobility inside of nation-states for reasons of employment, family re-
union or education is not counted as migration and those involved are normally not
treated as migrants.
11 See Castles & Miller (2003). The Global Commission Report can be read as an effort
to overcome this basic contradiction in the time dimension, arguing that interna-
tional migration will be to the benefit of all ‘in the long run’ – although it is faced,
at present, with all kinds of ‘short-term’ barriers.
12 The most recent southern immigration countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece)
seem to be attracting migrants in a rather clandestine manner, on the one hand, for-
mally adapting their migration regimes to the existing EU framework and allowing,
on the other hand, constant flows of irregular migrants by means of recurrent legali-
sation programmes (for Italy, see Finotelli 2006).
13 The integration programmes referred to can be found in many countries since the
late 1990s, among others the Netherlands, Sweden, France and Germany. See
Michalowski 2006; Schönwälder, Söhn & Michalowski 2005.
14 It seems that control of migration and social integration are two key elements of cur-
rent migration and integration policies in Europe, i.e. the effort to define and to en-
force the difference between the wanted and the unwanted migrants. This implies
access to opportunities for those migrants seen as potentially competitive (e.g.
highly qualified migrants, entrepreneurs and students) and restrictions as far as pos-
sible for unavoidable migration based on family reunification and humanitarian rea-
sons. In this same context, the controlling capacities of single states and the EU are
constantly increased.
15 Countries like France, the Netherlands and Germany link non-participation of mi-
grants in obligatory ‘integration courses’ with sanctions concerning their status of
residence (Michalowski 2006). It is obvious that states cannot threaten their citizens
in the same way, which demonstrates that citizenship, once acquired, remains an
undeniable social status protecting against deportation.
16 ‘Public integration panics’ as were observed after the murder of Theo van Gogh in
the Netherlands, the riots in France and the dispute on the Mohammed caricatures,
seemed to indicate quite some effort to return to more substantial assimilationist
and identity policies. In the end, it turns out that liberal states cannot easily suspend
cultural and linguistic pluralisation, since it proves to be impossible to identify and
agree on guiding values and norms beyond the basic principles of freedom and
equality which allow for what is seen as problematic and in need of restrictions, i.e.
cultural and linguistic pluralisation.
17 It seems that multiculturalist policies conceptualising ethnic minorities collectively
as the main addressees of integration and welfare policies have been a late outcome
of the prosperous welfare states of the 1960s and 1970s; for the Netherlands, see
Entzinger (1998).
18 See Marshall (1950). A classical text of the sociology of the welfare state, it described
the institutionalisation of national citizenship in 1949 as the historical emergence
of civil, political and social rights. Empirically, Marshall referred to the development
in Britain, and interpreted the welfare obligations of the state as the successive, evo-
lutionary realisation of the structural implications of modern national citizenship.
‘Citizenship’, for him, meant the institutionalisation of the expectation that it is the
duty of the modern state to secure social inclusion of all citizens as full members of
society and the national community. Clearly, his starting assumption was that the
nation-state will be able to control enough resources in order to enforce this ‘ideal
citizenship’.
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19 One of the means to maintain control on migrants is the introduction of time-lim-
ited access to the territory and labour market based on models of seasonal and con-
tract labour. These types of migrants are more or less effectively excluded from na-
tional welfare schemes, and the accumulation of irreversible social rights is linked
to a process of stabilisation of their residential status. There is a current debate
among EU governments as to whether models of so-called circular migration would
allow the advantages of illegal migration to be made use of by avoiding its unwanted
effects.
20 There can be no detailed discussion here concerning the potential success of these
efforts in the light of illegal migration, increasing globalisation, etc.
21 A more detailed analysis is elaborated in Bommes (2000). It may be stressed, how-
ever, that the importance of biography or life course is based on the structural condi-
tions of modern society and its mode of inclusion and exclusion, even if the institu-
tional designs of biographies differ to a certain extent from country to country with-
in Europe.
22 Achievement of a continuous employment career is difficult for quite a number of
individuals, thereby weakening their welfare position. Nevertheless, or perhaps even
because of this, competition between individuals in labour markets takes the form
of diversified careers, i.e. the collection of more and more experience in shorter time
periods and in increasingly varied locations.
23 This is not only the implication of their parents´ migration decision but also a pre-
condition for their access to education and the labour market.
24 As various comparative studies of the OECD, known under the names of PISA and
IGLU, have demonstrated.
25 To the extent that social networks play an important role for the mediation of access
to employment, this has serious effects on the labour market chances of the second
and third generations, since their parents often cannot act as ‘gatekeepers’, who
mediate in obtaining better paid jobs for their children; see Bommes & Tacke
(2006).
26 Most pension insurance funds in European welfare states make entitlements depen-
dent on the length of time spent on state territory and/or the length of time of em-
ployment and contribution (Dörr & Faist 1997). Because of the difference between
pension schemes, this is usually not compensated by the mechanisms of co-ordina-
tion and harmonisation established in international social law (Eichenhofer 1994).
This underpins the importance of the life-course-oriented relationship between a
welfare state and its citizens.
27 Cultural discrimination of migrants in the labour market and in employment has at-
tracted much attention. The basis for this, however, is the structural insecurity pro-
blem linked with the recruitment decision, i.e. the decision to select the right indivi-
dual for employment. This opens up a number of opportunities for discrimination
against outsiders applying for jobs and has been the focus of the struggle for gender
equality. The structural foundation of this type of discrimination is the mode of op-
eration of organisations based on decision making (Luhmann 2000; Bommes &
Tacke 2006) and not the organisational principles of welfare states.
28 The German Catholic charity ‘Caritas’ is one of the major employers in Germany.
29 On the history of the struggles over Islamic education in German schools, see Søvik
(2006).
30 Similar arguments for other European countries can be found in Klausen (2005).
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5 Transnationalism or assimilation?
First published in 2005 by SOWI-ONLINE.DE at www.sowi-online.de/reader/
journal/2005-1/transnationalism_assimilation_bommes.htm
In their analyses of the recent structural effects of international migration,
both multiculturalists and transnationalists have criticized the classical
frame of analysis in migration research. They argue that the analysis of as-
similation processes does not adequately take into account recent processes
of cultural pluralisation and the emergence of transnational spaces. This is
mainly attributed to assimilation theorists’ understanding of society as a
nationally closed container, which is seen as one of the problematic as-
sumptions of this approach.
Unsurprisingly, this is seen very differently by researchers interested in
assimilation processes (and for reasons of simplification we call them from
now on assimilationists) who argue that the paradigm of assimilation re-
search is still the most adequate frame of analysis. They argue that it is still
possible and useful to describe even the most recent migration phenomena
and the consequences linked with them as ongoing assimilation processes.
Hartmut Esser even claims that for migrants there is no serious alternative
to assimilation. Access to the most important social resources has become
increasingly dependent on access to and success in education, and the dif-
ferent education systems are fundamentally shaped by different national
traditions and languages.
Ewa Morawska has attempted to adopt a more moderate position in this
debate between assimilationists on the one hand and transnationalists and
multiculturalists on the other. She has argued that all processes of migra-
tion are linked with processes of assimilation as well as with the emer-
gence of transnational structures. In her view migration research is faced
with the task of describing the various migrations and the consequences
linked with them as different combinations of transnational and assimila-
tive structures and building typologies of these combinations.
In contrast to these positions, this paper argues that the debate between
assimilationists and transnationalists is based on a false opposition. This is
mainly due to the use of unclarified theoretical frames of analysis. The
central aim is to demonstrate that the arguments of transnationalists and as-
similationists can be systematically reconstructed as two different hypothe-
ses about the structural consequences of recent international migration. If
the two hypotheses are formulated within one common and coherent theo-
retical framework of analysis, it can be shown that assimilationism and
transnationalism do not necessarily refer to different research approaches
but rather to two different and competitive hypotheses about the effects of
international migration that, as such, are open to empirical tests.
I
Since the Second World War, Europe has become one of the most impor-
tant immigration regions in the world. This process has been accompanied
by various socio-structural changes that have recently been given much po-
litical and scientific attention. Migration research has described these
changes with reference to the topic of the multicultural society and to the
emergence of so-called transnational structures or spaces. “Multicultural-
ism”, i.e. cultural pluralisation, has been seen as a challenge to the efforts
of cultural homogenisation typically undertaken by nation states. And the
stress on transnational structures underlines the claim that migration and its
effects need to be seen as part of ongoing globalisation processes.
Multiculturalists and transnationalists share the assumption that central
structural elements of the nation state are affected by processes of erosion.
On the one hand, migration processes imply a growing cultural heterogene-
ity of the population living on a state territory. This kind of multiculturalism
seems to challenge the established programme of the nation state, i.e. the
cultural homogenisation of the resident population (Leggewie 1990; Cohn-
Bendit, Schmidt 1992; Bade 1996; Brochmann 2003). On the other hand,
transnationalism refers to the emergence of social structures that transcend
state borders. These structures are seen as the result of enduring migration
streams stabilised by transnational networks and organisations. This is ac-
companied by a change in migrant orientations: migrants start to orientate
themselves towards transnational opportunity structures; the nation state and
its classical aim of social integration loses relevance as a frame of action.
But this paper does not focus on the structural consequences of cultural plu-
ralisation, multiculturalism and transnationalism but rather on the scientific
debate between what is termed here transnationalists and assimilationists.
1 Transnationalists1 have argued that migration research should re-
place its more or less outdated research design based on a methodological
nationalism. It is argued that transnational structures render visible the con-
straints of the concept of a national society which is attacked as a “contain-
er concept” of society. In the eyes of transnationalists, assimilation research
is therefore characterised by a limited frame of analysis still conceptualis-
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ing migration and its social consequences as a problem of migrants’ assim-
ilation to the host society, its dominant groups and the cultures linked with
them. But transnational migrants, it is claimed, do not any more orient their
modes of life towards this type of container society but rather to the struc-
tural contexts provided by emergent transnational spaces. These emergent
structures cannot be grasped adequately by a nation state concept of soci-
ety.
At the centre of the argument is the claim that more and more migrants
are becoming so-called transmigrants. This type of migration cannot ad-
equately be taken into account by the classical pattern of description con-
ceptualising migration as a one-way move from an emigration country to
an immigration country. The life courses of migrants are more and more
marked by their participation in transnational social relations. They are
leading not just one- or bi-directional, but multi-directional lives. The re-
sult is the emergence of pluri-local modes of life of these migrants. In the
eyes of transnationalists migration is becoming a continuous process in
time and space. Transmigration and the new pluri-local social spaces are
not just seen as the extension of the migrants’ origin communities but as
independent social structures. According to transnationalists, as a result we
can observe the emergence of combined “bounded-nomadic” modes of life.
Under the conditions of globalisation and the diffusion of new technologies
of communication and transport these new types of transmigrants are gain-
ing more and more relevance. “This perspective on transnationalism and
transmigration and the re-conceptualisation of society, community and na-
tion state linked with it underlines the new importance of migration for the
diagnosis of recent social transformations by the social sciences” (Pries
2001b, 53).
Transnationalists argue that the developments identified as transnational
social structures or spaces can best be grasped by research approaches
which have become prominent as network analyses, theories of cumulative
causation, migration systems theories and globalisation theories.
2 These rather straightforward positions have been confronted with a
whole array of objections by American and European assimilationists.
These assimilationists claim that a theoretically reflected concept of assimi-
lation still provides the best frame for the analyses of even the most recent
immigration processes in Europe or the US. The classical concept of as-
similation as developed by Milton Gordon certainly needs to be amended
and re-conceptualised but this does not affect the strength of the general
approach. Notably, Alba and Nee (1997) and Brubaker (2001) have dis-
cussed the recent empirical results of the American immigration research.
They demonstrate that these results can be interpreted without difficulty as
providing evidence for ongoing assimilation processes even among the
most recent migrants that immigrated only after the 1960s. They argue that
the majority of these migrants is looking for labour on open labour markets
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and that these markets seem to be much more open than is often assumed.
These very same migrants seem to be able to gain an amount of income in
rather short periods of time that comes close to the level of income of the
resident population. Assimilationists therefore argue against an overestima-
tion of ethnic economies and their transnational character. Similar
arguments are put forward concerning the areas of housing, education, and
language. Some of the empirical results of research done in these fields are
ambiguous but there are strong indicators for progressive assimilation
processes which seem to be similar to those that were described for earlier
immigration waves in the US. The scholars reach the conclusion:
“Assimilation still matters.”
The most prominent German assimilationist Hartmut Esser (2001) has
put on top of this the claim that assimilation not only still matters but that
there is in fact no alternative to it. He argues that successful participation
in education is becoming more and more decisive for individual competi-
tiveness on labour markets and for any efforts to gain access to the impor-
tant resources for a decent living. Since the education systems are moulded
by national cultures there is no alternative for migrants to the necessity to
learn the national language of the country they have entered.
3 Ewa Morawska (2002) has tried to take a more moderate position in
this debate between transnationalists and assimilationists. She proposes
analysing the social consequences linked with migration as the combined
result of transnational and assimilation processes. According to Morawska
the relation between transnational and assimilative structures should be
seen as dynamic and changeable in both directions. Jointly with historians
like Bade (2000), Gerber (2000), Lucassen (2004) and others, she argues
that much of what is described by transnationalists as only recent develop-
ments is not entirely new and could already be observed for earlier migra-
tion movements. Morawska proposes to do more comparative empirical
research and to build typologies that grasp the various combinations of
transnational and assimilative structures to be found among different mi-
grant groups. The aim should be to develop theories that explain the emer-
gence and reproduction of these different types.
4 Morawska’s proposal is instructive. However in this paper we take a
different perspective. We agree with multiculturalists and transnationalists
to a certain extent. Indeed, processes of cultural pluralisation are one con-
sequence of international migration. We also assume that transnationalisa-
tion processes can be observed in an empirical sense. Many migrants’
modes of life may not be primarily orientated towards the frame of the
nation state. Migrants are more or less continuously included in border-
transcending social structures concerning family, economic, legal, political
or educational relations. But these empirical observations do not imply
what transnationalists like to suggest (on a rather unclear theoretical basis;
see Bommes 2003a), namely the need for completely new concepts and
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theories in migration research. It seems that there is rather a need for a the-
oretical framework that allows us to systematise the arguments put forward
by the opponents and to clarify the systematic relation between them.
Referring to the empirical observations just mentioned it has been
argued against classical migration research that its frame of explanation is
too narrow and still too much guided by the traditional (and seemingly
somewhat outdated) problems of integration and cultural assimilation. The
frames of reference for assimilation are reference groups and the national
society. Assimilationists have refuted this critique by referring to empirical
results of research which seem to support their position. Morawska’s effort
to mediate between the two positions perpetuates the conceptual opposition
between assimilation to the social structures of the host society on the one
hand and the emergence of transnational structures on the other. Another
option would be to deconstruct the seeming conceptual oppositions and to
recombine them theoretically in a different way.
In order to do this we replace a concept that understands society as a big
collectivity by a concept of modern world society, i.e. a society that is func-
tionally differentiated into different realms (such as the economy, politics,
law, science, education, health, etc.) and modern organisations (Luhmann
1997). The chances of individuals participating and getting access to social
resources are mediated by these differentiated social systems. We assume
that cultural pluralisation processes as well as national closure or transna-
tional opening are contextually dependent on the structural development of
social systems. And we are interested in the implications of this classical
mainstream sociological perspective – present in the work of Marx, Weber,
Durkheim but also Parsons, Habermas and Luhmann, understanding mod-
ern society as differentiated society – for an understanding of the debate be-
tween transnationalists and assimilationists.
II
Multiculturalists have always exaggerated. And transnationalists have fol-
lowed up this exaggeration through different means. The exaggerations are
the result of theory politics and not truly convincing. In contrast to both po-
sitions, we want to stress however that any migration implies assimilation.
This becomes visible if we look at the frame of analysis that is opera-
tionally used in empirical research. This should be distinguished from the
self-understanding employed by researchers. One weakness of classical
migration research and its mode of posing the problem of integration and
assimilation was indeed the use made of the concept of groups and the
concept of the national society. Social structures are basically seen as col-
lective structures. Any social event is therefore described with reference to
“groups” or to “society”. Correspondingly the distinction between origin
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and host society is still prominent. Concerning the host society, the nation
state and its integration programme still form the implicit or explicit back-
ground. These conceptual weaknesses are criticised by transnationalists
who point to globalisation and the resulting transnational social structures.
But a closer look at what assimilation researchers actually do proves that
“groups” or “the society” are not at all the frame of reference for empirical
research in operational terms. This would make no sense anyhow, as will
be pointed out in two steps. If assimilation implies a process of becoming
similar, we need to clarify the point of reference in relation to which that
process of becoming similar takes place. Second, we will have to elaborate
on the various dimensions of that process.
Individuals migrate for different reasons. They may be looking for
labour, education, health treatment, to join their family or to flee political
repression or ecological decline. For all of these migrants, it does not seem
plausible to conceptualise the problem of assimilation with reference to
groups or society. In order to work or study, to apply for asylum or to seek
health treatment, individuals usually cannot address either “groups” or “the
society”. Access to labour, the treatment of patients, the education of pupils
or students, the taking of exams and the decision on asylum applications
are not provided by groups. The same is true for society which simply can-
not be addressed as such and which can therefore not be the reference
point for any effort to become similar (or dissimilar). Processes of assimila-
tion emerge inside the organisations of the important functional realms of
modern society, i.e. in enterprises, hospitals, schools, universities, and
administrations. They emerge when individuals start to work or try to get
access to goods, education, rights, social welfare, and so on. Every individ-
ual that intends to work or to gain access to these provisions must fulfil
the expectations that define the social preconditions for the success of these
efforts. Every individual must therefore have some knowledge of what it
means to work or how to behave as a patient, a client, a pupil, a student,
or an applicant.
If we start from these rather simple considerations and apply them to the
behaviour of different migrant categories – labour migrants, refugees, fam-
ily migrants, and so on – we see immediately that all migrants do assimi-
late when they take roles inside organisations and fulfil the bundles of so-
cial expectations linked with these roles, even if they do this to a different
extent. We would not be able to understand how migrants succeed – and
they obviously do – in acting inside a variety of organisations if they did
not assimilate to the expectations linked with these roles. They not only do
conform to these expectations, but they also develop corresponding expect-
ations about the expectations of these organisations.
These rather obvious necessities of assimilation cannot be avoided, not
even by social networks. Social networks may mediate and modify the in-
dispensable necessities of assimilation. But most migrants, like most
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individuals, are dependent on opportunities to get access to and to partici-
pate in organisations.
Seen in this way the fact of assimilation seems to be almost trivial. It
belongs to the basic conditions of the mode of individual life in modern
society. Individuals no longer gain social belonging and social opportuni-
ties via birth or lineage. Each individual is responsible himself for finding
opportunities of access to and inclusion into the social systems of society
(Luhmann 1989). This includes the necessity to assimilate in a context, i.e.
system-specific manner, according to the differentiated systems of modern
society and their expectations. Any individual can be included in the econ-
omy, politics, law, education, science, health or the mass media and the
related organisations if they fulfil the specific preconditions for a compe-
tent participation in the respective system. Otherwise, they will be
excluded. In order to participate in the economy, education or the health
system, individuals must have money or should be educatable or ill. They
must be responsible, competent and disciplined in order to take over mem-
bership roles in organisations. In other words: individuals in modern soci-
ety are expected to orient their modes of life to the conditions of participa-
tion in the differentiated social systems and to develop corresponding com-
petence and willingness to participate. This is to say that all individuals in
modern society must assimilate.
Migrants declare their preparation for assimilation by the simple fact of
migration itself, since migration in modern society means the effort to find
access to social systems in a different geographical place by means of mi-
gration (Bommes 1999).
To stress the main point again: assimilation refers to a general condition
of existence for all individuals in modern society, i.e. the permanent
expectation that they will control their behaviour and action according to
the structural conditions of the differentiated social systems. Seen in this
way the problem of migrant assimilation refers to no more (and no less)
than to the conditions under which they succeed or fail to fulfil the condi-
tions of participation in social systems.
III
In order to describe the conditions of participation in social systems more
precisely it is useful to distinguish different dimensions of assimilation.
Modifying Gordon’s model (Gordon 1964), Hartmut Esser (1980) has dis-
tinguished four dimensions: cognitive, structural, social and identificational
assimilation. If we understand assimilation as a process related to the ex-
pectations valid in social systems – and not groups or societies – it is easy
to identify the simple systematic of these distinctions.
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Cognitive assimilation refers to the assimilation of structures on the side
of the individual in order to fulfil conditions of inclusion in social systems.
Individuals learn languages, skills, behavioural and situational patterns,
normative knowledge, orientations towards mobility, and so on.
Structural assimilation refers to a more or less successful process of
acquiring membership roles in organisations, earning an income, and secur-
ing occupational and legal status as well as formal education. This form of
assimilation therefore refers to the structure of migrants’ empirical partici-
pation in social systems (plural!) and to social resources like income, edu-
cation, rights, health, reputation, etc. that are mediated by participation and
which determine the social status of migrants. It is obvious that the assimi-
lation branch of migration research is centrally situated in the long tradition
of the sociology of social inequality. The main assumption here is that in
modern society, inequality is structured as social inequality. Assimilation
research assumes that these structures also regulate migrants’ access to
those social resources that are most relevant for the range of life options
that may be realised.
Social assimilation refers to migrants’ social relations such as friend-
ships, marriage, clubs and other associations or social networks. Migration
research focuses here on interethnic relations and assumes interdependen-
cies between structural and social assimilation.
Identificational assimilation finally refers to the claims of belonging and
identity made by migrants themselves and to the forms of identity made
use of. Research here is usually interested in migrants’ intentions to return
or be naturalised, their ethnic belonging, language use and political
orientations.
Based on these distinctions, assimilation research stresses two important
points: immigrants’ assimilation efforts are usually confronted with social
barriers. These barriers need to be analysed with reference to the specific
systems in which they occur. They can be found in firms concerning access
to workplaces, in schools concerning migrant children’s success, in states
concerning access to citizenship and rights, in families concerning access
to education, friendships or interethnic relations.
In the course of its history, migration research has not always had the
same understanding of assimilation. But on the whole it was generally
assumed that there is a strong relation of correspondence between the dif-
ferent dimensions of assimilation that have been sketched above. And this
is quite plausible because an individual with more cognitive preconditions
is more likely to be competent in fulfiling the expectations of membership
roles. An individual with a secure and more or less well paid occupational
position will find both easier access to health, education, rights and poli-
tics, and more social recognition and social relations. In addition, individu-
als who live regularly in those secure social contexts will develop corre-
sponding cognitive structures, and so on.
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The same holds true the other way round. It is unlikely that individuals
living in a narrow ethnic milieu will acquire the cognitive structures neces-
sary to fulfil the expectations of schools, to be occupationally successful or
to gain access to attractive and well-paid positions in organisations. The
same milieu is liable to reduce access to social networks, friendships and
clubs outside of it. This in turn is why members of this milieu will hardly
have feelings of belonging beyond its borders. Both successful assimilation
to the expectations of social systems, and its failure, seem to have a highly
self-perpetuating character.
We may call these assumptions the strict coupling hypothesis of the as-
similationists. They assume a narrow or strict coupling between the differ-
ent forms of assimilation (and may disagree amongst each other which
form of assimilation is of primary importance).
IV
We will not engage in an argument with this hypothesis but rather shall try
to show how the claims of the multiculturalists and the transnationalists re-
late to the strict coupling hypothesis of assimilation research. Our main
points will be:
A. Cultural plurality and assimilation do not contradict each other.
B. The arguments of transnationalism can be reconstructed as an effort to
question the hypothesis of a strict coupling between the different forms
of assimilation with reference to the empirical effects of globalisation.
This central point and drift of the transnationalist argument can be ren-
dered visible if we use the general frame of a theory of modern, i.e. dif-
ferentiated society.
A Cultural plurality and assimilation do not contradict each other.
Multiculturalism underlines processes of cultural pluralisation and de-
scribes these as major social challenges. But modern organisations and
functional realms like the economy, politics, law, education or health have
already to a large extent deregulated cultural life forms, and this does not
seem to be causing major social turbulences (Bommes 2003b). At the same
time individuals must be aware of those expectations that are valid in the
realms of education, work, law, health, and so on. To give an example:
schools expect a population of pupils that is multilingual and culturally as
well as religiously heterogeneous. Schools do not intend to repair this het-
erogeneity, but they expect pupils to acquire literacy, to learn the general-
ised language of intercourse and to develop other formal qualifications.
The aim is not to create a homogeneous school population as a community
(i.e. “assimilation” as the political program of the nation state of the 19th
and early 20th centuries; see Maas 1984, Therborn 1995), but to educate
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individuals in a way that they become competent to participate in social
systems. Hospitals are more and more prepared to treat patients of different
origin, language and culture. Firms take into account the religious orienta-
tions of their staff. Politics and nation states in Western Europe no longer
see cultural homogenisation as a precondition for longterm residence, set-
tlement and naturalisation (Joppke 2001). And the law protects individuals
against discrimination for religious or cultural reasons.
Against this background we may speak of a factual multiculturalism in
Europe which has been confronted with amazingly little resistance by the
European nation states – amazing at least if one recalls the anxieties articu-
lated at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. At that time
multiculturalism and cultural plurality as an effect of migration were seen
as a challenge for the nation state and its seemingly indispensable program
of cultural homogenisation of the resident population. We may think here
of the prominence of Brubaker’s (1992) comparison of France and
Germany.
To sum up: multiculturalism and assimilation do not contradict each
other. Modern organisations in different realms can cope quite well with
pluralised cultural orientations – which does not mean that individuals can
cope with it just as easily. They may fail in their efforts to find access and
inclusion if they fail to assimilate. The main point of reference for assimi-
lation is differentiated social systems: organisations and functional realms
like the modern economy, law, politics, science, education or health but
not groups of (majority) societies. Assimilation to social systems refers to
a social condition that applies in a culture-transcending manner – it is in
any case not culturally specific.
B On closer inspection transnationalism does not contradict the assimi-
lation thesis either. The main thesis of transnationlism is that globalisation
leads to a loose coupling of the forms of assimilation, i.e. cognitive, struc-
tural, social and identificational assimilation. The substance of the debate
between transnationalists and assimilationists is two different and compet-
ing hypotheses about the consequences of international migration which
can be tested empirically. The debate therefore should not primarily be tak-
en as a debate between two theoretically completely different approaches.
The claim that transnational relations or spaces are currently expanding
empirically refers to something different from what is asserted by multicul-
turalists. According to these assertions, the social systems to which individ-
uals try to find access are not confined to the borders of nation states. This
implies that individuals lead their lives in ways that transcend state bor-
ders. This may be the case for various realms like the family, education,
health, the economy or politics. To give an example: migrants work in the
host context in order to invest money, to care for the family and to engage
in local or national political projects in the context of origin. Successful
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migrants invest money in the context of origin in order to develop a new
industry as in the case of Indian IT-specialists. These transnational modes
of life can be found in different social contexts and in various combina-
tions depending on migrants’ different access and control over resources.
This has been shown by the research of a number of scholars (e.g. Hunger
2000; Levitt 1998, 2001; Müller-Mahn 2000; Singhanetra-Renard 1992).
On closer inspection it again becomes evident that the arguments of
transnationalists do not contradict the assumption that there is no alterna-
tive to assimilation in modern society. This contradiction holds only as
long as the frames of analysis are not clarified.
To state the main hypothesis again: even transnational migrants do have
to assimilate – to the expectations of those social systems in which they
want to participate. This means for them that, for instance, they may have
to find a balance between the expectations of their family in the context of
origin and the conditions of achievement at the workplace or in organisa-
tions of education in the immigration context.
It is important to keep this in mind since it allows us to realise what pre-
cisely is controversial between assimilationists and transnationalists. The
critique concerning conventional migration research by transnationlists
argues that this type of research is still too much confined to “methodolog-
ical nationalism” (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller 2001). This is seen as the rea-
son why assimilation is conceptualised based on a container concept of
society and related to a concept of integration that still uses the nation state
as the central frame of reference.
This argument is right and wrong at the same time. It is right since
assimilationists do indeed conceptualise society as a big national collective
society. It is wrong in that the actual subject of assimilationist empirical
research is something very different, i.e. the connection between the differ-
ent forms of assimilation (cognitive, structural, social, identificational), as
discussed above. Combined with this focus is a strong socio-structural
hypothesis: the assumption of a strict coupling between the different forms
of assimilation. Assimilationists assume a strong link between individual
cognitive structures as a precondition for assimilation (indicators are educa-
tion and language in particular, i.e. the existence of structures that allow
the building of further structures), structural assimilation (measured by
achieved social status), social assimilation (access to non-ethnic networks)
and identificational assimilation (collective, especially ethnic and national
identity). The main thesis implies principally two points: 1) It can be ob-
served that migrants enter those coupled assimilation processes (they enter
education, strive for social status, change their social networks and forms
of self-identification); this shows that the different forms of assimilation
remain relevant for migrants. 2) It can be demonstrated that assimilation
remains central for their life chances. Only then can they reach the level of
life chances of the non-migrant population. Failure to assimilate results in
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e.g. the emergence of segregated ethnic milieus. There may be diver-sifica-
tion, but ongoing assimilation processes are more likely and in the end
unavoidable.
This implies a further thesis which is empirically interesting but hidden
by the ongoing use of a national concept of society and the corresponding
“methodological nationalism”. The thesis can be rendered visible if we
reconstruct assimilation in the way proposed above. The implied thesis is
that the nation state is still a decisive frame for the structure of the relations
of distribution and inequality even in a globalised world society. The con-
nections between the different forms of assimilation remain regulated and
strictly coupled because of the continuous importance of the nation state.
Even under the conditions of globalisation these relations are still not
loosely coupled and contingent. To put it differently: it remains unlikely
that especially the structural, social and identificational forms of assimila-
tion vary arbitrarily. Hartmut Esser has emphasised this point by arguing
that education systems are shaped by national cultures and that national
languages preserve their continuous relevance.
For reasons of clarity we again underline that assimilation research is
thus based on the general paradigm of inequality research, implying the
following core assumptions:
– The relations of distribution in modern society are structured relations,
i.e. they produce structured social inequality linked with the emergence
of identifiable social groups which we call classes.
– The relations of distribution are still mediated by nation states. Beneath
the transcending relations of international inequality embodied in the
North-South and East-West imbalance, the structures of social inequal-
ity are essentially nationally segmented and structured.2
– Structured inequality means that the distribution of social resources
such as money, occupational position, education, health, rights and
political influence is not likely to vary arbitrarily. Social advantages
tend to cumulate where advantages can already be found, and this form
of social inequality tends to be reproductive and self-perpetuating.
Individuals with good chances of participation in social systems and
access to social resources tend to build networks securing and safe-
guarding these opportunities and corresponding collective identities. At
the same time they care for conditions that allow the maintenance and
reproduction of individual competences for themselves and their chil-
dren which, in turn, constitutes a precondition for access to social sys-
tems and social resources.
– To a large extent assimilation research means the application of the
above assumptions to the field of migration research. The measurement
of assimilation in these different dimensions is used as an indicator for
migrants’ success or failure to penetrate existing relations of distribution.
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Interethnic relations are evidence of penetration of the relevant reproduc-
tion networks of social inequality by migrants.
Seen against this background it is easy to identify the antithesis of transna-
tionalism (if we leave aside some conceptual problems and metaphors such
“transnational spaces”; see Bommes 2003a). The central thesis of transna-
tionalism is that we witness a decoupling of the different forms of assimila-
tion. This in turn implies the more general thesis that transnational devel-
opments are part of a general process of destructuration of social inequality
– a process that has been registered independent of migration research and
the consequences of which are the subject of an ongoing sociological
debate. The thesis of decoupling is based on the following empirical
observations:
– The participation of more and more migrants in different social systems
is distributed over several locations (“plurilocal”) and regularly tran-
scends nation state borders (it is “transnational”). It is open to debate
whether these processes are enduring and stable, but this would imply
that the interconnections between the chances of participation in the
different social systems like the family, economy, law, education, poli-
tics and health could change. In this view they tend to be less and less
controlled or mediated by established national welfare regimes, and
these regimes may themselves be eroded by these changes.
– Participation in social systems is more and more mediated by transna-
tional migrant networks. These networks organise access and inclusion.
Connected with this is the assumption that social assimilation in the
sense explained before loses relevance. Assimilationists assume that the
enduring existence of ethnic milieus is mainly an indicator of the repro-
duction of structured inequality restricting migrants’ social options.
Transnationalists emphasise instead the potential of those networks for
the mediation of social options.
– The diversification of collective identities is seen as a symptom for mi-
grants’ reorientation to the nationally decoupled and transnationally
mediated forms of identificational assimilation.
– The emergence of transnational competences finally evidences a change
in the conditions of cognitive assimilation. These assimilation processes
take place now in relation to the transnationally structured conditions
of participation in social systems.
To sum up: compared to the position of assimilationists it becomes evident
that transnationalism puts forward a decoupling hypothesis. The forms of
assimilation are undergoing a process of decoupling under the conditions
of globalisation. Transnationalism implies that new oportunities of varia-
tion between these forms emerge. In this sense the forms of assimilation
are loosely coupled in a globalised world and the nation state loses its
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relevance for social integration, i.e. the restriction of variation between
these forms of assimilation.
V
What are the consequences of this mode of reconstructing the positions of
assimilationists and transnationalists? It is easy to see now that transnation-
alism and assimilationism do not necessarily refer to different theoretical
approaches. What is at issue between transnationalists and assimilationists
is the strict or loose coupling of the different forms of assimilation. This
does not prove in itself the need for different approaches – rather the con-
trary. Reconstructed in the general frame of a theory of modern society the
dispute between the positions gains transparency. The substitution of theo-
retical concepts for metaphors like transnational spaces rather hides the
substance of the dispute.3 But the blind spots that become visible by com-
paring the two positions with reference to the theoretical frame used in this
paper are instructive.
1 The assimilationists show that transnationalists neglect the enduring
mediation of chances of social participation of migrants by nationally es-
tablished relations of social inequality and welfare states. The assumption
of the diminishing relevance of the nation state seems to be a nearly con-
ceptual starting point. For this reason they also fail to notice that the emer-
gence of transnational structures may even be a consequence of the specific
modes in which national welfare states treat migrants and include or ex-
clude them politically. In this sense nation states are part of and to some
extent even the precondition for the emergence of transnational structures
(Koopman & Statham 2002). Trans-nationalism itself is still influenced by
the classical claim of the nation state to be the head and centre of society.
For that reason, transnationalism has no theoretical concept of society any-
more and tends to understand globalisation without nation states or with
only a very limited version of that institution. For the same reason, transna-
tionalists seem to have serious difficulties in conceptualising the challenge
of the empirical phenomena they refer to in theoretically adequate con-
cepts, i.e.:
A. that the consequence of the emergence of transnational structures
and modes of living may be the destructuration of the institutional-
ised forms of social inequality so far mediated by national welfare
states and
B. that this precisely means a serious challenge for assimilation re-
search. But this may be a challenge not because assimilation does
not matter anymore, but because relations of assimilation may be-
come loosely coupled as an effect of the re- or destructuration of
the relations of social inequality formerly strongly mediated by the
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institutions of the national welfare state. If this is the case, it cannot
be conceptually derived but needs to be demonstrated by empirical
research trying to answer questions like the following: What pre-
cisely are the transnational forms and constellations of migrants’
participation in various social systems? In which contexts do these
transnational structures emerge? What are the mechanisms of stabi-
lisation for these structures and under which conditions do they
dissolve? What kind of effects do these transnational structures
have on the established relations of distribution and social
inequality?
2 The transnationalists show that assimilationist approaches employ
the nation state as a tacitly presupposed frame of reference not least be-
cause of the underlying concept of national society. The mediation of the
relations of social inequality and assimilation by national welfare states is
a premise of analysis in this approach rather than an emprical fact that
needs further analysis concerning its social and historical preconditions. As
a consequence the assimilationist approach should become more open for a
discussion about the role of the nation state and the extent to which the
coupling of assimilation forms may be socially contingent. This would
open the field for empirical research of potentially alternative develop-
ments. The main debates of migration research would then be less con-
cerned with the (false) opposition of transnationalism versus assimilation,
and more with the description and explanation of social structures in a
world society which may or may not be combined with changing relations
of assimilation.
Notes
1 Among the numerous publications see Bauböck 1994; Glick, Schiller, Blanc-
Szanton 1995; Faist 2000; Hannerz 1996; Levitt 2001; Ong 1997; Portes 1996;
Pries 1997, 2001a; Vertovec 2001; a general reader is provided by Vertovec, Cohen
1999.
2 This can also be seen by the fact that most research on social inequality focusses on
the description of nationally structured inequality. In a similar way Stichweh (1998)
underlines the role of the national welfare state as an “institutionalised threshold of
inequality”.
3 The continuous repetition of these metaphors and the proclamation that this is a
new theoretical approach opening up new perspectives to the various disciplines of
migration research (see recently Gogolin & Pries 2004) continue to hide the sub-
stance of this dispute.
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6 ‘Integration takes place locally’
On the restructuring of local integration policy
First published in 2008 by Campus Verlag for the Council on Migration (RfM)
as the chapter ‘“Integration findet vor Ort statt”: Über die Neugestaltung
kommunaler Integrationspolitik’ (pages 159-194) in Migrationsreport 2008:
Fakten – Analysen – Perspektiven, edited by Michael Bommes and Marianne
Krüger-Potratz
Reprinted in 2011 in ‘Migration und Migrationsforschung in der modernen
Gesellschaft’ in IMIS-Beiträge 38 (pages 187-220)
Translation into English for this book by Anja Löbert
‘Integration takes place locally’: this motto accompanies a multitude of
events which for some time now have been organised in cities, municipal-
ities and rural districts in Germany for dealing publicly with the subject of
migration and integration. A great many of these events are associated with
public commitments to integration. Perhaps in the past the subject has been
given too little attention and not been treated systematically enough. Or
perhaps this has in fact always been done, but in the future it needs to be
done even more intensively and systematically. There is, accordingly, a
need for directing all responsible authorities in the local community to-
wards this end, while gaining greater support among local citizens for this
subject. ‘In the future it will also be the municipalities that will have to
provide the bulk of integration support services.’1 In this connection, local
integration plans or concepts are being newly drafted or rewritten, options
for the longer-term monitoring of integration are being examined and ap-
propriate initiatives are being subsumed under the motto of intercultural
openness, of integration management and diversity management.
The present text2 examines the question of what has set in motion this
realignment of municipalities and led them to make integration policy a
central concern of their local policy. In the first section we discuss various
suggestions for explaining this. In a second step we recommend embed-
ding this realignment in the changes being made in the integration policy
of the German federal welfare state, changes that result from the political
realisation that migrants have become the normal clientele of political ad-
ministration and that migration has become a normal structural feature of
the population. In the third step we argue – against this backdrop – that
municipalities have been pushed to this new integration policy in recent
years through political mobilisation from within and without, and we con-
sider their various efforts toward realignment to be attempts to lend their
integration policy a legitimate, publicly recognised institutional form by
aligning it to relevant models. In the conclusion we address the issue of
the consequences of the analysis for the evaluation of future local integra-
tion policy.
What Explains ‘the Time for Integration’ in Municipalities? Open
Questions
Many welfare associations, churches, private institutions (in modern
German: NGOs) and other entities have for a long time been pointing out
that immigration and the settlement of migrants (which has been occurring
for decades) need public recognition by politics and, in association with
this, an appropriate migration and integration policy geared towards it. In
recent years, these entities have had to register the fact that their unrelent-
ing efforts and their insistence on the importance of the topic are now
being crowned with a success that has almost taken them by surprise. They
are certainly entitled to lament the fact that this has either happened too
late and should have occurred long ago, or that quite a few things have in
their view been tackled incorrectly, because their expertise was not drawn
on in time or not drawn on at all.
Migration researchers, too, find themselves confronted with the virtually
astounding success of their policy counselling. In the early 1990s they had
presented a ‘Manifesto of the 60’3 in which they warned about the need
for no longer ignoring the issues of migration and integration and for
acknowledging its great importance in bringing about a politics with a
future. Soon afterward, this was followed by the founding of the Council
for Migration, which as a union of organisations had the goal of pressing
for an adequate immigration and integration policy, while at the same time
monitoring its actual elaboration.4 The Migration Report also saw itself as
part of this critical policy monitoring, from the time of its first publication
in 2000. Now one can (at risk of exaggerating) state the case as follows:
today, the subject of migration and integration no longer requires pro-
moters. Everyone talks about it. The economy and politics, the public and
the mass media agree that it is an important topic, and there is now an al-
most dizzying level of activity in matters of migration and integration
around migration researchers, and with their participation. Since Gerhard
Schröder’s Green Card initiative and the establishment in 2001 of the
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Immigration Commission, a kind of permanent political mobilisation at dif-
ferent federal levels has been brought to bear. With the setting-up of a
dedicated federal agency with its own research department, the launch of
an integration programme with its own federal competence, the mobilisa-
tion of municipalities on behalf of integration, as well as national integra-
tion and Islam summits, migration and integration in Germany have risen
to the status of political topics that attract the attention of the main policy-
making authorities. One can, as a result, register the following fact: the per-
sistence with which the scientific or scholarly community and ‘civil soci-
ety’ have made the topic of migration and integration a public issue ap-
pears to have paid off, the presentation of problems is now being tackled
at all levels of politics – and thus also at the local level.
But can one reasonably consider what has been initiated since the begin-
ning of the 21st century to be the result of persistence? Ought one to
assume that everything depended on the staying power of enlighteners, at
the same time understanding the result to a certain extent as the product of
a previous domination of a ‘rejection of knowledge’? Or does one need to
assume – keeping in mind that every idea has its time5 – that in politics
itself the perceived need for such action must first mature? The question of
origin may in this respect appear irrelevant, since in the end the important
thing is that sooner or later the reasonably correct course is adopted. But it
may nonetheless be worthwhile to ask why the time for integration has
now been accepted in politics in general, and more recently in local gov-
ernment politics, and why integration is now the right policy. The starting
point for this is a series of observations which do not primarily question
the fact that at present potentially important and appropriate measures are
being taken in matters of integration in municipalities. However, these ob-
servations do challenge the assumption that the ‘time for integration’ has
dawned – be it the result of enlightenment and consultation, be it long
overdue insight into structural requirements. For the further development
of local integration policy, it may, as a result, be not entirely irrelevant to
ask what factors are responsible for the present integration euphoria that
can be observed.
1 First, in general terms there are reasons for assuming that politics –
at whatever level it may reside – does not necessarily become involved as
a consequence of scholarly consultation, the insight that results from this
consultation, or through application of the knowledge that has been made
available. Nor does it make decisions and implement appropriate policies
on this basis. The application of scholarly knowledge takes place under the
premises of its users. This applies not only but especially in politics, in-
cluding migration and integration policy.6 This does not detract from the
significance of the knowledge that has been produced and made available,
but it does underline the fact that, in order to understand why the time for
integration has come (both as political programme and as symbolic
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politics), we need to understand why its time has arrived in politics and
hence also in local politics.7
2 What is striking about the current integration euphoria and the re-
lated semantic phrase ‘integration takes place locally’ is that it is far from
a new insight. This was already observed by Helmut Stang8 in the 1980s.
Municipalities, provided that they have taken into account migration and
integration as issues that affect them, have associated this with the fact
that, as municipalities, they are obliged to make available to their inhabi-
tants and thus also to foreigners, that is, migrants, the required economic,
social and cultural institutions and services. In other words: for municipal-
ities, unless they are in a position to reject migrants, there has been no
alternative but integration as a required task.9 What then are the reasons
for the current mobilisation of municipalities in favour of integration, what
is new about it and distinguishes the current process from the previous his-
tory of integration policy in municipalities? The answer to this question
can be sought on a practical level, and one may ask if something entirely
different and new is being offered. Or the answer may be situated at a
higher level and be assumed to lie in general social development trends.
3 Such an answer at a higher level has been repeatedly formulated by
Rinus Penninx10 and others. Penninx interprets the increasing importance
of cities to a certain extent as ‘fall-out’ from the loss of importance of the
nation state that results from the globalisation process, from which there re-
sults an increase in importance upwards and supranationally toward the
EU, and downwards and locally toward towns and cities. In his view, cities
are the actual places of integration, and migration for its part is a compo-
nent and expression of the globalisation process. This is underpinned by
reference to the fact that migrants in Europe live predominantly in cities
and, at the same time, especially in big cities.11 But this situation is not
new. And what is meant by cities as ‘places of integration’? If cities are, in
quite practical terms and without any far-reaching theoretical claims,
understood to be spatial accumulations of parallel economic, legal, politi-
cal, sport-related, familial, educational, etc., events and opportunities, inte-
gration should then occur under these very same premises, that is, econom-
ic, educational, legal, political, etc., ones. The locality, the place as such, is
at the same time not a decisive factor in a social-structural sense. This
should be distinguished from the way in which cities or municipalities are
spoken of as political-territorial authorities with more or less far-reaching
decision-making competence. Integration can be shaped using the means
of municipal politics but it cannot, to the extent that it affects the economy,
education, the family, etc., be effected or guaranteed politically. A number
of decisions that concern the general political, legal and financial condi-
tions of integration in fact lie outside the competence of cities. One may
lament this fact, but cities, were the occasion to arise, would hardly have
the capacity to make and implement such decisions without the support of
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the nation state. This situation has to do with the proper customisation of
policy-related decision-making competences – be it in federal states, be it
in unitary states – to the problem of balancing generalised, as opposed to
context-sensitive, politics. Whatever one may take to be an appropriate
customisation, in the context that interests us here, it is striking that for the
actual description of what cities can achieve in terms of integration, even
in the case of Penninx, really no new catalogue of tasks and services re-
sults from what is in his view the newfound importance of cities. Instead,
what is involved is integration in the labour market and education, the sta-
bilisation of families, integration in the housing market, the involvement of
migrants in politics and the public sphere, the fight against intolerance and
racism, etc., and the question as to what cities as political decision-making
contexts are able to contribute in this respect. None of these proposals is
really new or has surprise value for municipalities, which are accustomed
to problems of integration.
4 If, on the other hand, one looks for an answer to the empirical ques-
tion of what is new about the current mobilisation of municipalities in
favour of integration, here too, nothing substantially new can be discerned,
either with respect to what is being recommended to municipalities, or in
terms of what they themselves are claiming they want to do. If one takes a
look, for example, at the recommendations for action being put forward by
the Bertelsmann Stiftung12 or the Local Government Association for
Municipal Administration (German: KGSt),13 which in recent years have
been extensively involved in the mobilisation of municipalities on behalf
of integration, no indications can be found there of anything that local inte-
gration policy should focus upon, anything which lies beyond what has al-
ways been the object of local integration policy: language, education, em-
ployment and, in addition, a number of fields of activity in the areas of
housing and social services with which municipalities are well acquainted.
The only new element is the indication that this should be combined with
so-called new steering models, in other words, provisions for evaluating
and monitoring on the basis of defined sets of indicators, that is, practising
integration following methods of modern administration.
5 Certain texts and events sometimes convey the impression that the
peculiarity of the local aspect, of cities and municipalities, is being newly
discovered. ‘Best practice’ examples teem with good ideas which, so it
seems, could be implemented because context-specific opportunities were
put to use and surprising things were achieved. On the basis of this, the
conclusion is drawn that it is only a question of taking advantage of locally
existing creative potential – it can be done ‘locally’. On closer examina-
tion, however, this usually turns out to be an effect of the focus on munici-
palities. If policies to shape the general conditions of integration are dealt
with at the federal or state level, it is then, however, not a matter primarily
of issues relating to the context-related re-specification of regulations,
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which must always be applied and take effect in such specific contexts, be
it in businesses, schools or administrations. The disappointments associated
with the welfare state, which relies on being able to bring about integration
using general programmes, have greatly reduced the preoccupation and
confidence in developing general programmes. If instead one focuses on
the creative processes involving the local, context-sensitive ‘enacting’ of
regulations and programmes, it appears as if it were mainly a matter of
what takes place ‘locally’, hence of the particular initiatives of the munici-
palities themselves, their citizens, businesses and schools, etc. And that is
entirely and undeniably correct. Implicit in the slogan ‘integration takes
place locally’ is the reminder that ‘locality’ implies specificity. Every mu-
nicipality needs to carry out this very same re-specification of general con-
ditions, adapting them to local conditions. Therein lies, moreover, the very
meaning of the subsidiarity principle.
6 But in the case of the discovery of municipalities and cities, are we
really dealing with such a process of rediscovery? The idea that it is a mat-
ter of the specificity and creativity of the local actually only occasionally
crops up in descriptions of successful examples of community integration.
For the most part, nothing particularly new or unknown is evoked by the
current texts and events on this theme. On the contrary, one is confronted
instead with processes of extreme standardisation. Everything that can be
said about local community integration – and, as has been shown, it is ac-
tually a matter of old topics that have been present in many municipalities
for more than twenty years: education, employment, housing, social serv-
ices, intercultural communication and openness – is being presented in a
standardised linguistic design and circumscribed in a semantics in which
the key concepts remain the potentials of integration, intercultural open-
ness, concepts, plans, indicators, monitoring or control. When, as it is
claimed, it is a matter of the specificity and the specific local potential of
cities and municipalities, the standardisation that can currently be recorded
and the willingness of local communities to align and present themselves
in relation to such standardised forms and the associated expectations of
‘community-based integration management’ are in any case at odds with
this claim.
7 The current willingness of municipalities to take part in the stand-
ardisation of the organisational design of their local integration policy is
relatively new. Local integration policies since the 1970s have differed sig-
nificantly from one another. Since then, and through the 1980s and 1990s,
they have – though not simultaneously, and in a cumulative and often un-
coordinated fashion – rather incrementally constructed local integration in-
frastructures, combined with corresponding local structures and traditions.
Against this background, they persistently and also successfully resisted
earlier attempts to standardise them. They have rejected both the numerous
attempts to include resident alien advisory councils binding on
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municipalities and the efforts to force local bodies to appoint resident alien
and integration commissioners, and such efforts have largely failed.14 They
put forward revealing and quite understandable reasons for such rejections,
which, when examined closely, clarified the specificity of each municipal-
ity in opposition to the associated standardisation and setting of organisa-
tional structures. They argued that organisational decisions ought to be
made dependent on context-specific needs and that general requirements
would limit the freedom of action of municipalities to an unacceptable lev-
el, and thus limit their constitutionally established autonomy.
8 It could be argued that the contradictions outlined here might be re-
solved by pointing to the fact that the problems posed by integration today
are more intense than in the past, and that this pressure has produced a
new understanding of the issues and a willingness to address them. In op-
position to this view one should finally point to the following two points:
(a) There is no verifiable connection between the scale of immigration to a
particular municipality and the latter’s commitment to integration policy. In
the Federal Republic of Germany there are municipalities which, when
seen comparatively, have experienced rather moderate immigration and
which have nonetheless devoted considerable resources to integration from
an early stage; just as there are municipalities that were greatly affected by
immigration but have scarcely undertaken any action. Integration policies
and the different forms they assume can instead be explained by the logic
of local politics and its organisations. They are less to be understood as re-
actions to, and the outcome of, surrounding events, such as immigration
and settlement in a particular community. Whatever problems were and are
associated with this for the particular communities, whatever solutions are
aimed at, and whatever means are appropriate, have been developed in the
local political organisations themselves against the background of their his-
tory and in terms of what is considered to be appropriate and legitimate in
political-public terms. The result is the specific institutional design of inte-
gration policy in the municipalities.15 (b) Neither is there any verifiable
connection between the effort involved in local integration policy and the
course taken by the integration of migrants itself, measured, for instance,
by participation in work and education, the provision of housing, health or
the stability of families.16 At present we can see that there is considerable
public effort being put into institutionalising the belief in the importance
and effectiveness of integration policy and that attempts are being made to-
wards a general and standardising orientation of municipalities towards this
belief. But this has no empirical basis in the proven effectiveness of local
integration policy – beyond the ‘best practice’ evidence of the ‘beautiful
passages’.17
9 Indeed, this cannot be otherwise if one considers more closely what
the local integration policy designates. It does not describe a conditional
programme which determines what has to take place administratively when
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‘a case of integration’, identifiable by definite criteria, occurs. This is
somewhat different for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in
the case of newly arrived immigrants. With the registry of their arrival, un-
less certain exceptional circumstances are present, they set a corresponding
integration machinery in motion.18 But neither does integration designate a
definite purpose programme19 in reference to which the output of a local
integration policy could be clearly defined – an output by which one could
measure what integration policies and corresponding programmes actually
achieve. This is first of all due to the fact that local integration policy is
not primarily aimed at integration into local politics itself but is instead, us-
ing political means, aimed at the integration into other, non-(communal)
politically defined and controlled social spheres. It can only influence the
latter indirectly, and only in the rarest of cases can it achieve and demon-
strate direct influence in one or another direction. The connection between
politics and output is thus only a loose one: labour market integration, aca-
demic success, health, familial or social harmony in residential areas, etc.
In this regard who can conclusively prove the effects of local integration
policy? The same thing can also be illustrated by the observation that local
integration measures in one case may be presented as evidence of the suc-
cess of municipal integration efforts; while, on the other hand, they are pre-
sented as evidence that the problems and conflicts that occur in schools,
city districts or businesses are not caused by the fact that too little effort
has been made in terms of integration policy. Organisations that are con-
fronted with so much uncertainty with respect to the effects of their own
actions seek support in their institutional design.20 They equip themselves
in terms of personnel, programmatically, and as far as their forms of inter-
nal and external communication are concerned with those elements that
have gained internal and public recognition, in other words, that are con-
sidered legitimate. The different forms assumed by local integration policy
in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany result from this, namely,
the differing and far from unified frame of reference used for legitimately
shaping municipal policy. This may then also be an indication that this
frame of reference has shifted, resulting in the current willingness of mu-
nicipalities to align themselves toward a largely unified design in the orien-
tation of local integration policy.
If we summarise the points gathered here, it then seems to be completely
implausible that the ‘time for integration’ in municipalities has dawned be-
cause they have allowed themselves to be convinced through consultation,
because an entirely new situation exists in the cities, or because new, hith-
erto undiscovered opportunities for action are now available. The time for
integration seems to have dawned neither because of pure insight resulting
from enlightenment nor because of functional necessity. If it is established
that municipalities have, historically, tackled problems of migration and
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integration in a variety of ways and have mostly shown themselves to be
resistant to attempts towards uniformity and standardisation, the following
questions thus still remain unanswered: why does this situation appear to
have changed over the past few years, and why have so many municipal-
ities engaged in processes of standardising their integration policy and al-
lowing themselves to be mobilised for the sake of integration?
At this point we offer the suggestion that this may be interpreted as a
process of mainstreaming local integration policy in which communities
are pressured externally and internally to acquire a new, standardised insti-
tutional design, one which is imposed from the outside as the sole alterna-
tive, as it were, but one that is also positively sanctioned, to whose estab-
lishment they can contribute during the execution phase, and that provides
them with new legitimacy. The essential provider of this design and the
engine behind the aforementioned pressure is the welfare and immigration
state, flanked by charitable foundations, think tanks and the EU. The com-
munity promoters consist, moreover, of private institutions and initiatives,
welfare associations, resident alien advisory councils, foreigners’ and im-
migrants’ associations, community employees and researchers, so the inter-
ests of those involved vary from case to case. In what follows, we would
like to explain how this embedding has led municipalities to realign them-
selves in the sense outlined above.
In the following we first of all deal with the change in the meaning of
integration in the welfare and immigration state. We explain how integra-
tion ought to be understood as part of the programme of the activating wel-
fare state and, in this context, the new integration policy as a programme
of political mobilisation. This provides us with the basis for responding to
the question of what importance accrues to municipalities in the reformed
welfare state and to their mobilisation on behalf of integration.
Integration Policy – Policy for Migrants as the Normal Clientele in
the Activating Welfare State
‘Integration’ has become a code word in German federal migration and
integration policy. It is at one and the same time a programme and a sym-
bol. In the process, symbolic inflation such as becomes visible, say, in the
initiation of the national integration summit in 2006, the promotion of the
first ministry for integration in North Rhine-Westphalia as a form of politi-
cal marketing, or the formula ‘Germany, country of integration’, hides the
structural basis of this gain in importance, namely the changed situation of
migrants in the activating welfare state, not only in Germany but also in
other north-western European immigration countries. This may be summar-
ised here in note form:21
‘INTEGRATION TAKES PLACE LOCALLY’ 133
– Migrants in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in north-western Europe
acquired civil and social rights that were formerly considered the privi-
lege of citizens,22 and have thus achieved the status of ‘denizens’
(Wohnbürger23). The countries affected all became in this connection
countries of immigration more or less inadvertently (and hence Europe
also became one of the world’s great immigration regions).
– The irreversibility of this situation has been evident since 1989. Since
then, European states have attempted to carry out a renormalisation by
granting ‘denizens’ access to citizenship. In Germany this occurred
with the reforms of the law concerning foreign nationals in 1990 and
1993 as well as with the reform of the citizenship law in 2000. At the
same time, European countries in the framework of the EU harmonised
their migration regimes under the premises of increased control and se-
lectivity (entrance for desirable, potentially capable migrants, rejection
of undesirable migration). Integration programmes are part of this proc-
ess of the growing entanglement of migration and integration policy
and of an associated reorganisation of the institutional design of
countries.24
– Integration does not designate any particular state access to migrants as
compared with the rest of the population but rather a tailoring, specifi-
cally aimed at migrants, of the general programme of the activating
welfare state and the related redefinition of the relationship of service
between welfare states and their potential benefit recipients.25 The lib-
eralisation of requirements for naturalisation implied the central impor-
tance of the integration issue, under the maxim ‘supporting and requir-
ing’ (fördern und fordern).26 The emphasis on the integration issue is
an attempt by the welfare state to bring about the normalisation of mi-
grants’ status in alignment with naturalisation and the irrefutability of a
selective migration policy.27 Integration places the focus on the issue of
the current and future social-structural positioning of the resident and
future migrant population and their associated – particularly economic
– productivity and capacity for achieving a self-reliant way of life, in-
dependent of social transfers.
The central importance of the integration issue and its symbolic capacity
for mobilisation cannot be grasped adequately against this background if it
is solely traced back to the notion that there was an ‘integration crisis’ in
the 1990s or the early 2000s – in the sense of a dramatic reduction of mi-
grants’ opportunities for social participation.28 Migrants’ labour market
participation, their educational successes, their position in the housing mar-
kets, their income levels and the risk of poverty they face always differed
from that of the non-immigrant population at the lower end – with signifi-
cant differences between the various groups of immigrants. In the course
of time there have been equalisations as well as intensifications in the level
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of deviation. But this does not explain the central position of the integra-
tion issue and its symbolic potential for mobilisation. Two other sets of cir-
cumstances are instead significant in this respect. Integration as a form of
political semantics29 designates the relationship between the welfare state
and the individual, be it as a citizen or as a foreigner (migrant). Welfare
states are responsible for directing individuals – in keeping with the motto
of ‘supporting and requiring’ – towards integration in those spheres of life
such as work, education, the family or health that are important for leading
an independent lifestyle. Success or failure at the same time defines their
position within the welfare state as (potential) providers of a service or as
service (benefit) recipients. With respect to new immigrants, the welfare
state makes residence and permanent residence contingent on integration,
as clearly laid down in the Immigration Law. For the majority of those mi-
grants who already reside in the country, this option no longer exists. The
central importance and the symbolic charge of the integration issue thus
results first from the realisation that the migrant population has become
permanent and irreversible clients of the welfare state. The welfare state
must under conditions of limited productivity address the issue of how it
can prospectively guarantee integration under the historically cumulative
conditions of an immigration population that is for the most part social-
structurally disadvantaged.30 Second, hand in hand with this there is the
additional realisation that this migrant population does not represent a
quantité négligeable but rather, depending on the age group, constitutes be-
tween one fifth and one half of the population and, depending on the way
in which it is counted and legally established, is increasing at a relatively
rapid pace. Migration becomes, therefore, a structural feature of an increas-
ingly greater segment of the population and it demands, consequently, an
adjustment to this situation in terms of institutional design.
Nevertheless, the reliance on integration and integration policy is no
German peculiarity, but rather a good deal of what is reflected in the
Immigration Law and elsewhere has been copied in essence from other
countries, in particular the Netherlands.31 It is related to the fact that
European welfare states in parallel have been searching since the 1990s for
appropriate migration and integration policies, since they all find them-
selves confronted with the fact that Europe has become an immigration re-
gion for the world and since the results of their more or less incremental
migration and integration policies correspond only marginally with the
erstwhile political aims. This search and the insecurity associated with it
are publicly determined by questions concerning the following: the costs
and the benefits of immigration; the opportunities, limits and costs of a
‘catch-up integration policy’32; the degree to which past experiences may
be extrapolated to the future; what demands ought to be placed on future
immigrants; which, if any, immigrants are desirable; and, finally, how this
can be managed and how social integration can be shaped institutionally so
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that a policy of this type, particularly in times of persistent, relatively high
levels of unemployment and limited budgetary resources, can be conveyed
politically. In other words: the establishment of an integration policy in the
German federal welfare state is embedded in this European context of inse-
curity and of the search for an alternative, legitimising institutional design
for such a policy. In the reciprocal copying of models under the label of
‘best practice’, support is being sought, without this necessarily resulting
in the national results turning out to be the same.
Until now, only Germany has laid claim to being a ‘country of integra-
tion’. Bundled up in this symbolic charge of integration is the institutional
uncertainty emanating from the two aforementioned circumstances – mi-
grants as a normal clientele rather than as a special clientele and migration
as a probable structural feature of this clientele. This feeling of uncertainty
provides, as it were, the source of energy for the mobilisation drive aimed
in different directions – particularly at political administrations, their clien-
tele, organisations of trade and industry and education as well as ‘citizens’.
In the case of administrations, their mobilising orientation toward migrants
as a normal clientele is at stake, the related institutional adjustments and
the incorporation of this new responsibility into practical routines. In the
case of migrants, the orientation towards the expectations associated with
welfare state citizenship is involved, in the sense of an internalised, subjec-
tivated citizenship conceived as a bundle of expectations consisting of both
rights and obligations. Educational organisations, as with organisations of
trade and industry, are mobilised on behalf of integration through the use
of appeals and programmes. Citizens are called on to become involved and
demonstrate public spirit. This is, alongside the potential practical implica-
tions, the symbolic nucleus of the integration summit – as a focusing and
intensification of mobilising events of this type and at the same time as a
vehicle for their continuation until further notice.
In order to understand what is meant here as well as the related symbolic
effort involved, it is helpful to clarify to oneself the fact that from a struc-
tural standpoint, social integration and the programmes associated with it
in the ‘activating welfare state’ have in mind access to migrants who are in
the process of settling here – a form of access which in a fair and in no
way exceptionalist manner establishes a link between migrants and the
welfare state, just as it does with the rest of its potential clientele.
‘Supporting and requiring’, ‘rights and obligations’: these designate a rela-
tionship between the welfare-state service providers and their clientele in
which it is demanded of all benefit recipients as individuals, for the most
part independently of their nationality, that they provide a quid pro quo,
namely that they direct their own behaviour in an independent and market-
oriented fashion towards a lifestyle that is as self-reliant as possible, as
independent of social subventions as possible. The difference between mi-
grants/foreigners and German nationals has, as a result, lost a good deal of
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its relevance. A person’s nationality acts to a decreasing extent as a social
‘usher’. Germans and foreigners are equally seen from the perspective of
the welfare states in terms of the distinction: productive/competitive vs.
unproductive/uncompetitive. The eligibility for benefits in the welfare state
must be earned by all individuals, and thus, conversely, the accessibility
and acquirability of citizenship occur on the basis of successful social
integration. Entirely in keeping with this, the Immigration Commission set
up by the federal government in 2000 already stated: ‘Integration is a so-
cial process in which all those living in a society are continuously in-
volved. The will to integration is absolutely essential. This will to integra-
tion is expressed by the fact that each individual on their own initiative
seeks to become socially integrated. This applies to natives as well as
immigrants.’33
For new migrants, the acquirability of citizenship is thus conditioned by
integration policy. Total political inclusion is contingent on the condition
of the individual’s ‘integration capacity’, that is, on the economic, cultural
and social competencies necessary for participating in the main spheres of
life, in particular, the labour market and education and training. But from
the perspective of the activating welfare state, it is a matter generally of
bringing about such an integration capacity with respect both to immi-
grants who are already present in the country and to the (inevitably) newly
arriving immigrants in the double sense of ‘supporting and requiring’, in
other words, offering immigrants the opportunity to integrate while at the
same time demanding that they strive to do so. As stated above, this in no
way distinguishes them from the non-immigrant population.
The fact that the central semantic importance of integration and the cor-
responding mobilisation of administration, migrants, education, economy
and citizens to this task are largely symbolic, becomes apparent when one
considers that nothing substantively new is occurring at the structural
operational level – given that migrants represent the normal clientele of
administration. Financial resources have been made available for the pro-
motion of language, education and qualification, for the counselling and
stabilisation of families, for the upgrading and maintenance of harmony in
certain city districts or for the support of associations. Where necessary,
legal tools are employed to advance formal equality and prohibit discrimi-
nation (this doesn’t necessarily mean that it is prevented). In addition,
attempts are made, by means of symbolic communication, to mobilise
above all those organisations such as administrations, schools, businesses,
on the one hand, and the migrant and non-migrant population, on the other,
to participate in integration. Under changed and symbolically enhanced or-
ganisational conditions, with greater intensity and public staging, what is
done is what has always been done (if anything at all has been done): in
practical terms, coping with everyday tasks in diversified organisations
charged with integration in politics and administration, education and
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training, social work, employment, sport and health. But in doing so, those
actors involved show, through a symbolically staged reorganisation of the
institutional design, what integration policy has promised, namely efforts
toward integration and the prospect of integration.
In order to understand the process in this manner, one needs to bear in
mind that, since the first Immigration Commission and finally with the pas-
sage of the Immigration Law, the setting-up of an explicit policy of inte-
gration was, quite literally, a bold promise. The reason is that social inte-
gration in the different areas of the economy, law, education and training,
health and religion, takes place in a variety of ways. The successes and
failures of social integration arise in distinctive ways34 (not only in the
case of migrants) and show themselves to be especially unwieldy in rela-
tion to political attempts to control them and hence also in relation to an
integration policy aimed at migrants.35 And in the course of realising that
migrants have become permanent clients of the welfare state, why has the
prospect suddenly opened up of an entirely new repertoire of action be-
yond what has already been done up to this point? Today, politics and the
state generally operate on the assumption of a restricted capacity to control
and intervene. Society has shown itself in its various subdivisions and or-
ganisations to be too heterogeneous, mobile and incalculable.36 Against
this backdrop, too, integration policy indeed sets out surprisingly strong
political claims about what appears to be its big plans.
In response to the unavoidable designation of migration and migrants as
a problem and as an obligation of the welfare state, integration is being
conceived both politically symbolically as a value (the self-reliant lifestyle)
and as a problem (the burden on the welfare state). Yet how can integra-
tion, understood as both a value and a problem, be practically and publicly
implemented in policy?37 What can be achieved when there is no longer
any doubt that something must be undertaken in order to fulfil visibly an
expectation such as that of integration, a factor which nonetheless cannot
be measured by any obvious political output? One possibility for solving
impossible tasks such as the fulfilment of diffuse (self-produced) expecta-
tions is to view them on the basis of existing and available means and rec-
ognised solutions: in other words, to centre the problem of integration
around the existing means and solutions and to supply them with a new
institutional design, thus rendering them determinable.38
The Immigration Law and the main task of integration set forth there;
the associated conversion of the former Federal Office for the Recognition
of Foreign Refugees into the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
(German: BAMF) as the body responsible for the implementation of lan-
guage and integration courses; the central position of language as the basic
prerequisite of integration: all this marks out integration as the symbolic
centre of a policy that at the same time has provided itself with a new insti-
tutional design. Offices such as the BAMF and the Immigration Authority,
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which formerly dealt primarily with the rejection of migrants and their
claims, are now responsible for integration and reinvent themselves as
‘competence centres’ for migration and integration. Comprehensively ar-
ranged language courses as a legally based federal programme also demon-
strate that something is being done, just as is the case with the proliferating
reporting services for migration and integration in the federal govern-
ment,39 in the Länder and ideally in municipalities as well, that is, in the
‘monitoring of expectations’.
On closer examination, however, the establishment and realisation of
integration courses by the BAMF or the setting-up of initial consultations
for migrants represented no great break with the previously applied integra-
tion policies, with their services such as language courses or social coun-
selling services. Precursor structures were used and reorganised. Similar to
the way in which the Immigration Law as a whole combined existing regu-
lations, introduced few new elements for the opening-up of immigration
options and provided for merely moderate changes in the Residence Law,
in the regulation of so-called ‘existing cases’ as well as in the handling of
forced migrations and asylum migrations, here too, beyond the restructur-
ing of organisational competences and the legal inclusion of new immi-
grants in integration programmes, no radical break with the past occurred
but instead an expansion of the previously applied integration policy in the
Federal Republic of Germany – albeit in an altered, symbolically charged
design.
This new integration policy is being symbolically staged as a new begin-
ning and as a break with the past. In opposition to the everyday experience
of déjà vu and instances of organisational turbulence, which result from
changed competences, problems of coordination and newly deployed pro-
cedures, there was and is the emphatic communication of a new beginning.
Integration is formulated as ‘society’s principal challenge today’, and
against this backdrop the importance of task formulation is underlined.
Integration has become a kind of contingency-coping formula for migration
and integration policy and all measures prompted or enabled by it.40 This
symbolic policy of integration had its provisional apex in the National
Summit on Integration.
This came about in reaction to an entirely unintended effect of symbolic
policy: the rhythm of politics demands rapid results. The symbolically
charged programme of integration focuses public attention on migrants and
their living conditions. Under the influence of events in the Netherlands
(the murder of Theo van Gogh) and in France (the suburban riots in the au-
tumn of 2005), the media’s seismographs were directed at potential social
catastrophes: at ‘parallel societies’, at honour killings and forced marriages,
fundamentalist organisations or marginalised and potentially violent male
adolescents. For practitioners and academics who had been dealing for
years with issues of migration and integration, nothing really new has been
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said or uncovered. However, prompted and put into focus by an exacting
integration policy, these events were observed with great attention and con-
veyed by the media primarily with a focus on social catastrophes.41 The
‘failure of integration’, however, seemed in the meantime to be obvious to
the public. More moderate voices were viewed to a large extent as playing
down the problems.
In this situation the Chancellor initiated the Summit on Integration, from
that time on a regularly occurring major public event intended to mobilise
‘society’ on behalf of integration and in whose framework the National
Integration Plan (NIP), involving all levels of politics (the federal govern-
ment, the Länder and municipalities), migrants’ representatives and all rel-
evant segments of society in ten working groups, was developed.42 The
drawing-up of the plan itself as a series of events, together with the result-
ing National Integration Plan, attests to the organisational and symbolic
effort being placed on generating public commitment. And so it is stated in
the NIP: ‘What began in July 2006 as a meeting in the Federal Chancellery
has in recent months sparked a lively development in our society. In terms
of integration policy, too, Germany is experiencing a sense of a new era
about to dawn’ (p. 9). And one of the two guidelines of the NIP states: ‘To
demand of every person self-commitment in his or her area of responsibil-
ity, since everyone can contribute something to the success of integration
in Germany’ (p. 10).
The political event called the ‘National Integration Plan’ is not yet fin-
ished. Evaluations and stock-takings are planned. What has been achieved
and what has not been achieved are to be the object of debate. Critical re-
actions have repeatedly noted that the commitments contained in the NIP
are without real substance. This is a highly contentious issue. More signifi-
cant in our context is that the NIP offers almost nothing that is substan-
tively new on the question of how integration policy may be shaped and
how integration can be promoted. Why should this be otherwise, given that
the terrain is familiar and that an extensive repertoire of recognised meth-
ods and solutions is available?43 At its core the NIP demands more effort,
it requires a commitment to the belief that integration requires a specified
set of tasks, and in this context it pushes for the institutional redesign of
policies to further integration to the forefront of public awareness.
Local Integration Policy as Institutional Design
What does this have to do with municipalities? What role is ascribed to
them in this process, and how is this process related to the commitment of
municipalities to the task of integration as cited at the outset, and to their
alignment towards the standardised expectations attached to the institution-
al design of this policy? There are three possible responses to this question:
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1) Municipalities are the main bodies responsible for public administration
in the federal system of the Federal Republic of Germany, which in partic-
ular look after tasks conferred upon them by the federal government and
the Länder; 2) in the reformed welfare state an altered status has been
conferred upon municipalities; and 3) the formula ‘integration takes place
locally’ builds bridges and opens up opportunities for mobilising
municipalities.
1 Municipalities are the main bodies responsible for public administra-
tion in the federal system of the Federal Republic, a level of administration
which oversees numerous tasks conferred upon them as well as tasks deter-
mined on the basis of the autonomy given to local communities. Prior to
any further specification, these administrations and their staff are the
addressees of this mobilisation for integration, through which they, in
structural terms, are being adapted to the generalised, (nearly) uncondition-
al inclusion of the migrant clientele.44 This alone, however, does not
adequately explain the aforementioned willingness of local communities to
commit themselves to engaging in integration, through reinforcing and par-
allelling federal mobilisation efforts.
2 Municipalities have become the focus of political mobilisation in
favour of integration because a prominent position has been structurally
assigned to them in labour market policy reforms (Hartz I-IV) and in the
Immigration Law. By this, too, it can be recognised that integration policy
has to be seen as part of the reform programme of the activating welfare
state. This and the already mentioned equal treatment of migrants and
natives from the perspective of the welfare state become clear when the
integration courses are set in relation to the systematic changes that have
resulted from the Hartz reforms. The replacement of the previous unem-
ployment assistance by the Unemployment Benefit II and the inclusion of
all previous recipients of social assistance, who as employable individuals
are now available to the labour market, places all individuals who receive
benefits and are no longer entitled to unemployment benefits in the same
position relative to the state. The formula ‘supporting and requiring’ refers
to the limitation being placed on their entitlement to reject the requirement
that they take up work that has been procured for them based on their sta-
tus, that is, with reference to their education, previous occupational status
and income expectations.45 The entitlement to support is hence only recog-
nised insofar as the requirement that people take up work is complied with,
detached from any previously acquired occupational status. Integration
courses are also primarily aimed at enabling new immigrants as well as
those migrants who are considered ‘in need of compensatory integration’
from a linguistic and knowledge-related viewpoint to align themselves
early on with lifestyle requirements in the context of immigration and in
particular with requirements of the labour market. This becomes evident in
structural terms as well from the organisational entanglement of the
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integration programmes with the Federal Employment Agency or the Work
Associations (Arbeitsgemeinschaften).
As a result of these changes, the burden on municipalities has, on the
one hand, been lessened in two respects. With the replacement of the pre-
vious unemployment assistance by the Unemployment Benefit II and with
the inclusion of all previous recipients of social assistance who, as employ-
able individuals, are now available to the labour market, this new service
provided by the Federal Employment Agency has brought to a close the
communalisation of unemployment problems, which the municipalities had
been protesting against since the 1980s.46 In addition, the majority of those
migrants who are not eligible to receive unemployment benefits now fall
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Employment Agency and, as a result,
the previous communalisation of the follow-up costs of immigration has al-
so now been corrected.47
On the other hand, municipalities are incorporated into the associated or-
ganisational arrangement in such a way that they now have devolved
responsibilities for shaping local integration policy, responsibilities which
have resulted both from the Immigration Law and from the Hartz reforms.
On the basis of the integration courses offered by the BAMF in coordina-
tion with the Aliens Authorities for which they are responsible and based
on their newly acquired position in the Consortium, local communities can
influence which bodies within their reach are recognised or recommended
to migrants, which migrants are included in the integration courses and
how the initial consultations for migrants are shaped. In the framework of
the prescribed Consortium, but also in the so-called optional municipalities,
they have competences and opportunities for a community-specific organi-
sation of job placement in which they can take into account immigrants, if
necessary by considering integration-specific points of view. These oppor-
tunities must be seized, however, and this requires that municipalities be
mobilised to grasp them and that the problem of integration be couched in
terms of the inclusion of the local migrant population as part of the normal
clientele. This mobilisation is not the inevitable result of their previously
changed status as outlined above.
3 However, mobilisation is not left up to local coincidence either. The
‘Successful Integration Is No Accident’ competition, jointly initiated by
the Interior Ministry and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, is formulated to some
extent in opposition to this view and presents the results of this competi-
tion as a model and as a mobilising challenge.48 Similar initiatives aimed
at municipalities are derived from the project ‘Immigrants in the City’,
which has been run by the Schader-Stiftung since 2004,49 but also from
the federal-Länder programme ‘The Social City’50 and other campaigns.
The mantra informing such programmes – ‘Integration takes place lo-
cally’ – has considerable plausibility and unifying potential.51 This formula
expresses the subsidiarity perspective as regularly asserted by municipalities
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especially in defence of their political autonomy. It restricts, on the other
hand, claims on the federal government and the Länder. Furthermore, it
finds support in the fact that social integration and its consequences occur
in a locally differentiated way and in the fact that a large number of the
practical political programmes involving integration are set up, as far as
their customisation is concerned, to be context-specific and apply in a com-
munity framework. Support programmes in the areas of education, training
and employment, the family, housing and city districts that are aimed at mi-
grants are in many cases designed to be complementary and adding value,
and act as variants of social work. Their institutional design is locally52 and
community oriented, although the support programmes themselves are
being set up by the Länder,53 the federal government, the EU54 or founda-
tions.55 Mobilisation for integration, seen as the symbolic diffusion and im-
plementation of the belief in the possibility of integration through commit-
ment, thus finds points of contact in municipalities both by connecting with
the communities’ self-image through the formula ‘integration locally’ and
by means of the institutional design of the available practical integration
measures, for which corresponding funds have been provided.
Related to this are the expectations about the symbolic and organisational
direction of such local integration programmes, which some municipalities
quite rapidly set up as explicit political programmes, and which they have
quite aggressively seized upon and promoted – as can be seen in cities such
as Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Munich, Solingen, Essen or Wiesbaden.56 A seman-
tic repertoire is made available to municipalities for the description of prob-
lems, appropriate solutions and effective means, and in this context admin-
istrative forms of rationality – from monitoring to indicators to evaluation –
offer a repertoire with which they may apply for funds for legitimate inte-
gration measures, and have good prospects of receiving them. This includes
their increasing orientation toward conceptual and organisational key con-
cepts and maxims as core elements of the institutional design of the new in-
tegration policy: ‘integration as a cross-sectional task’; declaring integration
to be a ‘top-level concern’; setting their sights on a ‘holistic municipal inte-
gration concept’ and ‘integration management’, based on regular integration
reports, evaluation and ‘indicator-based monitoring’;57 the understanding of
migration and integration in terms of ‘potential’ (and less as a problem);58
the addressing of migrants as ‘subjects’ and from the perspective of ‘partici-
pation’; the ‘bundling of activities’ and the ‘creation of networks’; the ‘in-
tercultural opening-up of administration’ and the ‘rejection’ (or more
strongly: fight against) discrimination and racism’.59 Contained in this se-
mantics is the double offer of (a) a procurement of resources, on the one
hand, and (b) recognition and legitimacy, on the other.
A With regard to social policy, many municipalities have learned since
the 1980s how to procure resources through third parties, in light of the
crisis of public budgets and of a sizeable stock of permanent and
‘INTEGRATION TAKES PLACE LOCALLY’ 143
unsackable employees, resulting in high follow-up costs and limitations on
flexibility. They have built up support networks, through which resources
for dealing with local tasks in different social areas could be procured
through external intermediaries, without the need for entering into the
long-term or irreversible obligations associated with permanent positions
and the tying-up of community resources. Insofar as they have cultivated a
longer tradition of integration work, this approach can be applied in that
area, too. Conversely, the existence of numerous private institutions,60
which are increasing in number, has meant that these institutions are under-
taking corresponding efforts toward resource procurement. These private
institutions confront the municipalities, in alliance with churches and in
some cases alien advisory councils and migrant organisations, but also with
the support of municipal employees, who view this as an opportunity for
the growth of their department or task area, invoking programmes and ini-
tiatives of the EU, federal government, the Länder and private foundations,
which have corresponding expectations and claims. They thereby encour-
age the communities to become active in the area of integration policy and
to adapt their administrations for this purpose. In this respect, they repre-
sent the potential for mobilising municipalities from the inside by contribu-
ting to delegitimising their – as the case may be – historically and incre-
mentally achieved solutions61 in opposition to the nationwide communi-
cated design of modern integration policy and its orientation.
B In light of these internally as well as externally triggered processes
which result in the erosion of the legitimising bases of their policy to date,
the offer of a realignment in the design of local integration policy promises
municipalities the prospect of a recognised legitimate institutional constitu-
tion and thus the possibility of regaining their stability. This redesign along
the lines of copying and ‘best practice’ indeed offers them no guarantee
that integration will succeed – through management, monitoring, nor eval-
uation – but it does provide them with institutional security in view of the
uncertainty that surrounds integration policy. The circumscription of the
New Management Model to one of local integration policy, such as that
which the Local Government Management Association (KGSt) has taken
on board for several years now and imparted in numerous training ses-
sions, continuing education sessions and community projects,62 does not
eliminate the aforementioned insecurity surrounding integration. This inse-
curity results from the fact that policy is unable to effectively steer those
areas of integration which are significant for individuals’ way of life –
above all employment, education, the family.63 On closer examination, the
proposed methods for monitoring integration and for managing local inte-
gration64 demonstrate above all that what the municipalities have undertak-
en – proceeding on the basis of the (means- and concept-based) selective
observation of their environment and taking into consideration the avail-
able legitimate means and solutions, how they have observed this
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reflexively from the standpoint of an effective and efficient use of means
and have continually adjusted this in the manner of their reporting.
Whether this serves the purposes of integration is and remains uncertain,
but it does provide some formal rationale to alterations in the institutional
design of local integration policy. This, combined with the orientation to-
ward ‘best practice’, provides institutional legitimacy through alignment
with what is considered appropriate and effective, without it being alto-
gether clear what this achieves and although it is known that the transfor-
mation of ‘best practice’ to other contexts results in experiments with an
uncertain outcome. In other words: security and legitimacy are drawn from
an institutional design that offers a formal rationality that mirrors other
comparable organisations, in terms of the public communication of com-
mitment and in the orientation towards measures that bring about what is
generally recognised as appropriate and effective – ‘best practice’. This al-
lows one to deal with the irrevocable uncertainty associated with political
organisations and programmes, which, like integration policy itself, set tar-
gets which need to be achieved in social contexts but which cannot be de-
termined by political means, so that the means and solutions established to
reach these targets have only a loosely coupled relationship with the stated
goals. The currently observable willingness of municipalities to accept the
standardisation of their integration policy and the public demonstration of
their commitment thus has its basis in the fact that this changed institution-
al background, publicly recognised as legitimate, gives them an acceptable
framework for dealing on a daily basis with the uncertainty of integration
policy.
Conclusion
The account given here has examined the basis for the willingness of
numerous municipalities to adjust and align their integration policy. What
does this account imply about what can be done, in the context of the
debate surrounding integration policy? Doesn’t this type of critical account
inevitably lead us to the conclusion that, from a practical standpoint, such
observations really cannot be taken into account if one wishes to avoid ren-
dering oneself incapable of acting politically? On the other hand, however,
one hardly runs into serious opposition when referring to such a perspec-
tive in the context of expert sessions, education and training opportunities
or in public debates. ‘Insiders’ are familiar with the latent foundations of
the game – and for that very reason it may be that they have need of the
‘hidden protection’ that results from non-treatment of the topic. But this is
not necessarily so. It can also be the case that integration policy may profit
from more knowledge about its contingency, since it can be organised and,
if necessary, revised more calmly without the presence of exaggerated
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claims and complaints about unfulfilled expectations. We conclude this es-
say with a few concluding observations on this point.
The uncertainty and riskiness of integration are hardly new insights; on
the contrary, it is the very foundation of the welfare state’s origins as a
means of dealing with this risk which, particularly in Europe (in contrast
with, say, the US), pervades society in the form of far-reaching processes
of institutionalisation. International migration reminds us once again of the
riskiness of integration processes.65 Integration policy is an option for deal-
ing with this, which lies close at hand but which neither annuls its uncer-
tainty nor is able to guarantee integration itself.
If one relies on such a policy, as has been shown, it is only logical then
that the welfare state should not enter into any special relationship with
migrants. The peculiarity lies solely in the issue of the specific conditions
affecting migrants or their environment, in the context of their attempts to
integrate. These conditions ought to be taken into account in the shaping
of the integration policy that is tailored to migrants, assuming one accepts
an unchanged general objective: integration as the enabling and obligatory
expectation of a self-reliant lifestyle. Such special conditions involve cul-
tural features such as language, education, occupational qualification,
skills, knowledge and faith, the adjustment of familial and other social rela-
tions on the part of the migrants, but also opportunities or barriers which
they run up against in the particular immigration context that is relevant to
them and which can run the gamut from the institutional hurdles of non-
recognition of acquired extraterritorial qualifications and the associated
monopolisation of occupational markets to the insinuations involving lim-
ited educability or cultural prejudices and just plain racism. The various
options for reacting to these issues by political means have been known for
some time. With money, politics can apply measures for the promotion of
language, education and qualification, for the counselling and stabilisation
of families or for the support of associations. By legal means it can ad-
vance the cause of formal equality and prohibit (not necessarily prevent)66
discrimination. And by means of symbolic communication it can mobilise
above all organisations such as administrations, schools, businesses as well
as the migrant and non-migrant population to participate in integration.
This is what is currently happening, and we have tried to show that these
efforts have gained resonance in municipalities.
If one relies on integration policy as thus described, one can expect the
following implications: for the time being, one must believe in such an
approach, and also deploy adequate resources for implementing it. If it is a
matter of winning over all federal levels and particularly municipalities to
this policy, then in addition to symbolic mobilisation one must also in-
crease the available resources. In doing so, one may realise that the numer-
ous practical programmes and support measures are an integral part of the
history of integration and its results to date, and that in many cases old
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programmes are being set up with a new design. It may be that this is not
harmful but, in view of the ‘sense of a new era about to dawn in Germany,
the country of integration’, in this case disappointments, which quickly
arise in daily business given the slow process of integration, are bound to
occur. One can protect oneself against this by remaining aware of the un-
certain nature of integration, without at the same time having to abandon
attempts at constantly improving things, attempts which should of course
be based on observation, indicators and evaluation. The appropriate control
procedures of evaluation and monitoring, such as they have also penetrated
the domain of integration policy, provide, on the one hand, a certain work-
manship-like sense of security. But, at the same time, they also furnish this
domain with a myth of rationality which for its part runs the risk of bring-
ing about a sense of false security surrounding the effects which should be
or have been produced while, on the other hand, concealing uncertainties
and insecurities in the output design of the relevant reporting and evalua-
tion procedures.
Attempts at equality (as well as attempts to symbolically mobilise politi-
cal administrations, trade and industry, education as well as of the popula-
tion of migrants and non-migrants on behalf of integration) are aimed, on
the one hand, at the total inclusion of migrants, their recognition as a nor-
mal clientele and the expectation that they should participate in this process
through subjectification. On the other hand, in the case of non-migrants
there is an expectation that they, in their roles in politics, administration,
education and the economy as well as their daily lives, should bring about
this equalisation and equal treatment through ‘intercultural openness’. This
much is evident and is as such constantly being alluded to, especially by
migrants: in concrete terms, this form of mobilisation for the ‘normal mi-
gration case’ underlines the special nature of migrants and thus serves par-
adoxically to underscore this special status.
Finally, it should be expected that the processes of institutional redesign
go hand in hand with phenomena of loose coupling.67 The level of public
representation given to local integration and integration policy does not co-
incide with what is decided upon locally, and the premises that underlie
the actions of the various administrations. And representations and deci-
sions do not determine daily behaviour: rather, the latter shapes the margin
of manoeuvre created by (symbolic) representations and decisions, from
the viewpoint of how practitioners come to terms and deal with pertinent
problem situations. This loose linkage between the way integration policy
is represented, the decisions made and actions taken is unavoidable. No or-
ganisation can get by without a certain amount of hypocrisy, as Nils
Brunsson has called it. When municipalities announce at numerous public
events and campaigns that they have adopted a new design, these different
levels need to be disentangled in order to determine what is occurring. The
forms of self-presentation that occur in the increasingly standardised forms
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of reporting, observing and evaluating occasionally give the impression –
in light of these circumstances – of an attempt to disguise these unavoid-
ably loose couplings by means of movable walls. These forms of self-
presentation derive their effectiveness from the institutionalisation of such
standardised forms of description and thus lay the foundations for the risk
of immunisation against deviant forms of observation. This, too, one must
be aware of.
But if this is so, one must assume that, in the case of future integration
policy, protection for its foundations – in view of the foreseeable problems
resulting from a symbolically charged integration design, the anormalisation
of migration through a rhetoric of normalisation or the phenomena of a
loose interface hidden by a unifying emphatic rhetoric – will be of little
avail. Irony in this case appears to be more promising, since it is aware of
weaknesses and communicates decisions in the light of other possibilities,
without laying claim to an infallible understanding of how things occur. But
not every process which is not fully understood can be left unattended until
such time as it is understood: integration policy will be continued until fur-
ther notice. And for this reason municipalities may also seize the opportuni-
ties that have been outlined above. They may then, as we have suggested in
another context,68 become integration moderators, and they may be able to
achieve part of what Häußermann and Kapphan as well as Pavković have
discussed in this volume.69 Remaining in the dark is only one option. Irony
is another, one which is perhaps less susceptible to disappointments – and
for that reason has no need to insist on breaking with the past and on (in
any case unlikely) radical changes in order nonetheless to be serious about
how it confronts or acts upon criticism and divergent views.
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26 Christine Weinbach, ‘Europäische Konvergenzen: Zur Restitution von Staats-
angehörigkeit in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien’, in: Berliner Journal
für Soziologie, 15. 2005, Heft 2, pp. 199-218.
27 Irrefutable in the sense that any policy, even a non-policy, is a decision – and be it
only the decision to make no decision which characterized the migrant policy situa-
tion of the Federal Republic in the 1980s and 1990s.
28 This is the view, for example, of Boswell, The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge,
who assumes such a crisis with no more evidence than the background of the trans-
formation of migration policy in Germany.
29 A distinction must be made between the sociological meaning of what is designated
by the term ‘integration’ and the political semantics of integration. The degree of so-
cial integration (not only) of migrants describes, in sociological terms, essentially
the question of the extent to which they succeed in taking part in those social
spheres that are significant for an individual’s way of life, that is, access to work,
education and training, housing, health, the legal sphere, politics, the mass media
and religion. For further discussion, see Michael Bommes, Erarbeitung eines opera-
tionalen Konzepts zur Einschätzung von Integrationsprozessen und Integrations-
maßnahmen. Gutachten für den Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration,
Osnabrück 2004, http://www.bamf.de (Publikationen Themenbereich Migration).
In this text we are dealing with the political semantics of integration.
30 In this context, migrants have become the subject of public discourse both as a
symptom and as a cause of the welfare state’s underachievement. In this connection
see Bade & Bommes, ‘Einleitung: Integrationspotentiale in modernen europäischen
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7 Illegal migration in modern society
Consequences and problems of national
European migration policies
First published in 2006 by VS-Verlag as the chapter ‘Illegale Migration in der
modernen Gesellschaft: Resultat und Problem der Migrationspolitik
europäischer Nationalstaaten’ (pages 95-116) in Illegalität: Grenzen und
Möglichkeiten der Migrationspolitik, edited by Michael Bommes and Jörg Alt
Translated into English for this book by Anja Löbert
I
Discussions about the structures, causes and consequences of illegal migra-
tion or about the circumstances of illegal migrants begin in many cases,
and not without good reason, by establishing what the term ‘illegal migra-
tion’ is supposed to signify. Here the talk of ‘illegal migration’ is repeat-
edly seen as the terminological stabilisation of a misjudgement: on the one
hand, because most of those who live in Europe illegally, i.e. without a res-
idence permit, are not ‘illegal migrants’ in the sense of having illegally
crossed the external borders of Europe or national borders; on the other
hand, because illegality as such is not, strictly speaking, based on a crimi-
nal offence but in the first instance on an offence in terms of residency law
or employment law – even if it is often seamlessly connected with other
infringements. Here this term is taken as a starting point, despite its ambi-
guity in public discourse, and the choice is made to retain the facts indi-
cated by the term instead of trying, in the name of ‘political correctness’,
to semantically correct defensive positions which are assumed to be closely
linked with the taboo forms of description. After all, discarding this term
means obscuring the important social fact which it indicates: illegal migra-
tion is always also connected to the attempt to conceal one’s actions from
the eyes of the law. The consequence for those affected is that they rob
themselves of the legally mediated capacity for conflict and consequently
find themselves exposed in differing degrees to the risk of social extortion.
Against this background it is hardly surprising that legal experts not only
disagree on what legal residence means and where this ends, but they offer
even less information on what exactly is meant by the social fact of ‘illegal
migration’. From the point of view of migration research, it makes sense
to start from the other end and with the in-house tools of migration re-
search, as it were, i.e. to begin with the fact of migration and then to ask
what the special features of illegal migration are.
When migration becomes a matter for public discussion, what is meant
is international migration. Such migrations are mainly motivated by indi-
viduals’ attempts to take up opportunities to participate in labour markets,
in the educational system, in families or other social contexts. So the pri-
mary concern here is not law or politics. Migrants fulfil an expectation of
social mobility which is institutionalised in modern society, the expectation
that they will go wherever the significant social resources for independent
living can be accessed. The specificity of illegal migration only becomes
visible in the light of this background: each international migration is an
attempt to achieve a lifestyle; these attempts are not problematic, per se,
for the social structures which are the primary motivation for migration,
such as labour markets, educational institutions or families,1 but – as in all
migrations crossing state borders – politics and the law intervene in these
migrations in various ways.
The basis for this is the form of organisation of politics in modern soci-
ety, the nation state. Political and legal interventions in international migra-
tion do not occur by historic chance and transitorily, but are the expression
of a structural problem of the modern world society. On the one hand – be-
cause of the constitution of labour markets, the education system, the mass
media, the institutionalisation of the nuclear family (to mention only the
most important contexts) – this world society constantly generates motives
for international migrations; but, on the other hand, it then restricts these
migrations, because of the specific constitution of the political system, its
segmented division into nation-states (Stichweh 1998).
This is generally applicable, and so far has little to do with illegal migra-
tion in particular, but does offer a perspective on it. International migra-
tions call into question the division of the world population into state pop-
ulations, and states regulate their relationship to these migrations through
the intermediary of the two constitutive dimensions which define their rela-
tionship to their own state populations: the relationship of loyalty, which,
in the name of maintaining political sovereignty, demands compliance with
state decisions from citizens and all other persons present in the territory;
the relationship of service which obliges the state in return to provide serv-
ices of legal, political and social security, such as are contained in the con-
cept of the welfare state (Marshall 1992). It is possible to show that nearly
all political forms of regulation of international migration are structured by
aspects which pertain to these two dimensions, i.e. questions of loyalty and
welfare-state service provision (Bommes 1999). At present, this can easily
be illustrated by the fact that, on the one hand, migration and terrorism are
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repeatedly treated as closely linked in public discourse, pointing to the is-
sue of loyalty, and that, on the other hand, there have been repeated discus-
sions in recent years in all European states about whether immigration con-
tributes to the productivity of welfare states or reduces it (Bade & Bommes
2004).
And yet attempts to regulate international migration in European welfare
states are at the same time part of a redefinition of the service relationship
which these states are undertaking in their relationship with their national
populations, in the context of a restructuring of their welfare-state security
systems. Beyond any precise definition of its magnitude, illegal migration
has gained importance in the European context (and elsewhere), with a sort
of double political movement having been noticeable since the early
1990s:
– On the one hand, a comprehensive attempt to clarify the historical and
future conditions of the social integration of the migrant populations
who are present in these countries with a long-term and fixed residence
status (Michalowski 2006). Here there is a striking convergence be-
tween the opening up of the conditions for naturalisation and the in-
creased focus on the issue of integration under the maxim ‘supporting
and requiring’ (fördern und fordern) in the activating welfare state
(Groh & Weinbach 2005). This does not indicate that these states are
targeting their migrant populations especially, but that they are tailoring
the general redefinition of the service relationship between the welfare
state and its potential beneficiaries in a migrant-specific way (Bommes
2003).
– On the other hand, and corresponding to this, considerable efforts on
the part of these states in selecting which migrants they want to have in
future, and which they do not want, and in enforcing these decisions.
This implies, on the one hand, an opening-up to those migrants who
are considered potentially productive (especially highly qualified per-
sons, entrepreneurs, students) and, on the other hand, restrictions on op-
portunities to immigrate on humanitarian grounds, on family reunifica-
tion and marriage migration, as well as the upgrading of control capa-
bilities in these states and the EU for the purpose of prevention of and
defence against unwanted migration.
– Social integration and control of migration thus constitute the two core
building blocks of current European and in this context also German
migration and integration policy.2
Illegal migration has gained importance in this constellation in Europe,
both empirically and with regard to the political attention it attracts. It
forms the flipside of this structural context of European migration policy.
In the first instance, like other forms of migration, it connects directly and
primarily to social opportunities, such as are to be found in labour markets,
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in education and health systems, and in families. From the migrants’ point
of view, illegality and its implications for the social forms of lifestyle are
an unavoidable side-effect, given the lack of alternatives for legal access,
which they (must) put up with if they are to seize these opportunities,
despite legal prohibition and political attempts at control and at enforcing
this prohibition.3 One component of their lifestyle is therefore always the
attempt to keep this lifestyle from coming to the attention of the law and
politics – with many and varied implications for their social capacity for
conflict and for their access to services such as health or education, insofar
as these are provided by the state and/or closely linked with the state’s ap-
paratus for registration and control.
For illegal migrants, however, such opportunities to participate arise in
labour markets, families and elsewhere, and gain greater permanency be-
cause there is a receptive context for them, one which is in part politically
and legally constituted by the same welfare states which seek to control
and prevent these migrations. This is not meant only in the trivial sense
that everything which is illegal about illegal immigration is only illegal be-
cause there are corresponding laws which limit or prohibit residence or
work, but more particularly in the sense that motives arise in labour mar-
kets, in private households, in housing markets or in welfare organisations
themselves to disregard such limitations or to use them as boundary condi-
tions for establishing employment relations and tenancies, for starting fami-
lies, providing services or setting up aid organisations which would
scarcely come about otherwise. Two examples: services in private house-
holds, such as housework, care services, home renovations and repairs are
only in demand because they are offered and very reliably carried out by
migrants at prices which are affordable and socially acceptable for private
households.4 And in the area of building, which is considered particularly
susceptible to undeclared labour supplied by illegal migrants, it was, not
least, the Europe-wide restructuring of the whole sector in the wake of the
establishment of the freedom to provide services in the EU which created a
context for the attraction of illegal migration and employment (Hunger
2000; Bommes, Hoesch, Hunger & Kolb 2004).
In other words, illegal migration is the result of an interplay of societal
structures which have their foundations in countries of origin, in which the
migrants find no opportunities to fulfil their aspirations, in processes of
globalisation, and not least in the countries of immigration themselves. The
latter are, in a general sense, richer in opportunities, but at the same time
offer only very selective opportunities for immigration, in order to uphold
not only the general barrier of inequality between states, but also the rela-
tive welfare-state privileging of their citizens (or the legally resident popu-
lation). But the flipside of this is that they are at the same time producing,
in parallel, a high level of receptiveness for illegal migrants, and are thus
creating the opportunities which are connected to illegal migration –
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otherwise it would be difficult to understand why so many people seize
this opportunity. Seen in this light, illegality denotes in a sense the ‘loca-
tional advantage’ of these migrants, since their availability makes it possi-
ble to circumvent taxes and social contributions and establish employment
relations or access services, most of which would otherwise not come
about at all (Schneider & Enste 2000; Enste & Schneider 2006).
What sets illegal migration apart from other forms of migration, then, is
not the focus on establishing employment relations, occupying housing
space, living with one’s family or utilising health services, but a constitu-
tive element of its social structure, the fact that these attempts conflict in
various ways with legal regulations which limit or exclude the opportuni-
ties for migrants to enter into such relations, and in this respect cause ille-
gality. These attempts are thus subject to limitations based on forms of
control and law enforcement which differ from state to state.
This, however, points to illegal migration as a paradox of a society
which for structural reasons has not yet dispensed with controls on interna-
tional migration and thus gives this problem a remarkable dynamic of esca-
lation: illegalisation causes a specific demand for migrants which is based
on the attempt to avoid socio-political and tax-related regulations – the
same rules which the control of migration is supposed to uphold. It is
therefore possible to assume that illegal migration is a ‘productive societal
problem’ which has a range of structural effects on the various areas of
society and which produces numerous solutions which contribute to the
reproduction of the problem.
If one assumes, following this argument, that illegal migration denotes a
self-generated problem of modern society which has its roots particularly
in the state-based constitution of its political system, then this explains at
the same time why public political discussion of this problem mainly take
place in a field of tension determined roughly by two opposite poles. On
the one hand, there is the insistence that current laws should be enforced,
and the attendant view that illegal migration is the result of inadequately
equipped state mechanisms of knowledge and control. The consequence of
this is political support for expanding these mechanisms. On the other
hand, attention is drawn in particular to those consequences of illegal mi-
gration and employment which pertain to the social circumstances of ille-
gal migrants and their families, in particular problems of the withholding
of wages and social vulnerability to extortion, the inadequate supply of
housing and health services, or the limited access of their children to
schooling and training. Both positions articulate the paradox sketched
above in an illuminating way: politically, states can certainly accommodate
– depending on the history of their self-establishment and organisational
composition – each in its own way, the non-enforceability of a portion of
their political decisions and of the relevant legislation. Nonetheless, this is
an even stronger indication of a notorious structural problem, if it is
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simultaneously the result of efforts to solve it. On the other hand, the ille-
galisation of migration results in social circumstances which, when pub-
licly discussed, confront society in the European welfare states with prob-
lematic consequences whose existence is considered barely tolerable in the
light of institutionalised rights such as access to health care or the universal
right of children to schooling and training – and which are nonetheless in
the first instance the result of illegal migrants’ self-exclusion from the law.
They do not arise from any neglect or withholding of rights on the part of
welfare states, and yet there is an expectation that these states should inter-
vene socio-politically, and desist from enforcing laws and policies. We will
return to this in section III when considering the possibilities and limita-
tions of states’ powers of control with regard to illegal migration.
II
It can be assumed that illegal migration leads to specific manifestations in
the socio-structural contexts in which they feature, i.e. in labour and hous-
ing markets, in state and non-state organisations for the production of
knowledge and control, in the education and training system or in the
health system. Such structural effects of illegal migration on various areas
of society are actually very rarely discussed systematically, except where
they can be used in support of the positions taken up in the public debate
outlined above, be it the criminality of ‘smugglers’ and ‘people traffickers’,
the unscrupulousness of employers or landlords in their dealings with ille-
gal immigrants, or the inflexibility of government agencies in dealing with
the difficult circumstances of illegal migrants. This striking fact seems to
arise from the apparent fascination exerted by the normative snares of the
paradox of illegal migration. If one assumes, however, that illegal migra-
tion is a continuously abnormalised normal feature of all major immigra-
tion regions, and will remain so into the foreseeable future, then it is sur-
prising how little attention has been paid to asking, in very general terms,
what social structures arise from migration and what significance they have
for society, or what can be learnt about society from them.5
One observation to be made in this respect is that relatively little is
known about illegal migration and its effects in Germany, and that no in-
tensive research has been done on this (AKI 2004). On the other hand,
however, there are a number of indications in existing German and interna-
tional research that it is worthwhile asking questions in a way that allows
illegal migration to be seen not just as a matter entailing mainly political
and normative problems, but as one which also offers insight into society.
And yet, for an adequate understanding of illegal migration and its con-
sequences, no other approach is required than the normal methods of
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migration research. Like any migration, illegal migration can be socio-
structurally significant in the following systematic respects:
1. Like all migrations, illegal migration affects the functionally differenti-
ated subsections of society, each in specific ways. Illegal migration and
the social inclusion of these migrants (i.e. their integration) do not
denote a compact matter, but different things in each context. The in-
clusion of illegal migrants has different effects on the structures of the
labour market, the housing market, the health system, the education
system, social work, politics and the law as well as, finally, families. In
order to understand this in detail, it is necessary to look at the options
and barriers which enable or block the inclusion of illegal migrants in
these various areas, and at the prerequisites which the illegal migrants
bring themselves, i.e. their so-called ‘human capital endowment’. The
central question is then that of the structural consequences which illegal
migration and the multiple inclusion of migrants have for these areas of
society.
2. Functionally differentiated society is characterised by structured social
relations of distribution and inequality. The presence and employment
of illegal migrants also have effects on the social relations of distribu-
tion and inequality. The manner in which this occurs is not yet fully
understood.
3. The conditions in which illegal migrants live vary, depending on their
varying opportunities for access to social systems and the access to so-
cial resources mediated through them.
4. Illegal migration, both the conditions of the actual migration and the
politically and legally criminalised opportunities for access to work,
housing, education, health and so on, gives rise to specific forms of mi-
gration and settlement and to related structural developments, social
networks and organisations which evolve on the basis of the specific
problem situations associated with illegality, such as transport, papers,
informal recruitment, avoidance of compulsory registration when rent-
ing accommodation, or the provision of health services.
When considering illegal migration in this light, it makes sense to be more
cautious in grappling with normative questions, at least until there has been
sufficient investigation into the relevant context and adequate knowledge is
available to form an opinion. Depending on what this knowledge turns out
to be, however, it may reveal not only that the facts are different to what
was expected, but that the options for normative intervention prove ex-
tremely limited or non-existent. The following examples illustrate this.
Studies on illegal migration networks and trafficking from Ecuador and
China show that the emergence of such networks and smuggling organisa-
tions picks up on structures which have a long history, sometimes going
back several hundred years (Kyle & Koslowsko 2001). This is also shown
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by the immigration and by the forms of trade and social forms of
Senegalese street traders in France, Italy and Spain.6 Such studies are
instructive for Germany since they draw attention to the historical prerequi-
sites which explain the dynamics and the exact process of illegal immigra-
tion. As yet, however, illegal immigration from Eastern Europe and Asia
has hardly been studied from this perspective.7
Studies on the circumstances of illegal migrants in Germany have re-
peatedly drawn attention to their low and irregular incomes and their risk
of impoverishment (Alt 1999, 2003; Anderson 2003). Studies in the US,
however, show that the below-average incomes of illegal migrants cannot
be ascribed one-dimensionally to the fact of their illegality and the result-
ing limited options for action or chances of discrimination, but that they
are also related to their human capital endowment, the length of their stay,
language skills and so on. It is surely no coincidence that a country which
has a long experience of illegal immigration is able to matter-of-factly use
insights and methods from general migration research for the comparison.
Such studies then show that the status of illegality also has a substantial
causal role in the – on average – lower incomes of illegal migrants, though
they are unable to explain exactly how this status affects income. A num-
ber of questions still remain open here.
Political discussions of illegal migration and employment repeatedly
evoke the assumption that it is connected with severe detriment to the
economy. This is primarily based on the loss of tax income and social
security contributions. This is contradicted, on the one hand, by the fact
that the economic transactions in the shadow economy would in large part
not be carried out at all if valid tax and social-law conditions were to be
observed (Schneider & Klinglmair 2004: 29; Entorf & Moebert 2004; Jahn
& Straubhaar 1998). Furthermore, the economic processes in the shadow
economy and therefore the employment of illegal migrants apparently gen-
erate overall growth effects, which seem, however, to be simultaneously
associated with profits for certain groups of market participants and with
losses for others, i.e. with an overall effect of increasing social inequality
(Zimmermann 1998; Del Boca & Venturini 2003).
In this context little is known about a number of other important connec-
tions which are significant for an assessment of the social structures result-
ing from illegality and for the related living conditions. This concerns
questions about how illegal migrants are recruited as labour, how ‘con-
tracts’ and ‘rates of pay’ come about in this context, how social trust can
be built up under conditions of limited utilisation of law and politics (i.e.
in the absence of ‘trust in the system’) and how compliance with such con-
tracts can be enforced if need be (e.g. through ‘thug squads’ as a sort of
functional equivalent of the police). What consequences do illegal employ-
ment relations have for quality and safety standards? These questions are
aimed at systematically clarifying how the social relations arising from
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illegality are structurally shaped by the limited capacity for conflict, in the
absence of recourse to the law. It is also striking that, in the area of illegal
employment, the economy does not follow theoretical models, as it were,
but works empirically in conditions of legal and political ‘disembedding’.
Depending on the legal and political forms of regulation, illegal migrants
in countries such as the US, the UK and Italy seem to find employment in
many more areas than they do in Germany, and the mode of illegal migra-
tion (permanent vs. circular) also seems to be connected with this (Cyrus,
Düvell & Vogel 2004; Stobbe 2004). In Germany, evidently through the
coupling of residential and employment law, frequent checks, and the pri-
oritisation of control in the name of ‘internal security’, illegal migrants
have been pushed aside into particular areas, which probably also has the
overall result that the number of illegal migrants can be kept lower.8 In an
international comparative perspective, however, it is also evident that
Germany pays a high price for the strict illegalisation of employment –
since the lamented loss of taxes and social contributions is also the conse-
quence of a strict and cost-intensive policy of control. In Anglo-Saxon
countries, the enforcement of tax and social contribution liability can be
strictly separated, formally and organisationally, from control problems
related to residence law, but the German rule of law tradition does not al-
low this.9
Anyone dealing with illegal migration and its social consequences inevi-
tably comes to the question of the legal boundary conditions of illegal
migration and employment and the forms of organisation of state control.
There are constitutive boundary conditions for social structural develop-
ments in all other areas. At the same time, however, an astonishing limita-
tion in the discussion of politics, state and law is to be found here, since
they are considered only as regulators of the remaining societal relations,
but not as cases which are themselves empirically illuminating, which form
specific social structures in the wake of illegal migration, by helping to
produce them (as shown above) and in turn reacting to them. Law and pol-
itics are not themselves made the object of analysis, but in a sense incite
direct participation, with a normatively regulative intention. Thus, empiri-
cally, surprisingly little is known about how political and legal organisa-
tions react to illegal migration, the related attempts at evasion and self-
exclusion, and what problems of knowledge production, control, legal find-
ings and law enforcement they are engaging with. There is no lack of nor-
mative positions about what the police, the aliens’ authorities, the customs
offices, the German border control, etc., should be doing, nor is there a
lack of normative doubts about whether these authorities are coping ad-
equately with their tasks and doing what they themselves report. But there
is hardly any reliable knowledge about how such organisations function,
how knowing and not-knowing are dealt with under conditions of uncer-
tainty, and in what ways the dynamic of state organisation-formation
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corresponds to the dynamic of illegal (and legal) international migration, in
a relationship of reciprocal escalation.10 As long as states and their organi-
sations are mainly understood as the control unit of ‘society’ – and this
also defines most analyses in legal studies and political science – they will
not be understood as part of the reality of illegal migration and of its social
dynamic, which needs to be thoroughly examined and understood.
III
Nation-states are an internal component of the relations of migration in
modern society, and illegal migrations confront these states with problems
which draw attention to the necessities, possibilities and limitations of their
migration policy, which have their roots in the paradoxes explained in sec-
tion I. Nation-states cannot renounce their right to control access to and
residence in their territories. This right is implemented very differently in
different states. In Germany it is wide-ranging and penetrates numerous
areas of society. Illegal migration is the recurring, regular challenge to this
right and, as shown above, is able to catch up with societal relations and in
its own political manifestation.
A number of problematic social consequences are connected with illegal
migration, particularly in relation to health provision, legal protection or
the schooling of the children of illegal migrants – and this is neither
because they exceed the states’ ability to deal with these problems (at least
in the case of the European welfare states), nor because these welfare states
deny these services, in principle. Nonetheless, demands are made, espe-
cially by organisations with a religious or humanitarian focus, that these
states should remedy these problems. These demands range from the legal-
isation of illegal migrants to the provision of legal protection and health
care, and the inclusion of the children of illegal migrants in schools,
regardless of their parents’ unlawful residence.
The demand for the legalisation of illegal migrants is a reaction to the
fact that many of these migrants, on the basis of their unlawful residence,
enter employment, live, start families or send for their families and bring
up children, and that this process increases with the length of their stay. In
other words, they go through processes of social integration and build up
corresponding social connections which are, on the one hand, marked by
the insecurity of their illegal status and, on the other hand, subject to the
threat of destruction which might ensue if they are discovered and
deported. This is registered socially as a problem, since it is only the un-
lawfulness of their residence status which prevents them from more or less
successfully leading a normal life. In the media this is shown to dramatic
effect with images of aliens’ authorities tearing migrant families from their
precariously established normality, putting them onto planes and deporting
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them to their countries of origin, which they may have left long ago and
where they will have to largely rebuild their opportunities to make social
connections, if such opportunities exist at all. This is a thoroughly every-
day form of documentation for the contradiction described at the beginning
of this essay, that modern society generates multiple motives for migration
on the basis of its social opportunities, while at the same time taking pains,
politically and legally, to limit or destroy them. Against this background,
the demand for legalisation of illegal migrants gains plausibility from the
fact that destroying the possibility of a civilian lifestyle is seen as problem-
atic in the light of the principle of equality in democratic constitutional
states, and in the light of a universalism which assumes that work, family,
education and health should be available to all individuals. This also brings
into sharp focus particular universalism of statehood and citizenship
(Bommes 1999), since they make equality and universalism dependent on
the particular aspect of ancestry and origin – and yet at the same time the
demands made for equality are addressed to them.
But even the demand for legalisation of illegal migrants takes this partic-
ularism as its basis and does not seriously question it – given the lack of
an alternative to statehood as the central organisational form of politics in
modern society. And this is exactly where the difficulties of this demand
lie – and of all demands which try to justify the access of illegal migrants
to health, legal protection and education in terms of principles and human
rights. Because legalisation does not challenge the fundamental right of
states to control access to and residence in state territory, on the basis of
national and international law. What is demanded is, in a sense, the belated
political recognition of the empirical facts of the relations of migration and
their social results, not least, as we have seen, in view of the living condi-
tions of the migrants concerned.
Legalisations are, from a systematic point of view, amendments to the
law in the light of a situation in which law enforcement was or is not em-
pirically possible – it is not or has not been possible to prevent politically
unwanted immigration effectively by political means. Legalisations put an
end to a situation in which something was not allowed, but in which the
law could not be enforced. In principle, however, there are always two
options when reality moves too far away from legal regulations: to increase
efforts at law enforcement, or adapt the law itself. And both options are
associated with risks: in the one case the failure of law enforcement ex-
poses the limited sovereignty of the state, in the other case the legalisations
paradoxically generate the conditions for a future re-emergence of the thing
which was supposed to be eliminated – the presence of a large number of
illegally resident persons in the state’s territory. Legalisations generate ex-
pectations and therefore renewed motives for others to try as well. Thus,
expectations develop on the part of migrants.11 Legalisation measures such
as have been carried out in Italy, Spain or Greece are considered scarcely
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viable in German politics. In light of the insoluble difficulties discussed
above, which are connected with legalisation and have their roots in the
paradoxes of illegal migration, it seems overly hasty to ascribe this to an
inability to learn. Whether states resort to legalisation measures or not can
be better explained with reference to their history and their organisational
capacity for enforcing law, in general. It then becomes evident, for exam-
ple, that the legalisation of migrants in Italy does not mean a break with
state tradition, since, for example, the legalisation of illegal building work
takes place comparatively regularly there (Finotelli 2006), while such regu-
lar, generalised amnesties are more unusual in Germany.12 In the area of
migration, too, legalisation does not take place in a generalised way, but in
an individualised, case-by-case approach – and even this is associated with
the creation of expectations.
Prospects of a legal immigration status exist not only in those countries
which carry out generalised legalisation measures, but also, in a different
form, in Germany. The elaborate apparatus of migration control, linked
with an equally elaborate supply system – in comparative terms – drives
the migrants who do not evade control altogether, for want of an alterna-
tive, into procedures in which they seek asylum or refugee status as the
only accessible legal residence status. The number of asylum and refugee
applications recognised is now low in all European countries. In parallel,
however, the numbers of ‘tolerated’ foreigners (gedultete Ausländer, i.e.
those with exceptional leave to remain) in Germany has risen continuously
since the mid-1990s; in recent years there have always been more than
200,000 cases. There are therefore local authorities, such as a town in
Westphalia, in which around 600 asylum applicants and over 2000 ‘toler-
ated persons’ (Geduldete) live.13
As in the case of legalisation, this is about handling the paradoxes of il-
legal migration, in the form of the Duldung (temporary toleration/excep-
tional leave to remain). The underlying fact is an unlawful state of affairs
which cannot be ended and is therefore given a secondary legal form: that
of the Duldung. Here too, the state lacks sufficient enforcement capacity to
carry out the administrative consequence – deportation – which arises
when a migrant is found to be unlawfully resident. The systematic reason
for this is the territorial limitation on the sovereignty of nation-states. In
many cases they are unable to persuade other states to accept persons who
are to be deported and/or to treat them in such a way that this does not
pose an obstacle to their deportation.14 The result is the presence of mi-
grants who are not actually allowed to stay, but who now need to be given
a legal status,15 because their deportation cannot in fact be carried out, and
this cannot be blamed on them.16 The fact that an illegal state of affairs
cannot be ended is thus dealt with in a form of quasi-legalisation which is
tailored to individuals with long and often hopeless careers within the asy-
lum process, and which is then followed by the so-called Altfallregelungen
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(old case or longstayers regulations) if need be. Altfallregelungen are, how-
ever, nothing other than a form of legalisation tailored to individuals who
have been through long and hopeless proceedings of this kind. The provi-
sion for imposing a time limit on the extension of Duldungen in the
German Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) valid from 1 January
200517 is based, on the one hand, on the experience that attempting to en-
force the law is empirically largely futile and that it makes more sense,
both in terms of administrative costs and in terms of encouraging migrants
to live independently and free of social-state subsidies, to provide them
with a regular residence status. On the other hand, the vagueness of the
law’s phrasing leaves it up to the authorities to judge whether there is any
chance of successfully enforcing the order to leave the country – and this
makes it clear that such legal regulations are formulated on precarious ter-
rain: they are concerned with the legal limitation of the enforcement of the
law with regard to unlawful residence.
Like legalisation, such forms of dealing with illegal migration lead to
the social build-up of expectations on the part of the migrants – it can be
done. This also emerges from the case presentations by Alt (1999, 2003)
and Anderson (2003) about illegal residents in Leipzig and Munich. The
migrants whom they interviewed experience fragmented careers between
legality and illegality, connected to the hope of eventually being able to
shift from a weak status such as that of Duldung to a legal status.
Both legalisations and Duldungen are interesting political-legal forms of
dealing with illegal migration: they are reflexive political forms of adapting
to and perpetuating an insoluble problem, accompanied by a political com-
mentary which nonetheless absolutely insists on the validity of existing
laws and their effective enforcement. In the light of the empirical relations
of migration, there are displays of advocacy for illegal migrants and their
rights, and demands for legalisation and longstayer rulings: the eternal per-
petuation of the illegality of migrants with all the social problems which it
entails is seen as problematic. Such demands are by no means futile, and
have recurring success. But since they martial the forces of empiricism,
they are always confronted with the difficulty that – and this can scarcely
be denied – legalisations of various kinds contribute to the perpetuation of
the problem which they are meant to help solve.
Against this background, it is striking that, in the same context, those
advocating access for illegal migrants to social rights such as legal protec-
tion, health care and schooling not only use humanitarian arguments, but
primarily argue on the basis of principles, with reference to human rights
(Bielefeldt 2006; Rausch 2006). This is meant – by way of normatively
final criteria which cannot be called into question by the European welfare
states on the basis of their current laws – to immunise these demands
against empirical objections, for example, that the opening up of access to
such rights might create new incentives for illegal migration. This is,
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however, not wholly convincing, since the problem is not, under closer in-
spection, that legal protection, health care or schooling for their children
are withheld from illegal migrants in European welfare states, in principle.
On the contrary, these are always open to them, and they in some cases ex-
clude themselves from such provision because they associate the exercise
of rights, the acceptance of health care services, and sending their children
to school with the fear that their unlawful residence status will be noticed
by the administration and that the foundations for their continued residence
and livelihood in the country of immigration will be taken away from
them. This is understandable enough, but can hardly justify a fundamental
demand that the state should limit its right to knowledge and control so il-
legal migrants can claim legal protection, health services, or schooling for
their children – since this would presuppose that illegal migrants had some
sort of right to disregard the law.
This does not exclude the possibility that it might make sense for states
to make such benefits accessible in some form to illegal migrants too, by
renouncing their right to surveillance and law enforcement for pragmatic
reasons. Arguments for this, however, will again be constructed more along
empirical/functional lines, and less in terms of normative principles. As in
the case of legalisations and Duldungen, the question of the provision of
benefits such as legal protection, health services and education for illegal
migrants is also about coping with the consequences of the fundamental
fact that disregard for the law occurs regularly and cannot be effectively
prevented. On the one hand, the claim to law enforcement cannot be lim-
ited, in principle, let alone given up altogether, even if it cannot empirically
be implemented. On the other hand the resulting social consequences can-
not be politically and legally ignored; instead, they require reflexive forms
of handling, such as legalisations and Duldungen, as forms of repair for
the non-enforceability of law. Similarly, it can be shown that it can make
sense for states to provide legal protection, health care or schooling for
illegal residents by renouncing their own right to control, in light of the
consequences of not taking this into consideration.
Guaranteeing legal protection without insisting on the clarification of a
person’s residence status can for example be advisable not just for reasons
of justice or the prevention of fraud, but also to prevent the formation and
growth of islands characterised by social relations of dependence and
power. The aim would then be to prevent illegal migration, which does not
primarily signify criminal behaviour on the part of individuals in a nar-
rower sense,18 from giving rise to secondary areas in which central aspects
of life such as working, income and housing conditions are exempt from
the law.
Giving illegal migrants access to health care without insisting on the
state’s right to control and record, as established particularly in German, is
not only seen as a means of preventing the human misery which results
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from the avoided or belated utilisation of health services. It is also a duty
of public health care, since the non-utilisation of health services also con-
stitutes a danger to public health, insofar as it can contribute to the spread
of contagious diseases. The establishment of relevant services such as the
Malteser health service in Berlin shows that corresponding provisions are
possible and that corresponding legislative adjustments for these kinds of
pragmatic reasons are now finding political resonance (cf. Bommes & Alt
2006: 193-210).
Finally, it is also in the interest of states themselves to effectively guar-
antee schooling for children of illegal families; schooling of the children
does not in itself stand in the way of a return or deportation of illegal
migrants, should this be necessary, but gives the children qualifications and
skills in the meantime, which will also stand them in good stead if this
does happen. But as long as the state cannot effectively prevent illegal mi-
gration and the settlement of illegal migrants, keeping children away from
school because of the fear of discovery will contribute to the perpetuation
of their social marginalisation in the future, and will foreseeably increase
the resulting social costs.
By looking at other countries we can learn that it is possible to find
arrangements which make it possible to deal with the above-mentioned
problems resulting from illegal migration. Such an arrangement can, as
shown, hardly be demanded as a matter of principle, for reasons of human
rights. But since illegal migrations represent a significant case of unsuc-
cessful law enforcement, for which states must hold themselves account-
able, it is required of them that they deal with the resulting problems and
find pragmatic forms which allow this without at the same time rewarding
lawbreaking and the undermining of political sovereignty, or creating
incentives for this. All such arrangements are concerned with the weigh-
ing-up of various highly valued, but conflicting benefits: the validity of the
law and the state’s capacity for law enforcement, on the one hand, and on
the other hand, the potential exclusion of a large number of people from
benefits such as health, legal protection and schooling, resulting in poten-
tially high costs for individuals and society.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the paradoxes of illegal migra-
tion appear to allow only solutions which are always part of the reproduc-
tion of the problem. They do not allow any fundamental solutions, be it
law and order solutions, which take a tough legalistic stance, insisting on
valid law and its enforcement, and yet cannot ignore the fact that they are
confronted with problems which emerge on the flipside of state migration
policy itself; or be it solutions based normatively on human rights, which
have trouble coping with the fact that the social problems resulting from
illegal migration are based on the self-exclusion of migrants from the law.
But if these are paradoxes which have their roots in the structural princi-
ples of modern society and the resulting contradiction, i.e. the simultaneous
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production and limitation of motives for migration, then it is unlikely that
generally valid solutions can be found. But is this a deficiency? Pragmatic
arrangements as a productive and problem-oriented way of dealing with
the consequences of insoluble contradictions expect error and failure and
take them as an incentive to develop practicable corrections. Principle-
based solutions have, by virtue of their construction, the charm of the im-
perative – and those who believe in them are generally determined to see
them through, even if they are incompatible with reality.
Notes
1 This can be seen in the case of internal migration, which, socially, is in many cases
not registered as migration at all.
2 This is also clear from the structure of the 2004 annual report of the
Zuwanderungsrat (German Immigration Council).
3 They are dealing in a sense with the paradox which imposes mobility on all indivi-
duals in modern society: to seek out and take up their social opportunities for parti-
cipation in societal function systems where they are to be found – only to regulate
and limit these attempts in political terms at state borders. This paradox also finds
its expression in the fact that there is an internationally recognised right to emigrate,
but no corresponding right to immigrate.
4 This implies several aspects: services of this kind often do not have to be provided
by Germans or other persons with an equal socio-legal status, since they can still re-
sort to state wage-replacement benefits (even if these have now been reduced) which
at the same time make it risky for them to take on such employment illicitly. Nor
should one underestimate the fact that illegal migrants bring with them a great will-
ingness to work, in contrast to which locals offering comparable services have often
experienced downward social mobility and deprivation, making it doubtful that they
will be socially competitive compared to the now tried and tested illegal migrants –
even if these locals are put under even more pressure to accept low-paid work.
5 Cf. (but arguing in a different frame of reference) Cyrus 2004.
6 In an ongoing study on the Senegalese Murids, Sophia Gaitanidou is able to show
that the forms of migration and settlement of these traders between, in particular,
Southern Europe and Senegal cannot be understood without the emergence of this
sect in the 19th century and its high adaptability to changing political and economic
structures. Sophia Gaitanidou, ‘Transnationale Migration: Die Muriden in Europa’,
Diss. University of Osnabrück 2006.
7 The significance of historically based constellations of immigration and settlement
dynamics has also been pointed out in a general way by Alt (2005).
8 It is virtually impossible to obtain reliable information on the exact number of illegal
migrants in various countries (Jandl 2003). On the one hand, this is in the nature of
things but, on the other hand, it also has to do with a continuing lack of sophisti-
cated research methods in Germany (AKI 2004).
9 In the German rule of law tradition every act of the state administration is based on
legislation, and must be able to be referred back to such a basis. A consequence of
this is the reconstructability of every decision in state organizations in terms of the
lawfulness of state (administrative) action. This lawfulness systematically (not prag-
matically, see section III) excludes the possibility that, in a state conceived as a
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single entity, its sub-organs (such as schools, social welfare offices, employment of-
fices) might be able to disregard what is considered right and wrong in its other
sections.
10 There are hints of this in some work by Cyrus & Vogel (2002), but in the end their
analysis of the control practice of employment offices is primarily focused on nor-
mative measures (of discrimination). See also the work of Scheffer (2001) on the
asylum procedure.
11 Empirically, this explains why fears that migrants who enter Europe via the
Mediterranean might make their way to Germany are largely unfounded. As a result
of the regular legalisation measures which have taken place in Italy, migrants
neither enter the asylum process there nor set out for Germany, because their pro-
spects of achieving a legal immigration status by means of a legalisation procedure
are more favourable there (Bommes 2004).
12 An example is the ‘Gesetz über die strafbefreiende Erklärung’ (StraBEG, ‘German
Act on the Declaration for the Exemption from Punishment’), valid from 1 January
2004 to 31 March 2005, which was meant to motivate owners of capital assets trans-
ferred overseas to declare their capital income and to pay the relevant tax in arrears
without prosecution.
13 The differences from town to town are considerable, partly due to the different ad-
ministrative practices of Aliens’ Authorities across the German federation.
14 Against this background, the EU and individual member states are making increas-
ing efforts to arrange so-called ‘admission agreements’ (Übernahmeabkommen) with
third countries, in which these countries commit themselves to taking back not only
their own citizens, but also those who have entered the EU through their states
(Sinn, Kreienbrink & Loeffelholz 2005: 54 f.).
15 Which is at the same time a non-status: the suspension of deportation is referred to
as toleration (Duldung) and therefore also the continuance of the unlawfulness of
the stay, which must be accepted until further notice.
16 This should be distinguished from the migrants’ obligation to cooperate in the clari-
fication of their case, i.e. their origin, route of entry, identity, etc. But the options for
obtaining this cooperation are limited, and run from negative sanctions such as re-
strictions on freedom of movement and confinement in so-called reception facilities,
and positive sanctions in the form of advice on return migration and financial sup-
port, as provided, for example, by the IOM, with support from the EU, in numerous
countries.
17 Just one comment: the legal form of the Duldung, the abolition of which had been
demanded, in particular, by the Green Party, was retained with the argument that it
allowed for ‘precise management’. This could almost pass for irony, considering that
Duldungen are mainly and in the first instance an expression of the fact that illegal
migration cannot be managed.
18 The police crime statistics for 2002 state: ‘Nine out of ten non-German suspects
who were residing in Germany illegally were registered as suspects because of in-
fringements of the Aliens’ and Asylum Proceedings Act.’ (121) Another 7,5 per cent
were registered on suspicion of forgery of documents, i.e. another matter directly
connected with their illegal existence. This shows that illegal migrants are at pains
to respect legislation, so as not to come to the attention of the law by committing an
infringement, and thereby endanger their stay.
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Introduction
Networks are everywhere. They operate in all areas of society. They range
from local community networks, business development networks, scientific
and health networks, women’s networks and anti-discrimination networks
to those associated with problems in society, such as trafficking and crimi-
nal drugs procurement. It is evident from such a list that two kinds of net-
work exist. The first type has a positive connotation and is deemed in po-
litical, economic, legal and scientific terms to be a force for good. In other
words, their development does not just simply occur, but is proactively
regarded as a goal in itself. The second type of network has a negative
association, which is why the aim is to prevent or destroy them. However,
regardless of whether they are assessed as positive or negative, or whether
they are scientific or trafficking networks, there is generally no question
about whether they are indeed networks. Yet what do business develop-
ment networks and criminal procurement networks have in common?
Labelling them is of no help either; this merely conceals their considerable
ambiguities. Any reference to what generally constitutes a network, and
whether their characteristics can be generalised, is therefore avoided.
Furthermore, not all networks actually call themselves networks.
Conversely, not every grouping that describes itself as a network falls into
the definition of a network in sociological terms, at least not when one
assumes that it is scientifically possible to capture the concept in greater
detail and to define what can be deemed as a network, and what cannot.
From a sociological perspective, a differentiation must therefore be made
between a ‘network’ as a social structure within society and a ‘network’ as
defined in everyday language by society, which is a looser interpretation.
One reason for this differentiation is that the present-day shifting use of the
term ‘network’ creates social complexity. Seemingly arbitrary social rela-
tionships are labelled as ‘networks’, and it has therefore become a catch-all
concept: whereas in the past workgroups, roundtables or associations were
established, nowadays ‘networks’ are created. The social sciences take
some responsibility for this semantic diffusion. After all, the term ‘net-
work’ has gained considerably in popularity over the past two decades in
business science and business administration (Williamson 1996; Thorelli
1986; Monse 1992; Sydow & Windeler 1994), political science (Mayntz
1993; Kenis & Schneider 1996), law (Teubner 1992, 2000), and sociology
(Powell 1990; Grabher 1993; Mahnkopf 1994; Weyer 2000).
Several reasons for conceptualising the essence of the network in greater
detail from a sociological perspective have already been mentioned, the
definition of which simultaneously allows for several minimum require-
ments. It has also been recognised that networks exist in all kinds of social
contexts. For this reason, a sociologically adequate general concept of the
network must be developed that is capable of describing common features
of widely diverse networks. At the same time, the concept must be con-
structed to be sufficiently adaptable for the very different contexts in
which networks exist in society. In addition, such a sociological structural
concept of the network must be distinguished from social semantics, which
give the concept of the network a meaning that is fit for use in both a sys-
tems setting and an economics setting. The prerequisite for this is a socio-
logical theory that differentiates between social structure and semantics
and that simultaneously focuses on their relationship with one another
(Luhmann 1980; Stichweh 2000a).1
The development of such a concept of the network is inter-related with
the differentiation between the construction and the portrayal of social cir-
cumstances conventional in everyday use. Not every portrayal of sociality
as a network corresponds to the construction of a network structure – and
not every network that emerges in society as a structure presents itself as a
network in communication. Social relationships portray themselves as net-
works when social forms,2 objectives, values and reference problems that
have a positive connotation in society can be associated with them (‘wom-
en’s network’, ‘innovation network’); by contrast, where illegitimate possi-
bilities can be realised in a social and contextual respect, such groupings
appear not to portray themselves as networks; opportunities for them being
labelled in such a way by external parties (trafficking networks, old boys’
networks) thus also tend to be avoided.3
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From a social theory to a systems theory of networks
A general approach to examining networks already exists in sociology
(Burt 1982; Granovetter 1973, 1985). Thus far, the theory has not yet been
fully explored, it is rather a ‘universal’ method for formally analysing so-
cial structures (cf. Trezzini 1998); the central theoretical premises are, how-
ever, sufficiently robust to enable them to be examined critically. They give
this approach the social-theoretical contours of a ‘structural action theory’
(Burt 1982): according to this approach, through their actions, agents al-
ways refer to other specific agents, and therefore in this way always enter
into social relationships with one another that ‘embed’ their action
(Granovetter 1985). Networks describe the structure of embedding action
in social relationships, and hence social structure per se. It follows from
the social-theoretical premises of the mutual composition of ‘social action’
and ‘social relationships’ that networks based on this approach appear as a
phenomenon of absolute social necessity.4 It is then, however, virtually im-
possible to distinguish networks from other possible forms of social struc-
ture formation, such as organisations or interactions. The theoretical reason
for this is that the basic concept of the theory already overlaps with the
problem to be clarified, and is therefore overloaded. After all, the concept
cannot assume the meaning of the composition of sociality, per se, as well
as simultaneously describing a social phenomenon contingent in its occur-
rence. In general, avoiding analytical pitfalls of this kind presupposes the
critical means that enables the basic concept to be separated from the prob-
lem: in other words, not answering the issue requiring clarification in the
empirical sense that already resides in the basic concept.
It has been assumed that systems theory is unsuitable for research into
networks (or even fails for this phenomenon) because it backs the basic
concept of the operatively closed social system and, therefore, ‘is irrelevant
to the description of principally unlimited connections’ (Hessinger et al.
2000: 66; similarly: Weyer 2000: 245).5 However, the advantage of sys-
tems theory is precisely that the concept of the network does not belong to
the repertoire of its social-theoretical basic concepts (communication, sys-
tem). The theory does not specify problems of social structural develop-
ment from the focus of social theory, but from the perspective of the theory
of society. As with other social-structural problems, this means that the
question of networks must be clarified in the context of the theory of mod-
ern, functionally differentiated society.
It is, then, generally widely accepted that network formation – at least in
modern society – assumes structures of functional differentiation. In what
follows, this is explained by the proposal that social networks emerge from
addresses, to be more precise: from the reflexive combination of the op-
tions and possibilities connected to the polycontexturality of social ad-
dresses in functionally differentiated society (cf. Tacke 2000; Bommes &
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Tacke 2005). The assumption that networks emerge via the reflexive com-
bination of addresses can be made from the social-theoretical network ap-
proach. Nevertheless, the systems-theoretical proposal cannot seamlessly
align itself with the social-theoretical network approach. After all, the
theory of social differentiation simultaneously suggests that networks in
modern society are not a primary, but a secondary form of order formation
that emerges from the primary structures of social differentiation. This hy-
pothesis is drawn from the social primacy of a form of differentiation. This
secondary form of order can then stabilise itself under certain conditions.
This must be stated within any network theory.
Firstly, there will be a brief explanation of the role played by the pri-
mary social-theoretical differentiation structure for network formations,
which is where social- and systems-theoretical concepts of the network dif-
fer. Then there will be an exploration of the emergence and stabilisation of
networks via address combinatorics. Unlike in systems theory, no differen-
tiation is made between modern society and its precursors in the social-the-
oretical network approach; congruent differentiations are even explicitly re-
pudiated (Granovetter 1985). This is remarkable because in its basic as-
sumptions, the network approach assumes what it denies: the social-
structural transition from a differentiated stratified society to a functionally
differentiated society.
On the one hand, the social-theoretical network approach conveys the
impression that it develops the notion of a primarily stratified, differenti-
ated society because it concedes social-structural ‘positions’ and ‘ties’
(Thorelli 1986) a ‘causal primacy’ (Hessinger et al. 2000: 31). After all, it
is relationships of social stratification, for which it is characteristic, that
form the basis for social relationships being determined by hierarchies and
affiliations. Furthermore, the conditions for participating in communication
are accordingly determined by social-structurally defined status role sets
(Burt 1982). On the other hand, a network theory in itself is only compre-
hensible as a reflection of the particularly modern understanding and expe-
rience that social and temporal connections and social-structural position-
ings become fluid in contemporary society. In other words, a network
theory only makes sense under the conditions that social relationships are
comprehended as having the ability to be created reflexively, rather than
being determined through socio-structural processes.
The reflexive creation of networks, however, requires the release of so-
cial relationships from sweeping social conditionings (and hence conditions
of functional differentiation). At the same time, this release from previous
socio-structurally appointed positions and conditions for participating in
communication in modern society is accompanied by a new set of condi-
tionings and selective specifications of communications. As shown by the
differentiation-theoretical tradition of Marx via Weber and Parsons and
finally Luhmann, this conditioning is based on the meaning-logical
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differentiation and autonomisation of social sub-domains. As Max Weber
saw it, ‘social relationships’ are ‘adapted to one another according to their
meaning’ (Weber 1980: 13; Herv. MB/VT). As Luhmann phrases it social-
theoretically, with the meaning-logical differentiation of society they end
up in the ‘inclusion maelstrom of functional systems’ (Luhmann 1997:
738), and are furthermore selectively conditioned by organisations and in-
teractions in each specific manner.
The network theory, therefore, overlooks the fact that the transition
from one social form of differentiation to another goes hand in hand with
a radical change in the inclusion modes of individuals. Functional differ-
entiation is only possible if individuals no longer take just one position in
the social structure, which conditions all of their social possibilities (total
inclusion), but instead participate in the differentiated contexts of commu-
nication (partial inclusions) from restricted perspectives on the basis of the
‘release’ of individuals from corporate ties (and hence conditions of
exclusion).
At the same time, in modern society, this implies that each specific sys-
tem context decides under which specific condition individuals will have
their addresses used for communication and be considered relevant (inclu-
sion) or irrelevant (exclusion) to the progress of the communication con-
cerned (Luhmann 1995a: 241). The systems, namely functional systems,
organisations and interactions, each regulate selectively and are independ-
ent; they decide on the content of the communication (for example cam-
paigns or topics) and accordingly regulate which positions they give to in-
dividuals within this communication (Luhmann 1997: 738f). Since such
positions, which make it possible to anticipate what to expect, change with
the systems’ references to meaning, they cannot be transferred arbitrarily
from one system context to another: for instance, a leading position in sci-
ence or art may not be able to substantiate a privileged position in law or
the health system.6
The point at which network- and systems-theoretical descriptions clearly
diverge is determined by the question of whether social participation by in-
dividuals is regulated primarily by their social-structural positions and ties
(network) or primarily via communicative references to meaning (system).
After all, the difference has far-reaching consequences: for example, social
differentiation means that systems rationally emerge from each specific
problem for which they then seek individual addresses (as well as organisa-
tions) and as attribution points for rationally specific messages. The social-
theoretical network theory does not assume such a primacy of the contex-
tual problems, substantiated by its own logic of meaning, which then
retrieves relevant addresses.7 Instead, it assumes a primacy of the social
addresses in its social-theoretical renouncement of arguments of differen-
tiation according to meaning.
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The separation of the two theories based on the process of participation
of individuals does not imply that one theory may not inform the further
development of the other. The systems theory can also support the under-
standing that networks take addresses as their primacy, at least in the em-
pirical sense. This means, then, that a primacy of the addresses applies to
the formation of networks. However, it does not apply to the formation of
the primary systems – in other words, functional and organisation systems
– in modern society. Unlike these systems, with their primacy of the prob-
lem for the search for addresses, networks can be established via the acti-
vation of addresses. The identification of problems and solutions, as well
as all subsequent topics and developments are based on their primacy. The
social-theoretical assumption of the primacy of the functional system dif-
ferentiation is, in any case, not necessarily called into question by the em-
pirically comprehended observation that the formation of functional and
organisation systems (problems/addresses) and networks (addresses/prob-
lems) is a complementary phenomenon. Nevertheless, the complementary
relationship between functional systems and organisations, on the one
hand, and networks, on the other, should be understood asymmetrically
insofar as the structure of modern society is based primarily on functional
differentiation; network formations are types of secondary system forma-
tion. This will be explored in more detail below.
Network formations start with observations of how addresses can be
combined, and develop from the opportunities that become available by
pooling these addresses and facilitating communication. Assuming the pri-
macy of the functional system differentiation enabling participation in com-
munication and building contact lists, these opportunities are based on
inclusions and exclusions in differentiated system contexts of society, their
functional systems and organisations. The mutually supportive relationship
between systems and networks already shows that the driving reason for
the establishment of networks can be seen in the potential associated with
linking heterogeneous opportunities, generated in different meaning and
systems contexts, that may become accessible.
Systems-theoretical network formation
Although networks evolve through connecting addresses, they are not sim-
ply ‘combinations of addresses’ (Stichweh 2000b). In order to explain this,
further clarification of what is understood by addresses is required, and
also an understanding of which kind of addresses are possible for establish-
ing networks and how networks are formed and stabilised by combining
them.
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Social addresses
A social address is an attribution object generated for communication pur-
poses, a more or less elaborated profile consisting of characteristics and be-
haviours with which personalised others are identified and equipped in the
communication, and with which the communication operates as an assump-
tion (cf. Luhmann 1995b; Fuchs 1997). Added to proper names, which are
the basic characteristic of social addresses, are a multitude of further differ-
entiations arising in the communication, which make them ‘complex ad-
dresses’ (Stichweh 2000b). One such differentiation is those components
that are combined with addresses in everyday language and which lead to
persons and organisations within the scope of availability: at least an
address, usually a telephone number and increasingly an e-mail address.
However, social addresses only gain contours through their individual pro-
file of inclusion and exclusion, based on their records of participation in
differentiated systems contexts, which hence simultaneously give insights
into their relevance for further communications.
On the one hand, according to the social form of differentiation, ad-
dresses emerge ‘polycontexturally’ (cf. Fuchs 1997); they open up possibil-
ities within the scope of their profiles, and simultaneously exclude others.
On the other hand, they are not remembered and updated uniformly, but al-
ways selectively and dependent on context. The realm of possibilities for
communication, and hence system-specifically constituted differentiations
and attribution forms, are determined by this context dependency (unlike
in network theory).
Social addresses are initially an ubiquitous phenomenon. They are a pre-
requisite when communicative meaning is assigned uniformly to a sender
or recipient, i.e. if it is assigned to somebody who can comprehend the
communication as a message instance (cf. Fuchs 1997; Stichweh 2000b).
This may apply when the sender is representing an organisation or commu-
nicating as an individual.8 Since the formation of addresses is reliant on
the presence of attributions in the communication, the communication con-
tinuously and inevitably produces addresses. In other words, social ad-
dresses are inextricably linked to participation in communications – and
hence to the system-specific modes of inclusion. Because whenever com-
munication takes place, inclusion occurs, and when inclusion takes place,
communication therefore has addresses at its disposal. The reverse, how-
ever, does not necessarily apply by implication. After all, the communica-
tion can also make addresses its subject without including the ‘somebody’
around which the communication is based in the communication. In effect,
addresses can then be updated completely unforeseeably in space and time.
This can be seen from a simple example: ‘Thank you for pointing that out.
I will ask her if she can help me in this matter. Do you have her e-mail
address?’
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Address books and mobilisable addresses
The starting point for network formations can be found in the reflexive
conception of communication via addresses, as the simple example shows.
An address is observed with regard to specific options that can be accessed
via targeted addressing. Networks gain their specific potential through the
reflective observation of the possibilities that attach themselves to ad-
dresses via system-specifically moderated inclusion and exclusion modes
and that represent themselves – for one another – in the communication.
Networks only differ from the primary systems, however, due to the fact
that they particularly relate heterogeneous aspects to one another – i.e. pos-
sibilities created in different contexts of meaning. This can be seen more
clearly when a differentiation is made between two types of address book
and their relevance to network formations.
Address books arranged according to categories (directories) use the
focus of media availability in the communication, but make the aspects of
social addressability visible to only a minimum extent. A local telephone
book is of no use if the caller does not know whom he wishes to call for
what reason. Not everyone can be categorised. The Yellow Pages are also
arranged according to categories. The directory orders addresses under
more specific aspects of addressability which, if nothing else, point to the
functional differences in meaning of the social differentiation structure
(producer, physician, solicitor, etc.). The respective descriptors simultane-
ously demonstrate that the ability to assign an address cannot be assumed
in the other contexts.
Individual address books must be distinguished from address books
arranged according to categories. What is meant by an address is an indi-
vidual’s address or an organisation’s address that connects with a number
of individuals via a single address. They are unique because each recorded
address refers to a history behind the contact and a certain systems context,
giving it a specific profile of ‘addressability’. Individual address books not
only contain mobilisable addresses, relevant to establishing networks, but
also addresses that can be activated functionally. This enables a distinction
to be made between the address of a physician listed in an individual ad-
dress book and that of an acquaintance who happens to be a physician.
The latter could therefore be approached informally if their professional ex-
pertise was required, but this would not be formally anticipated, as they
had not been listed in a directory based on this function. The fact that the
difference between functional and mobilisable addresses cannot be seen
from the text of an address book shows that this difference must neverthe-
less enable communication to succeed, and can be further enabled when
addresses are updated.
Uncategorised, individual address books are the starting point and foun-
dation for establishing networks. This simultaneously implies that merely
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linking addresses cannot yet be called a network. Although modern society
features an increasing degree of availability and enormous complexity with
regard to organising addresses,9 such ‘address connections’ (Stichweh
2000b) still do not constitute a network – either in referencing scientific
citations to other scientific citations, or in the form of being able to list
1,000 or more persons as acquaintances. Even if only minimal require-
ments are made regarding a sociological concept of the network that can
empirically capture even highly transient forms of network, simple address
connections, individual address books and networks must be treated as sep-
arate. Networks are not merely references by technical, categorical or indi-
vidual addresses to other addresses.
Network constitution and stability
The pool of individual addresses that can be mobilised to establish networks
is characterised by random circumstances that cannot be predetermined.
Although the polycontexturally based inclusion profile of each address
restricts the possibilities, unpredictable options can also always be discov-
ered and updated within the profile. For example, you might discover that a
former fellow student lives in the city where you’re in search of a flat; or, it
might occur to a professor that he could contact his brother to arrange a
work placement for his student at a television broadcasting company.
Access to the discovered possibilities and the initiation of networks is
precarious. After so many years would it be appropriate to ask the fellow
student if she would help you to look for a flat? The reason for the precari-
ous starting point is that mutual favours are initially connected to the con-
text that defines them: fellow students help each other with their studies,
but do not necessarily arrange accommodation. The request for access to
the cross-context possibilities discovered in an address is not necessarily a
socially supported norm because the two possibilities are unrelated on a
contextual basis. The risk of such a communication lies in the anticipated
rejection of the unreasonable demand and in the observation as an ‘illegiti-
mate’ request for linking heterogeneous possibilities.
If the risk is taken and there is a positive outcome, then further possibil-
ities might be explored within the profiles of addresses, and they, in turn,
could lead to reciprocal requests. It can generally be assumed that the self-
enforcement effects of the communication, once uncertainty has been
absorbed (cf. Japp 1992), contribute to the fact that the serendipity of the
establishment of networks can sustain them. However, the way in which
society, context and time contribute to the self-stabilisation of the network
must be investigated in further detail.
Whilst the diversity and accessibility of the addresses initially present a
potential barrier to the launch and establishment of a network, once this
barrier has been overcome, it will become the bedrock and the driving
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force behind the network’s stability. The problem of organising assistance,
contacts, access, advice, etc., made collectively available by the partici-
pants is resolved over the course of time: reimbursement for the services
received will inevitably take place at a later point in time, and any service
rendered constitutes a ‘credit’ for a non-specified return service in the
future (Gouldner 1960). The necessarily unspecified character of such re-
turn services and their non-predefined scope – after all, it is not a matter of
exchanging equivalents – constitute the ongoing continual presence of an
overhang, a ‘constantly remaining obligation’ (Luhmann 1997: 653) fol-
lowing such a return service. In other words: the polycontexturality of this
arrangement constitutes the foundation for the development of a general-
ised expectation of reciprocity. Viewed operationally, this expectation facil-
itates the continuation and stability of the initiated network formation, and
is therefore able to secure its validity and high degree of flexibility in vari-
ous contexts (ibid.).
This implies that it is not enough to define generalised reciprocity as an
essential principle of networks in order to define their emergence and abil-
ity to self-stabilise (as suggested, however, by Powell 1990 and Mahnkopf
1994). Although this form of generalised reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) does
initially facilitate the operational stability and continuation of networks,
this is only possible on the basis of the ‘combination of temporal and
social asymmetry’ (Luhmann 1997: 652). In other words, and as has been
shown, the expectation of reciprocity precedes the social network constitu-
tion in the previously described meaning of overcoming a barrier, which is
then followed by a time of stabilisation and establishment over time on the
basis of reciprocity.
Particularly because the social composition of networks under modern
conditions is based on the connection of heterogeneous addresses, the con-
tinuation of this reciprocity is subject to considerable assumptions. Under
these informal social conditions, reciprocity cannot be based on pre-regu-
lated or externally imposed fixed reference points.10 Networks in modern
society that are based on the release of social addresses and are particularly
initiated due to social opportunities11 must take care of themselves in all
their dimensions of meaning – in other words, socially, contextually and
temporally, i.e. they must ‘gain conditionings on the basis of reciprocity
that can be maintained over the course of time’ (ibid.: 653).
The communication of reciprocal expectations of services characterises
the functional mode of networks: rendering services with regard to other
future services yet to be determined. Contextually, this can range from
assistance and support within neighbourhood networks to innovation net-
works initiated by organisations (Kowol & Krohn 1995). In both cases, an
emergent service result is rendered possible via the improbable exchange
of heterogeneous individual services, whether concerning new products or
technologies or, alternatively, improving welfare provided by neither the
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market nor the state. However, it has not yet been clarified how this mode
secures its own connectivity, and hence the continuation of the network
communication.
The tendency to expand and the need for restriction
As already shown, networks emerge once the barriers to their establishment
have been overcome. They enable the improbable to happen by combining
contextually incompatible aspects with one another, made possible by link-
ing addresses. This is where they find their opportunity to emerge. In turn,
however, the communication form of reciprocity does not contain any cri-
teria of the contextual restriction (Gouldner 1960: 175). In this sense, it is
unpredictable in that, once established, it has a tendency to spread to
everything unchecked. For this reason, networks are initially subject to a
contextual tendency and then also dependent on social behaviour to ex-
pand, because the formal mechanism of reciprocity does not principally al-
low for a stop rule: the more intensive the network communication, the less
specific the opportunities regarding the creation of mutual expectations of
services.12 This substantiates a contextual and a social risk of overload.
For this reason, it can be assumed that numerous networks will disintegrate
shortly after their initiation because the potential participants shy away
from the expected expansion of the network, which is why continuous net-
work inclusion fails.13 After all, the principle of including participants in
network communication basically consists of the expectation of participa-
tion in the reciprocal rendering of services with reference to a limited range
of addresses.
How do networks succeed then in restricting their contextual and social
scope and, in so doing, deal with the contextual and social risk of overload
by excessive growth? Networks can evidently limit their growth by remain-
ing focused on the original reasons for their foundation in the first place.
This can lead to problems for newcomers who find it hard to gain a foot-
hold in socially exclusive, established networks. Difficulties can also
emerge when the networks’ original purpose was broad in scope, e.g. inno-
vation networks, regional business development networks, migration net-
works, neighbourhood networks and women’s networks. The contextual
meaning which inspires the formation of the network then defines its con-
textual scope. Assuming this, criteria can then be developed concerning
which addresses are potential participants in the network. Such initial self-
structuring may possibly succeed in engaging potential participants for the
continuance of an emergent network using the combination of social and
temporal asymmetry.
In local community networks, problems specifically associated with
everyday lives in private households typically become the focal point for
expectations that can be communicated and constructed within the
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framework of the reciprocity rule. It is generally a matter of overcoming
temporary situations of shortages of food and other household items, com-
munication problems, looking after and caring for children and the elderly,
limited mobility, security or building or technical repairs or developments.
In this respect, local community networks develop a variably deep and far-
reaching intensity through their own legacy and experience, which is stabi-
lised through repetition and which can then at the same time serve as a re-
striction. In the social dimension, they are primarily based on spatial and
temporal inclusivity and availability criteria, thus restricting its social
reach.14
In scientific networks and most forms of organisational networks, their
origins serve not only as the criteria for the contextual range of reciprocity,
but also for the inclusion of addresses. In scientists’ networks, their func-
tional starting point does not generally include helping each other over-
come routine, everyday problems, thereby restricting the network’s contex-
tual possibilities for expansion. Accordingly, the ability to make such con-
tributions does not substantiate participation in the network either. The
specific contextual and social orientation and selectivity of organisational
networks can be seen from the names they are typically given, such as sup-
plier or innovation networks.
By comparison, it is particularly evident in the example of illegal immi-
gration networks that networks are nonetheless able to expand their context
considerably: they provide information about transport, communication,
accommodation, gainful employment, health, law, power15 and a wide
range of assistance to help participants lead their everyday lives (cf.
Müller-Mahn 2000). These networks construe the reciprocity mechanism
expansively in the contextual dimension based on the foundation of their
underlying problem – immigration.16 At the same time, this justifies the
intrusive and unreasonable demand content of such networks that can af-
fect the entire lifestyle of participants. They tend to recruit and retain par-
ticipants in an unforeseeable manner by influencing a broad sweep of their
lives, leading simultaneously to social expansion. If nothing else, the status
of being an illegal immigrant restricts the possibilities of withdrawal, since
the ability to use services in organisations within the functional system is
reliant in many cases on inclusion in the networks, and hence continues
the inclusion in respective expectations, because no alternatives are open
to them.17
A further potential restriction to fulfilment lies in the combination of the
particular conditions of the contextual meaning dimensions of networks
with formal reciprocity as their specific communicative form, which is a
barrier to participants prospering in their own right. This demonstrates that
reciprocity is hence reliant upon probatory participation in social and tem-
poral terms. Temporally, each service rendered is met with a return service
in the future, which alone restricts the possibility of the expansive
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communication of further expectations of service: a certain degree of re-
dundancy is probable as a prerequisite for variance in the meaning of the
increase in the effectiveness of networks.
Providing a return service in the future simultaneously signifies social
probation. This forms the basis for nurturing trust and gives insights into
addresses once more is known about the character of the individual. But
here, too, the following applies: growth in terms of the increase and var-
iance of the addresses facilitates an increase in the combined possibilities,
but also brings with it the risk of weakening the mechanism of trust with
regard to social obligations (likely to be stronger in smaller, more intimate
networks) and the expectations of reciprocity and the focus of the network.
The closure and restriction of participation in the network therefore in-
creases the mutual ties and exclusivity of participation, but limits the op-
portunities of future combination gains (cf. Granovetter 1973).
In their structural development, therefore, networks are based on their
eventual redundancy. This allows them to strengthen and therefore, at the
same time, to test and limit their variation leeway from a social and con-
textual aspect. In other words: in this fundamental reflexive reference to
the contextual and social dimension, the potential of networks lies in their
dynamic stabilisation through the facilitation of growth and social self-
extension on the basis of eventual restriction and social closure.
Structural formation in networks is the result of their balancing variance
and redundancy. Their contextual starting point requires temporal and
social confirmation as the foundation for maximising their effectiveness
with regard to access to improbable possibilities. As such, their starting
point substantiates their path dependence in the realisation of their potential
which, over time, is more or less brought to bear in the definition of the
enhancement relationship between redundancy and variety. As already
shown, the incentive to establish networks exists in creating improbable
combinations of possibilities. They therefore result in highly specific serv-
ices for their members, arising from the combinatorics of these possibilities
under the structural conditions of the network formation and their stabilisa-
tion in the described sense. For this reason, networks are inevitably particu-
lar: they emerge in response to particular opportunities, and apply their
inner structure formation onto them on the basis of generalised reciprocity
and the associated stabilising influences. They then go on to develop their
specific achievement potential on this basis. After all, although an ‘objecti-
fication’ takes place in the process of network formation, enabling contex-
tual criteria and problem references to be created and stabilised (which fre-
quently lend their names to networks), the barrier to universalisation/gener-
alisation cannot be overstepped, owing to the particular constitution and
self-embedding of networks.18
Networks gain social cohesion from the address characteristics of certain
persons, contextual cohesion from the highly specified services to be
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arranged via them and temporal cohesion due to the reciprocal relation-
ships created and confirmed between members. The operation and inclu-
sion framework of networks are the formal communicative conditions
under which they can be observed. On this basis, they can emerge – and
dissolve again – in virtually any arbitrary social context. Some networks
are more permanent than others, not due to their reciprocal operation mode
alone (which characterises all of them), but due to the fact that the particu-
lar starting conditions are used reflexively to create structures in the
described manner, securing the connectivity communication within the
network.
In summary, this can be worded as follows: the ability to link up hetero-
geneous and therefore contextually unconnected services, accessible via
addresses, through reciprocity and the creation of a network-specific range
of services is essential for networks. Connecting heterogeneous elements
therefore does not find coherence in itself beyond the particular motive,
but is only required for initiating reciprocity, which, in turn, is anchorless:
contextually, as long as it is lacking a specified criterion of restriction;
socially, as long as it is not embedded in any institutionalised social posi-
tion or role, and thus backed by it, but merely through its ‘circumstance’.
This reveals the modernity of networks beyond the condition of the release
of social addresses: networks gain support in neither status nor roles, nor
in the social form of differentiation.
In this sense, networks apparently manage to stabilise themselves by
connecting several particular selections through reciprocity, which brings
them, as it were, into a relationship of mutual support, and thus self-sup-
porting structural formation. This justifies the significance of balancing out
the relationship between redundancy and variety in networks. Not every-
thing can be varied at the same time in such a supportive, inter-connected
arrangement: contextual enhancement must prove itself socially and tempo-
rally; social variation must prove itself contextually and temporally; and,
finally, temporal variation has to prove itself socially and contextually.
Against this backdrop, it can then be deduced that all structures of the net-
work – its participants, its obligations, its specific range of services, its
time relationships – are its own creation.19
Forms of self-simplification
Social networks primarily communicate expectations of reciprocity in a
continuous, implicit fashion; but they are also based on explicit self-
descriptions which are connected to various possibilities of the self-simpli-
fication of their self-created structures. One form of self-simplification is
the names they give themselves, which are used not only within the net-
work, but often also in the way in which they portray themselves to the
public.
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A name such as Netzwerk Frauenforschung NRW (Women’s Research
Network North Rhein Westphalia) recognisably refers to two contextual
references at the same time: science and politics. The reference to ‘women’
oscillates, on the one hand, between the policy dimension (equal opportu-
nities, in a German federal state) and the academic dimension (gender stud-
ies). On the other hand, the reference also complies with the inclusion di-
mension of the network (it is not intended that men will participate).
According to the way it presents itself externally, the network consists of
‘female network professors’ with accessible university addresses.20
However, neither the factual conditions of reciprocity in the network nor
the prerequisites of political success are described in its self-portrayal.
What is also presupposed, because of its positioning between science and
politics, is a set of organised, available network addresses from political
bodies that have accessible resources and that participate in the network in
the temporally, contextually and socially restricted mode of the communi-
cation of reciprocity. However, they do not appear as addresses in the ‘net-
work’, with the exception of the reference to a former minister who notice-
ably makes use of the aspect of a foundation myth in the self-portrayal.
This alone shows that the conditions present in the presentation and crea-
tion of networks can diverge to a lesser or greater extent. Its self-pro-
claimed scope as a ‘women’s research network’ is attached to a functional
(scientific research) and a universal viewpoint (equal opportunities for
women), which gives the process legitimacy. Its framework, however,
latently implies the fact that both the general reciprocity-assisted operation-
al basis and, in particular, the principle of self-endorsement and the status-
related exclusivity of participation also turn this network, in essence, into a
particularistic structure formation.
In contrast, a self-generated model in which ‘men’ combine certain serv-
ices into a ‘network’ cannot expect to be met with comparable responses
and legitimacy that political and public organisations engender. The respec-
tive improbability of such a model does not, however, indicate that the cre-
ation of networks established on the basis of the recognisably ascriptive
feature of being ‘male’ must fail. They are by all means empirically detect-
able. Comparatively, however, it is interesting to note that in such net-
works, the address aspect of gender need not be communicated as the sub-
ject and the declared exclusion criterion. In fact, the gender-related selec-
tive inclusion in the network can be based on the reference to bodies
disengaged from communication (sports, sauna), where the communicative
‘no’ is avoided or made invisible (Stichweh 2004: 355ff.). Analogously,
for instance, the communication does not imply whether regular university
‘professor’s football’ serves the purpose of creating and fostering a gender-
homogeneous corporate network in addition to its portrayable function of
regular recreational sport amongst colleagues, which selectively imposes
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its ‘physically’ based – in both senses of the word – social ties in the or-
ganisational decision-making process.
However, networks can also simplify their conditions by myths associ-
ated with them, such as by referring to themselves as ‘fraternities’ or
‘bonds of friendship’ or by invoking kinship or ethnicity as primary ties.
The secondary forms of reflexive stabilisation can also expand or restrict
the scope of possibilities and the flexibility of the network21 in these cases,
too, by furnishing it with structures of the portrayal of its boundaries in a
contextual, social or spatial respect. This is frequently overlooked in net-
work research, too.
In research about migration, for instance, the task of precisely defining
networks is frequently circumvented by calling them ethnic or kinship net-
works. Research thus assumes the self-simplifications of networks – as
though everything is implied by the labels. However, the meaning of the
concept of the network in modern global society is that it presents the pros-
pect of capturing a structure of social relationships that tend to be absolved
from conditions of close proximity and the social vitality of interactions.
As shown, social systems provide social networks with their opportunities
for establishment and growth; in other words, they require the social struc-
tural contexts from which they emerge. This paves the way for the spatial
decontextualisation and, potentially, the global operational mode of net-
works restricted by their own dimensions (Stichweh 2000c). By linking
addresses, networks combine the contextual possibilities available to the
individuals belonging to the networks. The reference to space (neighbour-
hood, regional origin) and social proximity (within the sense of kinship
and ethnic community building) enables networks to be stabilised through
simplification. This, however, should not be confused with theoretically
and empirically genetic and structural issues. Networks may primarily
emerge and spread through the medium of collectivisation mechanisms,
such as family and relations, or spatial indexing, such as urban districts or
origin: performances in connection with realising a migration project can
be expected on the basis of affiliation to a kin, ethnic group or local area.
Reciprocity then initially finds some kind of external support in the (for-
mer) inclusion of migrants in socio-structurally embedded reciprocity rela-
tionships (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958; Schiffauer 1987). With the creation
and continuation of such networks, however, it now becomes important for
this external support to be substituted by the process of reciprocity, gener-
ated internally by the network itself, in order for it to thrive. The networks’
moral obligation of reciprocity learns lessons from peasant society in
which a collective approach was applied in order to survive times of hard-
ship. However, this approach is made vulnerable if the variation in ad-
dresses is too excessive. And this is particularly the case in migration net-
works because the participants may provide one another with transport,
jobs, accommodation, the power of enforcement, legal advice, training,
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media access, solace, medical treatment or assistance. In the development
of a network, therefore, the self-created obligation of reciprocity replaces
the moral obligation content, which was embedded externally in the pre-
vious circumstances. This obligation of reciprocity is based on various
services which, if not fulfilled, however, make the further inclusion in a
network’s range of services more improbable due to the loss of trust.
Relatives and people with shared nationalities can then become ‘tiresome’
and be confronted with more and more requests, based on previous ‘cred-
its’ or increasingly withdraw from them ‘ashamedly’ with feelings of guilt.
In other words, when networks are initiated through genetic connections,
through relatives, regional or ethnic affiliation or other forms of collectiv-
isation, this does not structurally change the fact that they remain reliant on
their own support mechanisms within the structural context of functional
differentiation and have to adapt the conditions with which they started in
order to develop.
Delineation and system formation
By analysing the debate set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that net-
works, strictly speaking, should be regarded as social systems. Their char-
acteristics of fluidity and flexibility seem, however, to contradict this idea,
which, in addition to their proliferation,22 is repeatedly produced in the
general discussion about networks, which assesses their particularities and
strengths. These features, however, can only be comprehended on the basis
of the characterisation of the particularities of structure formation in net-
works outlined above, because it enables us to understand how stability
can be achieved whilst, at the same time, enabling path-dependent flexibil-
ity and fluidity from contextual, social and temporal perspectives.
Basically, a network consists of nothing other than recursive, reciprocal
service communication. Its fluidity is a result of the fact that within this
communication, no extensive, explicit definitions can be made, because
this would destroy the structural basis of the efficiency of the network, i.e.
the functionality of reciprocity: in contextual terms, no explicit definition
is possible in the long run – this and not that; in social terms, no explicit
definition can be given in the long run – this one and not that one; and in
temporal terms, no explicit definition can be given in the long run – then
and not earlier or later.23
The arrangement of the mutual interconnection of the contextual, social
and temporal structures, and the associated stability and flexibility, has to
justify its legitimacy in the course of the network’s performance.
Networks’ boundaries therefore appear to be flowing in both contextual
and social respects. After all, from their initial starting point, networks are
in fact capable of dragging everything and everyone into their maelstrom,
provided they fit into the self-reproducing structural arrangement as a
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potential service or address. The boundaries of networks appear to be more
or less determined by context and social influences because, in principle,
the whole contextual and social world can become the subject of network
communication, bearing in mind their contribution to the network and their
increasing scope of services on the basis of reciprocity. The evolving na-
ture of boundaries, however, must not be mistaken for indetermination.
Ostensibly, the characteristics of boundaries always concern only those
parts of the world that are deemed to be their relevant environments on the
basis of their structural arrangement, depending on the specific networks.
Consequently, the fluidity of boundaries does not mean that they serve no
purpose: a network establishes itself in the social world by performing its
reciprocal communication which determines its membership during the
course of this performance and on the basis of self-created structures. This
can be subject to considerable fluctuations, and yet not necessarily become
arbitrary. After all, although no sound criteria exist for this, the decision to
continue the network communication itself constitutes the last criterion.
Where communication ends, i.e. when a network dissolves, the construc-
tion of boundaries in terms of the function of sharing addresses and provid-
ing services now defunct, has failed. This is because the context has be-
come blurred and trust can no longer be nurtured, i.e. the particular and
structural arrangement of a network that justified itself during its perform-
ance has collapsed. It is possible for networks to disintegrate in this proc-
ess, but they may be reactivated. From an operational point of view, how-
ever, this is not surprising because networks stop and are brought back to
life, provided their basic model of the relevant communication of recipro-
cal expectations of services succeeds. In other words, they must be capable
of making connections and enable boundaries to be drawn with regard to
the aspects mentioned.24
Ultimately, difficulties in comprehending networks as social systems can
be further resolved and eliminated by comparing them with other systems
in modern society. Networks do not gain support in the contextual dimen-
sion, as with functional systems, nor in the social dimension, as with strati-
ficatory systems; they also do not rely essentially on presence and the
reflexivity of perception, unlike with interaction systems. The comparison
with formal organisations, however, is quite revealing: similar to these or-
ganisations based on the recursive linking of decisions, networks form their
structures by the recursive combination of expectations of reciprocity. In
contrast to other organisations, however, which can essentially make any-
thing the subject of decisions, networks remain inevitably bound to their
particular starting point, linking heterogeneous addresses and the services
procured through them. Decisions can be made a subject of decisions; thus,
in organisations, everything can be formally negotiated. By contrast, it is
not obvious how reciprocity would be applied to itself in networks. And
even if this was possible, it is not clear how it would manage to modify or
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eliminate the particular starting point as a basis for further structure forma-
tion. For this reason, networks are unable to establish themselves formally
in the way that organisations do. Instead, strangely enough, their formation
is based on the interconnection of universalism and particularism: on the
possibility of combining addresses based on their universal release under
conditions of functional differentiation; each specific combination and the
resulting performance content, however, are inevitably particular. Opera-
ting under conditions of functional differentiation, this is the reason for the
potential fragility of networks: they only gain support from within, em-
bedded in the specific combination and inter-relationship of social, contex-
tual and temporal structures applicable only to them. This makes networks
somehow arbitrary and universal at the same time: they appear everywhere.
They are ephemeral: they emerge, vanish and come to life again. This
makes it difficult to grasp this universally applicable possibility of network
emergence in functionally differentiated society and to understand that the
rapid emergence and disappearance of systems – as with their flexibility
and fluidity – does not contradict the fact that they are, indeed, social
systems.
Conclusion
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the present determination of the sys-
tem formation of networks and the mode of their structure formation does
not answer the question regarding which structures of modern society are
more likely to establish networks and what they actually achieve as secon-
dary structure formations in modern society, i.e. beyond each individual
network’s specific scope of services. After all, they appear to some extent
to materialise in structural spaces that pervade modern society. There is vir-
tually no other way to explain their ubiquity: they are, after all, secondary
system formations. As an independent analytical task, however, we can on-
ly focus on this adequately by taking the concept of the network devised
here into account. The proposal for such a concept put forward here there-
fore constitutes a research programme for the authors.25
Notes
1 Meier and Krücken (2003) emphasise the side of the semantic economy and por-
trayal of ‘network’ without, however, allowing for structural issues of their construc-
tion within the framework of their neo-institutionalist argument (network as a new
‘rationality myth’).
2 The contribution by social sciences is remarkable here, too: for instance, Powell
(1990) talks of networks as social relationships that are ‘more social’ than other
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social relationships because in networks socialisation is not based on the market
(prices) or hierarchy (orders), but on solidarity (trust).
3 In the first part of the present article, reference is made to arguments published pre-
viously by the authors elsewhere (Tacke 2000, 2001; Bommes & Tacke 2005). The
second part of the present text, however, goes beyond this status of the argument,
particularly with the proposal to describe networks as systems (unlike in Tacke
2000).
4 Advocates of this approach may see a simplification in this, provided they tend to as-
sume that, in addition to networks, social relationships also exist that are ‘less social’
than those in social networks. What is typically meant by this is that markets and
hierarchies are objectified contexts of social aspects, according to Weber. If this
should be taken into account, however, conversely the concept of the network can
theoretically no longer stand for the constitution of sociality, per se, at least not with-
out clarifying the relationship between the contextual, temporal and social
dimensions.
5 But why, one asks oneself, do social networks depart from social systems – they will
at least have to adhere to this boundary. They need not be called systems, but it is
impossible to avoid creating a boundary between social and non-social aspects.
6 This does not mean that transfers of this kind cannot occur empirically, but rather
that if they do occur, sociology faces special challenges to explain them.
7 And then, yet, implicitly or formally: strong ties (same context of meaning), weak
ties (heterogeneous contexts of meaning).
8 However, this is not the case with functional systems or interaction systems. It is
impossible to address ‘the’ economy or ‘the’ politics. And the attempt to address an
interaction system leads to the person concerned becoming involved in the interac-
tion (or being ignored).
9 This has become the subject of extensive research under the term ‘small world’
(Milgram 1967; Watts 1999). In this research, the accessibility of addresses (target
persons) via known addresses is investigated in experimental studies. ‘Small world’
emphasises that only very few ‘intermediaries’ are required to successfully reach and
address arbitrary addresses throughout the world via acquaintanceship connections.
10 For instance, the expectations of reciprocity are embedded in differentiated seg-
ments of societies in the form of differentiation; they correspond to the consistency
of the sub-systems (families, clans, etc.) within which the social possibilities of the
individual are defined on the basis of gender and generation. Here, reciprocity does
not substantiate networks that require the release of addresses either – but which
are therefore open with regard to their social composition.
11 They do not support the form of differentiation, but are established secondary to it.
12 In this context, let us not forget the networking potential late nights at the pub may
have during academic conferences or the significance of a lack of fences between
neighbouring properties.
13 Here, too, we can tell how it differs from the significance of expectations of recipro-
city in pre-modern social structures: the rejection of a ‘donation’, and the immediate
compensation for a service by a return service, and thus avoiding the emergence or
continuation of expectations of reciprocity are available as social possibilities.
14 This can be seen, for example, when a person moves away from a neighbourhood:
can you still make use of the typical services within the network, and if so for how
long, e.g. if the washing machine breaks down, or are you now reliant on functional
alternatives (laundrette) despite the continued spatial advantages?
15 Which can be seen, for instance, in ‘bands’ that collect wage payments that may, if
in doubt, be owing on informal labour markets.
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16 If migration is understood to be a form of geographic mobility to realise inclusion
opportunities (Bommes 1999), it is understandable that the performance of these
migration networks consists of conveying such opportunities, which is why they
tend to have a contextual and accordingly extensive and expansive design.
17 It is hardly surprising, as observed repeatedly from interviews with migrants, that
they attempt to leave such network bonds and their wide-ranging obligatory charac-
ter once alternatives open up and they gain a legal status (Alt 1999, 2003; Anderson
2003). The foundation for this is not least the opportunity to assume formal func-
tional or performance roles, access to which, however, often requires obtaining a
legal status. Compare the case study by Müller-Mahn (2000).
18 Even if ‘self-supporting’ network structures emerge that complement their contex-
tual restriction in accordance with structure-like addresses (cf. Müller-Mahn 2000,
Tacke 2000).
19 Which does not affect the argument that networks obtain their services from other
systems – because their significance and relevance in the available range of services
are created by the network itself.
20 This restriction to the participants’ status of professor underlines the aspect of pub-
lic and political profiling – of self-portrayal. Young academics, including the female
employees of ‘female network professors’, are referred to a secondary network.
21 Ethnicity, then, restricts social accessibility, but may simultaneously enable the
members’ expectations of performance to be expanded. At the same time, depending
on the social positions accessible to the members of an ethnic group in different
functional systems and their organisations, a restriction of the network’s range of
services can also be linked to it.
22 It is easy to see their ubiquity with the network concept presented here: in the estab-
lishment phase, they rely on a general mechanism that is universally applicable to a
large number of particular opportunities in modern society.
23 This also holds true if networks use their contextual starting point to restrict expan-
sion in a contextual respect, because then it is relatively clear that no general advice
on leading lives is provided in scientists’ networks – but this, by contrast, does not
allow for any positive preliminary determination of the scope of services – this re-
mains open at the level defined by the network communication. In the same way,
although a women’s network stipulates that participation by men is socially unlikely,
the addresses of women who might participate in it are not yet determined.
24 The speech on reactivation explains this: the communication has to know how it
works.
25 Incidentally, this alone is not seriously argued against the fact that conflicts are so-
cial systems. They emerge and disappear again for a more or less long duration, the
success of which is dependent upon their stabilisation by exploiting the structure
formation possibilities of their equally particular possibilities of emergence.
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9 National paradigms of migration research
(with Dietrich Thränhardt)
First published in 2010 by V&R unipress as the chapter ‘Introduction:
National Paradigms of Migration Research’ (pages 9-38), co-authored with
Dietrich Thränhardt, in National Paradigms of Migration Research (IMIS-
Schriften 13), edited by Michael Bommes and Dietrich Thränhardt
Reprinted in 2011 as ‘Nationale Paradigmen der Migrationsforschung’, in
‘Migration und Migrationsforschung in der modernen Gesellschaft’ in IMIS-
Beiträge 38 (pages 11-48)
Migrations are an inherent part of current processes of globalisation and in-
ternationalisation, which undoubtedly provide the foundation for the in-
creasing call for more international and comparative research. Accordingly,
the number of international research projects and networks in the research
area of migration has grown considerably over the last two decades.1
Scholars participating in this endeavour, however, soon discover that the
academic modes of conceptualising, defining and recording problems de-
pend to a large extent on the respective national histories of science. This
applies particularly to academic research into international migration and
the ensuing problems in the regions where migration begins and ends.
Research questions and approaches are frequently designed along the lines
of national traditions and patterns of state reactions towards international
migration and its societal effects. Seen in this way, migration research
seems itself to be rather a part of the complex of problems that it claims to
describe and explain. This context dependency certainly becomes more
visible in international research projects, since here researchers are more
often compelled to explicate their preconceptions.
Systematically, this leads to a number of questions: To what extent and
how is migration research shaped by ‘national paradigms’ or ‘hidden
national agendas’ like ‘race relations’ in the UK, ‘ethnic minority policies’
in the Netherlands, ‘assimilation into a French citizenry’ in France or ‘inte-
gration into a welfare state’ in Germany? These paradigms are perhaps
even present in critical efforts of scholars who strive to overcome their
very boundaries.2 How do these national patterns influence the way in
which international research and scientific modes conceptualise their re-
search questions? What are the consequences of this for the claim of scien-
tific validity with regard to propositions and applied theories? These ques-
tions have hardly been addressed systematically in migration studies
(Lavenex 2005; Vasta and Vasoo 2006) yet their investigation is an essen-
tial precondition for adequately reflexive international research.
The assumption that research may be imbued with ‘national paradigms’
is intentionally constructed in a paradoxical manner. Put in this way, we fo-
cus on one characteristic of the field of research, i.e. the indexing of the
paradigms of migration research as ‘national’. This may refer, on the one
hand, to a quite unproblematic matter of fact: Migration research takes on
different national shapes, since migration and the resulting societal constel-
lations differ in each country. As a consequence, different research ques-
tions need to be asked, and correspondingly, different theories and meth-
odological approaches need to be applied. Seen in this way, the heteroge-
neous appearance of migration research and concomitant problems of
mutual understanding may be simply the result of a lack of sufficient joint
explication and translation of approaches as well as their implicit context
dependency. This would, however, not principally foreclose scientific
claims of generalisability made by propositions on the basis of theories
and methodologies applied in nationally confined migration research. It
seems that the apparent paradox can be rectified easily and that it concerns
a rather unproblematic case: Internationalisation of research would simply
imply that nationally established approaches in migration research become
more explicit about their generalisability claims and enable a process in
which these claims are tested in an extended context of research, involving
comparative research designs and competition among alternative scientific
approaches. This will certainly be linked with the failure of research ap-
proaches and theories, i.e. we would just observe the normal and unspec-
tacular course of science not really worth specific mentioning.
However, we approach the issue of ‘national research paradigms’ in-
spired by a more far-ranging assumption: The paradigms of migration re-
search are ‘national paradigms’ not just because of their context depend-
ency and insufficient clarification of the conditions of generalisability; they
are ‘national’ because the modes of presenting problems and questions are
politically constituted by the nation states for which migration becomes a
problem or a challenge. This assumption finds initial evidence in the fact
that migration research is usually perceived as part of the applied social
sciences: This type of research emerged as a response to ‘social problems’
with the claim of contributing to their solution. This holds true for early
American sociology, whose first chair was established in Chicago at the
end of the nineteenth century, linked with the political expectation that it
would generate useful practical knowledge able to contribute to the
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practical solution of those social problems stemming from immigration.3
This similarly applies to Australia (Vasta 2006) and to migration research
in different European countries since the Second World War (Vuddamalay
and Withol de Wenden 2006; Scholten 2007; Favell 2001; 2005; Boswell
2009). These practical conditions during the emergence of migration re-
search do not necessarily prove that its different traditions create ‘national
paradigms’ in the political sense introduced above, since no initial condi-
tion determines the structure of research programmes.
We take this point only as a first indicator for the validity of our as-
sumption, and it turns out that it is easy to find others: 1) Up to the
present, migration researchers tend to be rather ‘committed’ and less ‘dis-
tanced’ researchers.4 In many countries, they play a major role in concep-
tualising migration and integration policies, either directly or as govern-
ment advisors. Much research is embedded in such activities, and ‘policy
relevance’ is seen as an important criterion for migration research. 2)
During the last decades, migration research has gained prominence in the
relevant disciplines5, although it did not contribute significantly to the
theoretical or methodological progress of these disciplines. Central and
paradigmatically relevant theoretical and methodological debates in the
various disciplines have influenced migration research only to a minor ex-
tent and vice versa: the findings of migration research had and still have a
rather low impact on these (sub-) disciplines. The general (political) con-
sensus about the societal relevance of international migration – linked with
the willingness to provide more resources for research – has created a cli-
mate of reputation and recognition for migration research, which is not
substantiated by scientific achievement. Research may be confronted with
increasing expectations, but the research questions and answers as well as
research approaches remain largely the same – certainly permitting differ-
ences in scientific preferences mainly dependent on the orientations of the
researchers.
Against this backdrop, we suspect that the paradigms of migration re-
search are national in the sense that they are hybrids resulting from the
handling and redesign of politically constituted problems by means of sci-
entific research. We want to clarify if and to what extent the tension
between the national constitution of the migration problem and its scien-
tific treatment affects the scientific claim of universality. Do aspects exter-
nal to science penetrate the internal conceptualisation of problems, theory
building and research design in migration research in a way that leads to
the emergence of ‘national paradigms’ of migration research?
In order to answer these questions, we need to clarify first to what extent
the problem of migration is constituted by the organisational form of the
nation state, and how different nation states frame the specific modes of
raising problems, which in turn define the subject of research (I). Second,
we discuss how the relation between practical relevance and scientific
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claim, between ‘commitment and distance’ (Elias 1956), is moderated in
migration research, and what kind of ‘national paradigms’ emerge out of
this process. The challenge is to identify the relation between politics/poli-
cies and science in different traditions of migration research. We assume
that in each case a specific relation of mutual enablement and restriction
provides the ground for different national paradigms (II). Finally, we dis-
cuss to what extent these paradigms and their foundations remain relevant
for the more and more internationally and comparatively oriented migra-
tion research.
Nation States as Constitutive Frame for the Problem of
International Migration
In all nation states, international migration and migrants become periodi-
cally a political issue, yet in varying ways and with a focus on different
topics. Therefore, an analytical framework of analysis is required that al-
lows us to account for commonalities and differences between nation states
in dealing with international migration (1). Based on this framework, we
provide some arguments for the assumption that nation states conceptualise
international migration based on their structural constitution (2). In a third
step, we discuss the extent to which these conceptualisations are mirrored
in the different national traditions of migration research (3).
1
Migration is usually defined as the movement across borders, from one na-
tion state to another – or from one society to another (Treibel 1990, 21). In
contrast, internal migration is evidently considered as normal, unproble-
matic or even functional and necessary, strengthening national cohesion
and opening access to locations where people can work and live most ef-
fectively and satisfyingly – the practical realisation of Adam Smith’s idea
of the invisible hand. In other words, internal migration in national labour
markets is not only seen as normal, it also refers to the socially institution-
alised expectation of social mobility. Internal migrants are therefore neither
perceived nor treated as migrants. Instead, the emergence of conflicts about
internal migrations usually indicates that a nation state is in crisis, that
processes of political erosion articulate themselves in increasing desires to
split up and create new states – be it a most imaginative ‘Padania’ in the
north of Italy, an independent Assam in the northeast of India, an inde-
pendent Kurdistan cutting across Turkey, Syria and Iran, or a Kosovo free
of Serbian domination.
The field of migration research dealing with international migration is
therefore over-determined by a contradiction, which has been prominently
labelled ‘the liberal paradox’ (Hollifield 1996): One central assumption of
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liberalism is that the freedom of movement of people as well as of goods,
capital and services refers not only to a natural right but also provides the
basis for the smooth operation of society. Restrictions upon such freedoms
are associated with authoritarian governments – pre-modern, colonial, fas-
cist or communist – and are seen as dysfunctional for a modern, i.e. open,
economy. On the other hand, national sovereignty, including the right to
control access to state territory, remains largely unquestioned. This is taken
as a basic principle of international and national law, only slightly modified
by the non-refoulement clause of the Geneva Convention. Communitarian
philosophers have reaffirmed this position as a legitimate right of closure,
based on the operational mode of communities and the requirements for
societal cohesion (Taylor 1993; Walzer 1983; 1990).
Only a small minority of political theorists takes a principled stance
against the territorial sovereignty of states (Bauböck 1994). On the whole,
however, idealist hopes for a borderless world (Soysal 1994; Jacobson
1996) have faded away since the fall of the Berlin wall. Inside the
European Union, the liberal paradox seems to be solved: The freedom of
movement is largely institutionalised, and despite the recurrent fears ac-
companying each enlargement round, no serious social tensions have arisen
so far. The liberal paradox re-emerges, however, at the external frontier of
the EU, and new member states situated at this border have to prove their
maturity for full membership by implementing Schengen conditions and by
establishing border control capacities according to EU standards.
In more general terms, ‘the liberal paradox’ refers to a structural contra-
diction of modern world society: On the one hand, international migration
is an outcome of the social expectation involved in the institutionalised
form of mobility in modern world society, i.e. individuals are expected to
move where relevant social chances for participation and resources for an
autonomous life are available. International migration means precisely the
effort to realise opportunities for a living by means of geographical mobi-
lity. This does not per se imply structural problems for the primarily af-
fected social systems, like labour markets, education systems or families –
the freedom to move may be rather a precondition for their functioning, as
liberals argue.6 Nevertheless, most international migrations are, on the oth-
er hand, confronted with all kinds of legal and political interventions and
restrictions.
The structural basis for these regular interventions is the organisational
form of politics in modern society, i.e. the nation state. Political and legal
interventions in international migration occur regularly and not just by his-
torical chance. They make manifest the internal structural contradiction of
world society (Stichweh 1998), i.e. the permanent production of motives
for international migration – due mainly to the demand of labour markets
and the opportunities of educational systems, the institutionalisation of the
nuclear family, the worldwide communication of options by the mass
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media and the accessibility of transport (just to name the most important
factors) – and the constant political effort to control these migrations7 and
to mould motives for migration, according to the specific structure of the
political system, i.e. its internal segmentary differentiation into nation
states.
One strong implication of the worldwide institutionalisation of national
states has been the partitioning of the world population into state popula-
tions (Halfmann 2005). International migrations have always challenged
this division by crossing borders in the quest for chances of social partici-
pation. The reactions of nation states towards these migrations are medi-
ated by the two constitutive dimensions that define the relation between
states and their populations: a) the dimension of loyalty refers to the
requirement that citizens and all other persons residing in a nation state ter-
ritory show obedience and participate in political decisions; it is therefore a
fundamental condition for the reproduction of state sovereignty; b) the di-
mension of provision refers to the obligation of the state to provide legal,
political and social security in exchange for loyalty coagulating in the con-
cept of the welfare state (Marshall 1950).8 Nearly all political modes of
regulating international migration are geared towards aspects linked to one
or both of these dimensions – loyalty and provision (Bommes 1999).9
These two dimensions are deeply interlinked. States shape their take on mi-
gration on the ground of patterns based on the conceptualisation of the
population as citizens resulting from historical state building processes:
How the population is constituted as a national community of citizens and
the related design of the welfare state define the common ground for all
kinds of political reactions to be found in states dealing with migration.
They are, however, differently articulated due to the different course of
state building based on different dynamics in the emergence of the state
population and the building up of welfare systems.
One major difference between European nation states and the traditional
immigration countries (USA, Canada, Australia) has always been the build-
ing process of state populations and the related concept of loyalty:
European state populations are the historical outcome of the efforts of
emerging states to establish sovereignty over a territory and a people
against competing claims of neighbouring states (Tilly 1990). Nation build-
ing in Europe took place as a process by which a population was de-
lineated and transformed into a nation, a people within a politically defined
territory (Koselleck 1992). This outlines the historical background for the
varying concepts and meanings of civic community as ‘the people’
(Brubaker 1992) and the specific relevance of the loyalty dimension in
dealing with migrants in Europe (Bade 2003). In contrast, in traditional im-
migration countries immigration has been an integral part of the population
building process by conceptualising immigrants, in principle, as future
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citizens – despite the exclusion of certain migrants for a long time on racist
grounds.
The different histories of state building also provide the background for
the different meaning of the welfare dimension in Europe and in traditional
immigration countries in dealing with migration. The emerging modern
states in Europe sought to politically mediate the chances of inclusion and
exclusion in reaction to the breakdown of pre-modern stratified orders of
inclusion (Bommes 1999). The modern nation state can most generally be
defined by its successful claim of sovereignty over a territory and a popu-
lation. From the outset, this was linked to the emergence of the welfare
state (Swaan 1988). By providing chances for participation in the social
realms of the economy, law, health or education – that is within a welfare
state – the nation state created the social preconditions for a process in
which former subjects were transformed into political citizens. This was a
process in which the inclusion of the whole population into the political
system via the individual citizens and the claim of political sovereignty
over them could gain political legitimacy and universal validity. The wel-
fare state became the central authority in modern society moderating rela-
tions between the principle of universal access10 to and inclusion in the
social realms of the economy, law, education, health or politics and the em-
pirical reality of social exclusion.
The effect was that national welfare states became the institutionalised
organisational model of the political system in world society, and they have
evolved as international ‘thresholds of inequality’ (Stichweh 1998). This
means that they have guaranteed the internal loyalty of their citizens by a
welfare policy that promotes chances for inclusion based on external clo-
sure and exclusion. From its beginning, welfare provided by nation states
had a territorial index. The provisions of welfare states initially addressed
primarily citizens, i.e. those individuals perceived by states as belonging to
their territory. The nation may have been defined in either cultural (e.g.,
Germany) or republican terms (e.g., France), but in the historical context
of competitive state building processes in Europe, the common welfare of
the people of the nation – of the community of national citizens – evolved
as the general frame of reference for states (Bommes 1999). This involved
the political claim for not only formal, but also some substantial equality
for all members of the national community; a claim based on the political
form of membership, i.e. citizenship (Marshall 1950).
This European model of the national welfare state gained worldwide
relevance (Meyer et al. 1997),11 although in different ways. Again, for our
purpose, one major difference between European welfare states and the tra-
ditional immigration countries is telling: Welfare in Europe implies a more
or less thick notion of ‘the people’ as the original political collective that
defines the addressee of welfare; correspondingly, migrants are seen as po-
tentially illegitimate welfare seekers from outside. In contrast, immigration
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countries conceptualise and recruit immigrants traditionally as potential
contributors to welfare – not because these countries do not provide wel-
fare in a privileging manner, addressing primarily citizens, but because im-
migrants are right from the start expected to become future citizens. In oth-
er words, the production of welfare has always been based on immigration,
whereas welfare in Europe is still to a large extent perceived as a ‘(gross)
national product’ leaving the contribution of outsiders, i.e. migrants, with
only limited acknowledgement.12
Despite these differences, in a most general sense, all national welfare
states try to privilege their citizens (or what they consider to be their core
citizens). They try
– to open or facilitate access to the relevant social systems (the economy,
law, education, family or health) and to reduce the risks of exclusion;
– to stabilise these systems and their capacities of inclusion (labour mar-
kets, families, education, health, etc.);
– to equip individuals so that they fulfil the conditions for social
participation;
– to compensate for the social consequences of failing access.
In order to achieve these objectives, states rely fundamentally on law as a
means of assigning rights and duties, of the political distribution and redis-
tribution of funds and the symbolic communication of civic duties. These
state efforts lead to highly differentiated welfare infrastructures encompass-
ing social security systems, which deal with the modern core risks of acci-
dent, health, age and unemployment, with social benefits for families, pro-
grammes to increase access to education, social benefit payments for the
long-term excluded and poor, various public provisions of social services,
etc.
National welfare states differ tremendously, even in Europe, and it seems
that this will also remain the case in the near future, despite the advance-
ment of globalisation and European integration and some, although limited,
processes of model mixing and assimilation (Obinger et al. 2006). These
differences are a result of the varied histories of national state building.
Welfare structures are the outcome of the accumulated political decisions
in history; they mould welfare in nationally specific ways with regard to
concepts of social cohesion, the size and qualities of a constituency, legiti-
mate membership and access to rights as well as notions of social risks and
failure, and expectations of mutual obligations constituted by solidarity,
which define we-collectives of insiders and complementary outsiders.
Different welfare states represent therefore different welfare cultures, i.e.
bundles of organisations, regulations and institutions referred to as welfare
states are culturally deeply imbued. Conceptions of security and insecurity,
assumptions about responsibilities for the provision of welfare, the limits
of welfare and the extent of individual self-responsibility are contingent
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and not self-evident. There are always alternative ways, and it is certainly
– at least in principle – possible to organise welfare differently. Each wel-
fare state is based on different assumptions about what states should do,
and to what extent they should intervene, about the meaning and founda-
tions of freedom or solidarity, about the main institutions and foundations
of society, etc.13
2
These considerations on the relation of national welfare states and interna-
tional migration provide an adequately generalised model in order to
account for the different modes in which international, i.e. trans-border, mi-
grations are conceptualised as political issues and handled by states. By
adequately generalised, we mean that this model should allow further case-
dependent respecifications, e.g. to account for differences between large
and small welfare states, the formation problems of new nations in Asia
and Africa, the transition of countries, like Turkey, from traditional emigra-
tion countries to transit and immigration countries. We assume that these
political modes of conceptualising migration resurface in the paradigms of
migration research, mirroring country specific constellations. In the follow-
ing, we summarise the assumptions of this model:
A commonality of different states is defined by the need to solve a bun-
dle of problems, in order to build and maintain a capacity for the produc-
tion of collectively binding decisions. Essentially, this includes the enforce-
ment of the claim of sovereignty over a territory and its population, i.e. the
people. This implies, as elaborated above, the two dimensions of loyalty
and provision: What kind of loyalty is expected from whom, and who is
suspected to be disloyal (e.g. autochthonous minorities, migrants coming
from competing neighbouring states)? Who should be included in civil,
political and social provisions, and who should be excluded? What kind of
civil, political and social provisions are institutionalised, and how are they
related to internal historical conflict constellations and cleavages?
Dependent on the historical handling of these constellations by states, in-
ternational migrants denote groups that stand in many respects in stark
contrast to the different demarcations and delineations resulting from state
building processes:
A. The relation between international migrants and the group of citizens is
precarious. Dependent on how delineations are defined, the conditions
for the inclusion of migrants are more or less open or restrictive, linked
with expectations concerning cultural similarity, the willingness of ac-
culturation, assimilation and loyalty. These expectations are anchored
in notions of the hereditary or acquirable character of cultural patterns,
paradigmatically articulated in the opposition of republican and ethnic
concepts of citizenship.14 These distinctions prove to be relevant not
only in Europe, but also for migrations in the successor states of the
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Soviet empire or the postcolonial states of the former Third World.
Additional complications face those postcolonial migrants in Europe
for whom national citizenships had been open (like in Great Britain,
the Netherlands, France and more recently in Spain and Portugal).
After closure, however, their social position has been redefined in most
of these countries in terms of ethnic or race relations.
B. Notions of (potential) belonging organise not only the formal rules of
access to welfare provision, which may include or exclude different mi-
grants to a different extent, but also the social perceptions of the legiti-
macy to claim benefits and the chance to scandalise it publicly.
C. In different national welfare states, migrants acquire differentiated ac-
cess to social rights and provisions. This depends on the different mode
of construction of welfare states; and fairly often, it is removed from
the question of whether this access is politically perceived as legitimate:
It can be the long-term outcome of participation in the labour market of
welfare states which make access to social rights dependent on employ-
ment; it can be the effect of welfare provisions that address the legally
resident population living in the state territory.
D. Migrations become a political issue in different ways depending on the
internal order and infrastructure of states: in countries with majority
voting systems differently from countries with systems of proportional
representation; in centralistic systems differently from federalist sys-
tems; in democracies differently from dictatorships, etc. That is to say,
the forms and dynamics of the reproduction of state power are relevant
for the question of if and how migrants become an issue under the per-
spectives of loyalty and provision.
If one regards this approach as an underlying framework of reference, one
can immediately notice that international migration and migrants assume
the form of specific problems in different countries, which depend on the
design of these states, their internal way of reproducing sovereignty, and
the related conceptualisation of loyalty and power relations. This explains
the difference between immigration countries and those countries in
Europe that conceive of their form of political organisation by dint of
founding myths as the constitution of native populations on ancestral terri-
tory. We have already discussed that this leads in each case to different
conceptualisations of migrants in their relation to the state population as
well as to welfare.
Nevertheless, the ‘multiculturalisms’ of the immigration countries
Canada, USA and Australia differ substantially from one another: In
Canada, multiculturalism has served since the 1960s as a sort of moderator
for the latent tensions between the two founding nations, while at the same
time it commits immigrants to this constellation. In Australia, it can be
traced back to a changed international situation in which the country
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repositioned itself politically in the Pacific region under the motto ‘popu-
late or perish’, by opening itself to immigration from Asia since the late
1960s. Australia linked this development with a ‘re-description’ of its state
population. As in the United States, this was accompanied by recurring
fears, whether on the basis of plural origins living together harmoniously,
immigrants can turn into loyal citizens or, vice versa, whether the founda-
tion of the state, a certain degree of uniformity and coherence among its
inhabitants, is at risk. On the basis of the highly selective admission of im-
migrants, these countries also differ with regard to the access immigrants
have to welfare benefits. However, especially their selectivity reduces the
likelihood that such benefits are claimed. It is, therefore, hardly accidental
that, particularly in the US, public debates arise regularly on the issue of
the exclusion from such benefits – yet, these concern in particular illegal
immigrants before the backdrop of an economic situation in which the
extended employment of such immigrants in certain sectors of the labour
market and the continued demand for them are hardly hot topics. This
leads to hypocrisy in public scandalisation and the establishing of harsh
control and defence apparatus, in particular along the border with Mexico,
while the immigration and employment of such migrants continue
(Cornelius et al. 2009).
In Europe, despite processes of adjustment during the last 15 years, dif-
ferences between the states remain, be it between cultural and political con-
cepts of nations (Kulturnation vs. Staatsnation), between republican and
multicultural-pluralistically oriented policies, or with regard to the constitu-
tion of their welfare states. This finds expression in the conceptualisations
of migrants in relation to state populations and in the variations of what,
unlike in the United States, is in most European countries purposefully tak-
en as the ‘integration’ and not as the ‘assimilation problem’ of migrants. In
France, for instance, republicanism turns out to be a quasi-lens through
which all immigrant-related issues are seen, be it the issue of access to citi-
zenship, which as a matter of course is open to migrants conceived as im-
migrants based on the recognition of the republican order and the assimila-
tively oriented expectation to become French, the shaping of the inclusion
of migrants in the educational system, or the handling of cultural and reli-
gious pluralisation. This has the mirror effect that immigrants perceive their
actual social marginalisation as withholding the republican promise to be
part of the French nation.
In the Netherlands the conceptualisation of immigrants as ethnic minor-
ities was, since the 1970s, based on the pillar model anchored in the specif-
ic Dutch state building. Until the 1990s, the corresponding direction of
welfare state integration policies allowed the combining of post-colonial
immigration and recruited labour migration in a historically proven model.
The resulting tension between political, multicultural tolerance and the de
facto marginalisation of large sections of the immigrant population in the
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labour market and in cities under well-developed welfare-state conditions
initiated the continuous and increasingly restrictive transformation of mi-
gration and integration policies, associated with both increasingly aggres-
sive, publicly expressed expectations of migrants to assimilate and consid-
erable turbulence in the political party system. In Denmark, immigration
and its consequences run counter to the country’s self-image as a culturally
and socially completely homogeneous nation.
In the British case, the conceptualisation of the immigration issue as
‘race relations’ shapes the public debate, which has its basis in the immi-
gration of ‘former subjects’ of the British Crown from the 1950s to the
1970s. Migration and opportunities for social participation of migrants are
primarily conceptualised as problems of the equitable cohabitation of
‘races’, of multicultural tolerance and anti-discrimination, which are meant
to domestically signal acceptance and equality towards immigrants, given
the closure of the British state for their home countries and for former sub-
jects of the Commonwealth in general. Historically rooted in the history of
the Empire, this conceptualisation is currently being ‘overwritten’ by a
new wave of immigration after the EU enlargement. According to the pri-
orities of New Labour, it is being replaced by a new interest in ‘indicators
of social integration’ regarding immigrants from Eastern Europe, also in
view of the increasingly apparent limits of the absorption capacity of the
‘open labour market’.
The conceptualisation of migration and migrants in Germany, which has
experienced several immigrations encompassing refugees and expellees,
‘guest workers’, asylum seekers, civil war refugees and ethnic Germans
(Aussiedler) was determined by two reference frames: a) Germany is not
an immigration country (Einwanderungsland), and therefore immigrants
(Zuwanderer) are not automatically seen as immigrants (Einwanderer);
they can and should become Germans only under restrictive conditions; b)
permanent immigration (Zuwanderung)15 and the settlement of migrants re-
fer to problems of social integration, which are the responsibility of the
welfare state. Into the 1990s, an ethnically founded citizenship barred
access to the naturalisation of migrants. Since then, under certain condi-
tions concerning integration, citizenship has become obtainable. On the
other hand, since the Second World War, the positive reference to what
constitutes a German was eclipsed and cultural difference was primarily
conceptualised as a problem for social integration, as a deficit and hurdle
for the required adaptation, particularly in education and the labour market.
This perspective remains prevalent until the present day and now also
includes ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) after their reconceptualisation from
formerly cultural Germans to culturally and socially different migrants with
typical integration problems. On the other hand, the German welfare state
proved to be inclusive in the sense that it effectively provided protection
not only for large parts of the migrant workers of the 1960s and 1970s due
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to compulsory social insurance, but it also covers the basic needs (food,
clothing, accommodation, health) of all individuals residing in its territory
via the welfare state concept. To a limited extent, this also applies to asy-
lum seekers. In Germany, the problem conceptualisation of migration and
migrants revolves, therefore, mainly around the question of whether immi-
grants can provide for themselves and whether they receive social benefits
legitimately – in other words, whether in the long run they manage their
‘social integration’ successfully. This finds its most recent expression in
the fact that probably in no other country in Europe was a ‘national inte-
gration plan’ created with a comparable symbolic effort.
Moreover, the management of immigration by the Mediterranean coun-
tries in Europe is embedded in their specific state traditions. The Italian
case indicates that the political handling of the significant immigration
since the late 1980s, rooted in the demands of an EU increasingly organ-
ised in regard to migration questions, can only be explained in the context
of a growing demand for services of a familistic welfare state faced with
the demographically accelerated ageing process of its population and a tra-
dition of the legal rectification of illegal situations, be it in relation to the
building code or residence permits. In this way, as in Spain, illegal migra-
tion and its legalisation became de facto migration policy, against the
actual backdrop of an official EU-oriented policy.
Discussions about the way in which states conceptualise problems asso-
ciated with international migration are usually confined to traditional immi-
gration countries and Europe. A look at worldwide migration (Castles and
Miller 2009; Massey et al. 1998; Thränhardt and Hunger 2003) shows
quickly, however, that the political handling of international migration is
also anchored in the structures of statehood in the respective countries and
regions. As the contributions on Nigeria and Malaysia in this volume show,
both countries debate ‘social cohesion’, the definition of a constituency, of
the people constituting the nation, of its delimitation and the claim and
testing of the reach of state sovereignty with regard to migrants, who are
partly, even by dint of violence, excluded from rights and benefits and ex-
pelled from state territory.16
Public policy regarding international migration and migrants was and is
embedded in international discourses. One can characterise the late nine-
teenth and the first half of the twentieth century as the era of the preva-
lence of the nation state. This era is also associated with unquestioned
domestic assimilation policies of countries towards their minorities and im-
migrants as well as related policies, such as the one set forward by the
League of Nations, which reacted to the vulnerability of this policy, appa-
rent in forced cultural homogenisation, separatist tendencies and wars, with
the redesign of state borders based on the ‘right of self-determination of
peoples’ or with the resettlement of ethnic minorities, be it ‘voluntarily’, as
in the case of the Greeks and Turks in the Treaty of Lausanne, or coerced,
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as in the case of the Allied Potsdam Agreement with regard to the
Germans in Eastern Europe.
The period since the Second World War was characterised by a decline
of nationalism in Western countries, the dominance of liberalism and the
increasing differentiation between law and politics as well as decolonisa-
tion in the Third World. This was associated with a relative decoupling of
state, nation and culture. Since then, cultural differences are seen as legiti-
mate, cultures are considered equal, and cultural pluralism is now regarded
as beneficial. An early source is the UNESCO Declaration on the equality
of cultures, which emphasised the right to diversity and its value. This has
not necessarily been replaced but, rather, has been accompanied by a ‘re-
turn of assimilation’ (Brubaker 2001) in discourse and political expecta-
tions in many countries, which does not necessarily constitute a negation
of the UNESCO Declaration but, in different ways in different countries,
calls into question the benefits and value of cultural pluralism. The need to
clarify the relationship between cultural pluralism and the indispensable
conditions for participation in the functional systems of education, the
economy, law, health, religion, and the mass media is also brought into
focus, such as the tension between human rights, cultural pluralism and rel-
ativism, respectively.
International discursive formations impact differently on the political
public as well as on policies of individual countries; they are re-articulated
against the backdrop of respective national histories. Multiculturalism, con-
cepts of diversity, integration and assimilation denote different things in
each case and can therefore not be understood adequately in isolation from
their contextual embedding.
3
International migration and its associated problems are, as shown, substan-
tially constituted by the character of policy and the specific structure of
states. They form the filter for international migration, which is essentially
caused by the mobility in modern society and thereby lend it a specific
shape as a problem. The latter is reflected in the ways of conceptualisation
in the various strands of national migration research.
Even a cursory comparative glance shows that the outline in the pre-
vious section of individual aspects of concepts of international migration
as problems in various countries finds its reflection in the main issues of
national migration research, which shall be briefly illustrated in the
following.
West German migration research formed itself by means of state-consti-
tuted migrant groups. At first, it succeeded as research into refugees and
expellees, then as research into guest workers, foreigners and ethnic
Germans (Aussiedler), before it developed into general migration research.
At the centre of its research stands the question of social integration, and
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the latter, in its different ways of conceptualisation since the 1970s, is evi-
dently geared towards the guiding precepts of the West German welfare
state, its guest worker foreigner policy and later policy concerning ethnic
Germans as well as, finally, its current immigration and integration policy.
The issues of French migration research revolve around republicanism
and related questions: Which consequences do international migration and
the settlement of migrants have, especially for the associated expectations
and concepts of assimilation, citizenship and laïcité; whether immigration is
inevitably associated with the growing importance of cultural, ethnic and
religious differences; whether their public irrelevance should be maintained
or instead be replaced with forms of tiered recognition; and finally, the ques-
tions of whether such differences can be empirically recorded and whether
their relation to other social dynamics within families, on labour and hous-
ing markets, or in the school system ought to be and shall be explored.
In the United Kingdom, ‘race relations’ are the constitutive reference
point for British research on migration until well into the 1990s. The critics
of this approach distance themselves by marking this approach as ‘racist’
(Miles 1994) in a tu quoque mode and thus remain performatively tied to
the criticised frame of reference in a peculiar way. This constellation, based
on the immigrations of the 1950s to 1970s in the context of a disintegrating
commonwealth, is being increasingly replaced by more recent research,
which essentially follows the objectives of New Labour, highlights the
potential and benefits migration brings, and explores ‘indicators of
integration’.17
Migration research in the United States is often characterised by the old
question of assimilation, starting with Thomas and Znaniecki, Park and
Gordon, and ranging from Gans, Portes & Rumbault, to Alba & Nee and
Waldinger. It places at its centre the constitutive problem of the United
States – how social order and coexistence can be guaranteed on the basis
of the coming together of so many different nations/regions (e pluribus
unum). This continuation finds its plausibility in the huge waves of immi-
gration since the civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s, which currently
keeps timely the question of whether the ‘melting pot’ still works. Noted
processes of differentiation are characteristically discussed as ‘segmented
assimilation’.
In Australia, migration research and its concepts were not only shaped
by the multicultural orientation of immigration policy since the 1970s, the
latter has also significantly helped to develop this policy – not least be-
cause of its close organisational link to politics.
Especially the last example shows that the orientation of different
national migration research towards the ways in which different states con-
ceptualised international migration, immigration and settlement as political
problems did not hinder the production of solid empirical and theoretical
contributions. However, a reflection from a sociology of knowledge
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perspective of this conceptually narrow focus and the often organisational-
ly close links between science and politics in the field of migration re-
search is still lacking.
National Paradigms of Migration Research? The Relationship of
Politics and Science in Migration Research
The aim of the following considerations is to develop a framework for
such a reflection. The contributions of this volume provide material, to
some extent, with which to begin such a project in a comparative perspec-
tive. Upon closer inspection, the determination of what could constitute na-
tional paradigms of migration research creates, conceptually, more difficul-
ties than the charm of this initially attractive project suggests.
A In the previous sections, we have highlighted how deeply migration
research is imbued by its embeddedness in the respective nation states.
This does not overlook the fact that migration researchers have in turn a
significant influence on the shaping of migration policies and related prob-
lem conceptualisations in many countries. The permeation of migration
research by politics and statehood is therefore not based on a relationship
of instruction. The issue is rather the interplay between the two on the
basis – usually, at least – of mutual independence. We assume that this
independence constitutes their interdependence:18 Politics cannot produce
scientific, i.e. research-legitimated, knowledge and science, vice versa, has
no access to political power and collectively binding decision-making,19
but for central functional conditions – particularly the freedom of science
and access to resources – it remains dependent on law and its political en-
forcement as well as to a significant extent on resources made available
politically. This captures the relationship between science and politics in
very general terms, yet the issue here is how they are shaped in and impact
on the relationship between migration research and politics.
B Migration research does not match the internal differentiation of sci-
ence into disciplines, and this justifies the assumption that it is research
with an essentially interdisciplinary orientation (Brettell and Hollifield
2000; Bommes and Morawska 2005). In the political and academic dis-
course, interdisciplinarity is, much like internationality, seen as an indicator
of quality, but initially, it primarily constitutes a problem. Migration out-
lines a field that involves many disciplines and calls for their responsibil-
ity: sociology, psychology, economics, political science, pedagogy or law,
social geography, ethnology and medicine. This characteristic transverse
position of migration as a topic repeats itself within the individual disci-
plines, as can be easily shown with regard to sociology. Here, migration
research operates as a reference point for sub-disciplinary specialisation, on
the one hand, and accordingly there exists a nationally and internationally
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organised sociological migration research.
On the other hand, according to an established textbook, sociological
migration research deals with migration as the ‘permanent or increasingly
permanent move into another society or into another region by an individu-
al or multiple persons’ and ‘with the causes, course and consequences of
migration’ (Treibel 1990, 21). It can therefore hardly avoid dealing with
almost all fields with which sociology is also concerned in its various sub-
disciplines. ‘Causes’ refer to the initial socio-structural contexts of migra-
tion, which require migration sociologists to have substantial knowledge of
developmental and migration sociology as well as anthropology, in order
to produce scientifically adequate descriptions. The ‘consequences’ of mi-
gration consist in the fact that migrants often appear in all relevant social
contexts, i.e. the economy, politics, law, education, health, sports, mass
media, or religion of the target region, either individually or as families.
Therefore, migration sociologists also have to assume roles as family soci-
ologists, educational sociologists, youth or legal sociologists, labour market
researchers, business, industry or organisational sociologists, inequality
researchers, conflict sociologists, political scientists or political theorists
and so forth.20 This is almost inevitable, as migrants, like all other individ-
uals, occur in society and its differentiated social structures. They become
relevant to political, legal, economic, educational, health or religious
issues, or as members of organisations. The manner in which they appear
here makes them first visible as migrants.
This leads to the problem of generating a framework of reference for
research that tends to repeat every specialisation of the discipline and that
can therefore determine its identity only in terms of its difference from
these specialisations. In a variety of fields, it therefore continually runs the
risk of structural amateurism. This constellation recurs for migration re-
search in a similar manner in other disciplines, such as law, political sci-
ence (Freeman 2005) or linguistics (Maas 2007).
Consequently, migration research does not constitute a discipline, but
refers to a multi- and interdisciplinary conglomeration of research which
deals with issues of international migration coming from different disci-
plines. Hitherto, it is unlikely, yet not impossible, that it will evolve into a
discipline, if disciplines are understood in a preliminary way as ‘forms of
institutionalisation of processes of cognitive differentiation’ (Stichweh
1979), including the following elements: 1) a nexus of communication be-
tween researchers, 2) a body of scientific knowledge coagulated in text-
books, which is codified, accepted and teachable in the discipline, 3) a
common set of problems and questions, 4) a common set of research meth-
ods and theoretical frameworks, 5) a career structure and modes of socialis-
ing and recruiting young scholars.21 One can certainly discover elements
of an internal differentiation and of the emergence of an (international) mi-
gration research field; yet, this issue does not have to find its final answer
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here. Especially, at the organisational level, the founding of research insti-
tutes and the establishing of research associations occur. Yet, there are
hardly any indications for the formation of a discipline. For the internation-
al and interdisciplinary research on migration, it can be stated in rather
general terms: ‘Since there […] is no theoretical integration of disciplines,
this form of cooperation is forced to take place at a low theoretical level’
(Luhmann 1990, 642). Instead, migration research primarily gains rele-
vance among the differentiated disciplines. However, due to its transverse
position among the disciplines and the resulting danger of structural ama-
teurism in view of the specialisations in various sub-disciplines, as men-
tioned above, it is even more confronted with the problem of defining its
constitutive problematique.
C In section I, we argued that the problem of international migration
has its foundation in the contradiction of world society (the simultaneous
production of migration motives through its institutionalised form of mobi-
lisation and its restraint through the shape of politics) that national migra-
tion research finds its respective issues here and that thereby it mirrors,
more or less, the ways in which the respective states conceptualise their
policy issues. Due to its peculiar intra- and transdisciplinary mismatch and
the resulting problem of how to delimit those problems defining research,
one has to presume that migration research orients itself towards state con-
ceptualisations of migration for structural reasons, namely due to its free-
floating nature – not only because the politically explosive nature of the
topic guarantees attention and resources, but also because this way of con-
ceptualising offers a moderator, who serves to hold together the rather
indefinite and frayed problem field of migration research with reference to
two main views: ‘integration’ and ‘inequality’.
These have, strictly speaking, their foundation in the classical nation
state problem of cohesion vs. corrosion (integration vs. disintegration),
peace vs. conflict, in modern European terms: social cohesion vs. disinte-
gration. This problematique is rooted in the historical way the modern na-
tion state emerged and differentiated itself. The latter links its claim to
have the sovereign right to enforce collectively binding decisions within its
territory and for people residing there and constituting the state population
with the self-description as an entity, the uppermost and controlling body
of nationally conceived society. This claim is based on the argument that
the nation state is the legitimate expression and bearer of the national will
of the community, be it politically or ethnically constituted. From the per-
spective of the state, functionally differentiated society is a state-delimited
context in need of integration, which finds unity and cohesion in the na-
tion, visible despite globalisation in the ‘national economy’, in the national
education system, or in the nationally constituted welfare systems. From
the outset, cohesion and corrosion, integration and disintegration of society
are rooted in the notion of the state as an entity, as the national bond of
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society. With this focus on the state, the claim of the ‘rule of the people’
permeates the community as the promise, however difficult to keep, to
steer society. Against this background, loyalty and domestic peace are
signs of the integration of society as a community, whereas disloyalty and
conflict, vice versa, are signs of disintegration. From this perspective,
states have historically viewed ethnic minorities as well as political opposi-
tion groups as potentially disloyal and conflictive – in Germany the Social
Democrats were, as is well known, seen as an ‘unpatriotic bunch (vater-
landslose Gesellen)’ (Groh and Brandt 1992). And in Britain the diverging
cultures of the emerging proletariat, on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie,
on the other hand, caused Benjamin Disraeli in the nineteenth century to
talk of ‘two nations’ before the backdrop of the social upheaval of the in-
dustrial revolution, begging the follow-up question of whether this indi-
cates the disintegration of society or casts doubt on its integration.
Cohesion and corrosion, ‘integration’ and ‘inequality’ – the central issue
of migration research captured in different terms rehearses this old prob-
lematique: the problems of differentiation and inequality, and the question
of whether and how the poor or the lower classes come to terms with un-
equal living opportunities; which potential for conflict it entails and to
what extent this is relevant for the integration of society? These questions
address migrants and the consequences of their settlement, recurrently and
especially in Europe, with its development into a world immigration region
after the Second World War, their integration perceived as precarious. And
the EU reformulates this problem in tandem with the expansion of its com-
petence claims in terms of inclusion/exclusion and social cohesion.
The main precepts ‘integration’ and ‘inequality’ of migration research
are therefore owed to the modern state, as the birth of ‘society’ in the mod-
ern social sciences has its roots in the spirit of the nation state (Tenbruck
1981; 1992). In a manner similar to hardly any other sub-discipline in the
social sciences until the present, migration research breathes the original
spirit of sociology and of social science as a science of crisis (Habermas
1981); it presents the problem of political order as the problem of cohe-
sion, ‘integration’ and the threat of internal disintegration through ‘differ-
entiation’ and ‘inequality’, paradigmatically formulated by Durkheim in
the late nineteenth century in his question about the possibility of a ‘con-
science collective’ in modern differentiated society.22
Here, for migration research, the respective terms used are not of impor-
tance: in the American context the problem of assimilation concerns the
question of how assimilation can be successful and considers cultural and
structural assimilation, i.e. the relatively identical socio-structural position-
ing and the individual and social conditions under which this can succeed,
as a prerequisite for the development of unity, whose extent has to be es-
tablished in each case. In the German context, the same debate revolves
primarily around the concepts of integration and inequality. In the Anglo-
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Saxon context, racial equality, ascertainable through non-discrimination in
labour and housing markets, education, health, law and politics, is meant
to allow coexistence on the basis of unity in diversity; similar points apply
to the various types of multicultural policy. Certain aspects of policy might
favour an orientation towards unity as the demand for adjustment or align-
ment, instead of granting civil and social equality; in a republican context
migrants may be confronted with this demand. On the other hand, their
principled otherness, defining the state population by its confines, might
lead to their expulsion.
In this perspective, terminologies, the ways of conceptualisation in the
different states, and the associated migration research rearticulate the prob-
lem of ‘migration and integration’ in various ways, rooted in the various
histories of nation building. This is the exact reason for the various ways
of conceptualisation. Yet, on close inspection, the same kinds of problems
recur, and research remains tied to its state-specifically articulated prob-
lems, even if it deals with very different areas. Whether it deals with fami-
lies, education, health, work, politics, law, mass media, religion, or lan-
guage, everything is seen in terms of integration and inequality, successful
or failed assimilation, the successful or unsuccessful easing of ‘race
relations’.
D Does it make sense to talk of ‘paradigms of migration research’, if
they are, as argued here, rather scientific rearticulations of nation state-
specific ways to constitute international migration-related problem constel-
lations? To answer this question, we first need to define the meaning,
which has until now been left open, of the term ‘paradigm’. Aware of the
elaborate discussion following the ‘paradigmatic’ investigation of Thomas
Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970/1976), we generally
assume that a paradigm can be recognised by the central distinctions used
to determine the subject of scientific research and the accordingly applied
theories. The empirical study of science is concerned with the question of
how science establishes the very criteria it applies to successful research.
In this context, in order to clarify what can be called a paradigm in the
strict sense, Kuhn (1970) distinguishes in his postscript between scientific
communities23 and what constitutes a paradigm in the strict sense as a
‘model’, its productive basic distinctions as starting point and basis for the
discovery, differentiation and development of problems. Paradigms describe,
therefore, functioning problem/problem-solving constellations, which are
unlimited in regard to the number of problems to be discovered yet produc-
tive, and at the same time, they allow one to turn them into common forms
of describing a problem and solving it (Kuhn 1970, 189).
The emergence of such paradigms requires the differentiation of science.
Kuhn speaks of the ‘unparalleled insulation of mature scientific commun-
ities from the demands of the laity and of everyday life’ (164). Scientists
aim to cater to the expectations of the scientific system, and their primary
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audience consists of scientists. Here, Kuhn sees a significant difference be-
tween the ‘mature’ paradigm-governed natural sciences and the humanities
and social sciences in the fact that scientists of these disciplines have to
more or less familiarise themselves with the entire history of problems and
problem solutions for the area they work in; they also face a wide range of
competing paradigms, whose appropriateness they have to evaluate them-
selves from case to case. This leads to a much lamented paradigm pluralism
in these disciplines with the respective scientific communities as ‘camps’.
This might also be the basis for the tendency of social science, recognised
by Kuhn, toward the ‘choice of a research problem – e.g., the effects of ra-
cial discrimination or the causes of the business cycle – chiefly in terms of
the social importance of achieving a solution’ (Kuhn 1970, 164; emphasis
added, M.B.). Yet, this is far from compelling, and the mentioned pluralism
does not exclude scientific introversion in these disciplines and their ‘insula-
tion […] from the demands of the laity and of everyday life’. The question
is rather, under which conditions these disciplines follow such tendencies,
and what their subsequent consequences are.
E The community of researchers on migration may certainly be con-
sidered a peculiar example for the case that the choice of research prob-
lems is recurrently justified ‘chiefly in terms of the social importance of
achieving a solution’. Migration researchers are also hardly reserved, when
it comes to communicating preferred solutions. Their majority advocates
the equality of migrants – be it as integration, reduction of barriers to as-
similation, inclusion and avoidance of exclusion, incorporation, and so
forth – and see this as a condition for the cohesiveness of society, of its in-
tegration. Hence, they still stand not only in the tradition of the social sci-
ences as a science of crisis and maintain its original spirit in their close link
to the state; they also do not aim for the ‘insulation […] from the demands
of the laity and of everyday life’, but rather continuously emphasise their
respective relevance. This applies to the various booms of migration. In
times in which migration attracts less attention, migration research follows
its daily business, that is, it delves into the ramifications of migration and
integration processes and warns of the possible negative consequences of
reduced attention to the overlooked or insufficiently noted effects of failing
integration, indicated by social inequality, social deviation, etc.24
However, if migration and integration draw attention, migration research
is a sought-after science of crisis, as migration and integration then become
synonymous with the politically communicated public perceptions of the
crisis of cohesion of a society essentially conceived as a national one
(Bade and Bommes 2004). The capability to political action is then demon-
strated nationally and at the European level by, among other means, the
funding of research – and this despite the fact that sufficient experience
already exists: ‘The politician who grants research money, founds new uni-
versities, establishes institutions can pride herself immediately, without
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having to wait, whether and what the results are’ (Luhmann 1990, 639).
This leads to a peculiar state of migration research, which is not simply
caused, as one can see now, by the fact that it is traditionally rather an
applied science, because the term applied science – differently from funda-
mental research – refers to the relation of the provision of science25 to oth-
er non-scientific social fields. It points to the provision of scientifically val-
id and specifically required knowledge.26 This does however not question
the fact that applied science remains embedded in fundamental research, it
must not contradict it and does contribute more or less to it.
However, this applies at best to a limited extent to migration research.
Instead, one must probably state – pointedly – that migration research is
periodically ‘taken in’ by its subject and ‘allows itself to be abused’ by it,
as due to its proximity to politics, there ‘lies in-between’ no ‘sufficient ali-
enation’ with the ‘headstrong ability to discriminate’ of a genuine scientifi-
cally constituted theory (Luhmann 1990, 645). Inversely, this is illustrated
by the fact that migration research claims in Euro-technocratic terms its
‘policy relevance’, in contrast to what constitutes a modern science and
that it increases the ‘social imposition’ of its knowledge and answers politi-
cal questions all too often: ‘This is as it is, make it so’ (634). The risk here
is reflected in the fact that those using this knowledge turn away due to
foreseeable frustration. Thus, the permanent effect of damage to the ‘facade
of the security of scientific knowledge’ (641) increases in the case of the
contact of science with other areas of society. This becomes visible in the
recent intense public debate in Europe surrounding the question of whether
the integration of immigrants has failed and whether migration research
has failed to provide the necessary knowledge and, therefore, failed in its
role as early warning system.27 Due to its claimed practical relevance, it
can hardly refuse this task – and reinforces this point by the repeatedly
heightened claim of its policy relevance.
F Should we, therefore, drop the concept of paradigm for migration
research and, hence, also the assumption of national paradigms in migra-
tion studies? This is not an inevitable consequence; rather, one has to ask
what kind of science migration research is. On the one hand, one can cer-
tainly talk about a community of migration researchers in the Kuhnian
sense, based on the criteria outlined above, and in recent years this applies
more and more to the national and also to the international level – remem-
ber that this was exactly the starting point for the argument developed here.
Furthermore, most migration research scientists are active in organisations
of the scientific system, in universities and research institutes. Moreover, a
consequence of the previously argued is that one can speak of paradigms
of migration studies in the sense that they display integration and inequal-
ity as central, nation state-specifically rearticulated distinctions with which
the subject of migration research and the theories it applies are delimited
and defined. In addition, this paradigm was productive, as can easily be
222 MICHAEL BOMMES (WITH DIETRICH THRÄNHARDT)
seen with regard to the scope and breadth of migration and integration re-
search.
The discussion of the peculiarities of migration research and the pointed
formulation that migration studies ‘allows itself to be abused’ by its subject
matter, as due to its proximity to politics it develops no ‘sufficient alien-
ness’ with a ‘headstrong ability to discriminate’ a genuine scientifically
constituted theory, is essentially based on the assertion that migration re-
search is not a case of a differentiated science in the sense introduced. To
properly understand this fact, the Kuhnian distinction between mature and
immature science is not of much help. Paradigm pluralism and competition
do not exclude the differentiation of science, rather the latter requires the
former. Therefore, this does not cover the claim that migration research is
not a differentiated science.
Rather, we have suggested earlier that migration research solves the
structural problem of its disciplinary and transdisciplinary transverse posi-
tion with reference to the political constitution of the problems of interna-
tional migration. In this way, it is and remains (from a systematic perspec-
tive), thus far a hidden reflexive theory of the political system by produc-
ing descriptions of migration studies in response to the self-descriptions of
this system and its environment, here migration and its consequences, as
its composition and not as a scientific outside description.28 The concepts
of migration research are based on an understanding of the political sys-
tem, which in reference to the latter’s self-conception, the hypostasis of its
function – to produce collectively binding decisions – the primacy of the
‘integration of society’ assigns it a kind of overall responsibility for society
and, therefore, for the problems caused by international migration.29
This policy-centric concept of society is shared by migration research
with everyday accounts, the mass media, protest movements, and with
some of the other social sciences, not least political science. There are sev-
eral reasons for this fact, which needs no further elaboration in our context.
However, the difference to political science is revealing: The latter trans-
lates the tension between science and reflexive theory of the political sys-
tem internally in the contrast between normative and descriptive
approaches, externally in its difference to political sociology. However, in
contrast, migration research turns out to be a quasi-unacknowledged reflex-
ive theory of the political system, resulting from the handling of its disci-
plinary mismatch and the subsequent scientific exclusion and determination
of its problems. The paradigms of migration research are national, as seen,
because they constitutively gain their problems from the ways in which its
respective reference state conceptualises international migration and its
consequences. This similarity is the reason for its diversity, and with regard
to these ways of conceptualisation it fleshes out its issues: the problems of
integration and inequality in different areas of ‘the society’ and their need
to be governed by politics.
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From this vantage point, one can also recognise why the systematic
nature of migration research as hidden reflexive theory of the political sys-
tem does not go away through its internationalisation – a notion which we
can only touch upon here at the end. The insight that society can hardly be
conceived of as national anymore does not need further detailed reasoning
– strictly speaking, international comparative research still mostly denotes
the comparison of national ‘societies’. Transnationalism takes the criticism
of the notion of society as a national container as its starting point, in order
to continue to assume national societies (Bommes 2003b). All this aside,
the continuation of migration research as a hidden reflexive theory of the
political system seems, above all, to surface where it abandons the (exclu-
sive) reference to the state as the organisational form of the political sys-
tem. This becomes apparent in two currently important issues: In European
migration research, the main themes of ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’
remain;30 in the wake of the ‘high-level dialogue’ of the Global
Commission, the increasingly important field of research on ‘migration and
development’ tries to link problems of migration control with issues of in-
tegration, on the one hand, and conditions of a (failed) development policy
on the other. Again, problems are here fleshed out in reference to the polit-
ical system and its conceptualisations, oriented towards policy relevance
and practical recommendations, whether they are consequences of the in-
ternal freedom of movement within the EU, the handling of illegal immi-
grants, or migration models as a ‘triple-win’ recommendation.
Due to the outlined reasons, an internationalising migration research
should work diligently to ascertain the respective national paradigms, if
only to dissolve the preliminary sketched ‘I can’t understand you’
(Kannitverstan) situations in international research cooperation. In addition,
it would suit it well to reflect its national histories as hidden reflexive
theories of the political system, of its nation states, before it starts with en-
thusiasm to merely repeat old routines in a transformed manner at the inter-
national level.
Notes
1 One exceptional example is the research funding of the EU. Within the Sixth
Framework Programme, the Network of Excellence (IMISCOE) has been funded
since 2004 (project period: 5 years). This network comprises over 20 established
European research institutes.
2 Like in the work of Robert Miles (1993; 1994), who is clearly fascinated with the
frame of race relations as he tries to move away from it.
3 In the introduction to their monumental work The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America, Thomas and Znaniecki (1958) criticised this line of thought as an inade-
quate basis for scientific analysis as early as 1918 (first publication 1918). In princi-
ple, they see the migration and integration of Poles as a theoretically interesting case
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for the constitution of social order – but in substantial parts of the book, they fail to
follow their own line of thought, i.e. to detach themselves from practical normative
issues.
4 Following a concept by Norbert Elias (1956) which was taken up by Treibel (1988)
for a sociological overview of the Ausländerforschung in Germany during the 1970s
and 1980s; see also Bommes in this volume.
5 Especially sociology, political science, ethnology, history, geography, linguistics, edu-
cation and economics. This multi- or interdisciplinary profile of migration research
will be discussed in more detail below.
6 This is why geographical mobility within nation states, due to employment, family
reunion or education, is socially not perceived as migration, and those involved are
normally not treated as migrants.
7 See Castles and Miller (2009); the Global Commission on International Migration
(GCIM) Report (http://www.gcim.org/en/finalreport.html) can be read as an effort
to overcome this basic contradiction by means of temporalisation: arguing that inter-
national migration will be to the benefit of all ‘in the long run’ – being faced how-
ever at present with all kinds of ‘short term’ barriers.
8 Not all states become welfare states, since they are not able to build up the necessary
capacity of provision. It is obvious, however, that no state can ignore the demands of
its population to care for welfare, and so-called failing states can to a large extent
not preserve the loyalty of their population because of their reduced or absent capa-
city to guarantee security and provision.
9 Current examples are the public association of migration and terrorism, which ques-
tioned the loyalty of migrants, on the one hand, and the frequent debates in nearly
all European welfare states but also in the US concerning the effects of international
migration on the capacity of welfare states in terms of costs and benefits, on the
other hand (Bade and Bommes 2004).
10 Universalism of inclusion in modern society means that nobody should be excluded
from claiming economic, legal or educational provisions, if he or she fulfils the so-
cial preconditions for these claims (Luhmann 1989). For example, one can partici-
pate in education, if one is perceived as educable; one can participate in the econo-
my, if one finds access to monetary means; one can participate in law, if one knows
how to act on behalf of one’s rights. At the same time, none of these necessarily im-
ply that inclusion always succeeds empirically – on the contrary, it often fails. Yet
the valid institutionalisation of social expectations, like the universalism of inclu-
sion, provides the ground for the perception of this failure as a problem in need of
remedy, e.g., by means of social policy.
11 See footnote 9.
12 As an effect of demographic changes, European countries start to realise the extent
to which they do rely on the attraction of immigrants. The recent debates on the in-
tegration of migrants articulate some of the fears linked with the realisation of the
increasingly fictive character of nationally delimited perceptions.
13 Different welfare states therefore make use of those institutions in different ways,
i.e. individual freedom on markets (liberty and private welfare: liberal individualistic
welfare states); families/communities (reproduction of the communitarian founda-
tions of society: conservative corporatist welfare states); the state (social equality in
labour market society; social democratic universalist welfare states). Based on those
distinctions, it is possible to categorise welfare states into different types. According
to Esping-Andersen (1990), we find three such types, i.e. the liberal, the conserva-
tive and the social democratic type of welfare state in Western society. Accordingly,
welfare states differ with regard to their extent of de-commodification, i.e. the extent
to which income and social security is made dependent on participation in the
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labour market; the role and amount of residual spending, i.e. national assistance as
a percentage of social spending; their redistributive aims and capacity; their corpora-
tist structure, i.e. the differentiation of social security systems according to different
occupational and status groups; the amount of private spending for health and pen-
sion systems; their conceptual assumptions about the main provider of welfare, i.e.
the market, the family or the state. Along these lines, welfare states vary largely ac-
cording to their orientation, which can be distinguished as individualistic vs. cor-
poratist vs. universalistic. Examples of the liberal individualistic type are the UK and
the USA, for the conservative corporatist type Germany, Austria, Italy and France,
and for the social democratic universalistic type the Scandinavian countries, espe-
cially Sweden and Denmark (Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmid 2002; Opielka 2004).
Many aspects of this modelling have been criticised. Some argue that there is a
fourth type in Europe, the Mediterranean type (Ferrera 1998); some question the
empirical applicability of the model (Alber 2000). For a discussion, see also
Kaufmann (2004). During the last ten or fifteen years, there have also been exten-
sive discussions about the adaptive capacity of these different welfare state types and
their ability to cope with new constellations as a consequence of the challenges of
globalisation (see Esping-Andersen 1996; 2002; Ganßmann and Haas 1999;
Goodin et al. 1999; Alber 2000; Fligstein 2000; Kaufmann 2003; Leibfried and
Zürn 2005); on a most general level, the outcome of this discussion is that those
welfare states do best which manage to combine access to labour and the provision
of welfare, instead of providing welfare as a substitute for labour – a problem mainly
for the conservative corporatist type of welfare states. In many countries, the recent
shift to so-called activating welfare policies is a reaction to these problems.
Integration policies in many countries belong in this context. Typologies of welfare
states have been developed in the context of international comparative welfare state
research. Certainly, they are to a large extent based on the analyses of leading
Western countries; see, however, Esping-Andersen (2002) for more comprehensive
comparisons. New immigration countries like Malaysia (an ethnic welfare state),
Nigeria (a corrupt state) and Hong Kong (a free market system) do not fit into these
schemes.
14 Often but misleadingly explicated by the difference between the French and the pre-
2000 German concepts of citizenship (see Hagedorn 2001 and Gosewinkel 2003).
15 Migrants who enter the country are not automatically perceived as continuous immi-
grants. So the question of whether they want to remain as immigrants is kept open
by the expression Zuwanderer whereas the expression Einwanderer in German
means that the migrant is expected to stay in the country. Choosing the word
Zuwanderungsgesetz in Germany connotes that migrants are not automatically seen
as immigrants.
16 The Gulf States are an interesting case, which we can not cover here in detail. Some
of these ‘pensioner states’, which obtain a substantial income from their energy
resources, exclude their population from political participation on the basis of pro-
viding for them. Associated with this are significant ‘modernisation deficits’ result-
ing in an insufficient workforce, at least with regard to the necessary skills for devel-
oping an infrastructure. This workforce is increasingly made up of migrants from
neighbouring countries (Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, etc.) and since the
1990s from Asia, who are vice versa prepared to do such work under considerable
constraints to their private lives in view of the employment opportunities and wages
in their home countries.
17 Moreover, this also expresses the Europeanisation of research, as efforts in the
English context, promoted by the Labour government, are at the same time linked
to projects funded by the EU.
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18 In such general terms, this point also denotes a commonplace in the sociological
theory of differentiation since Marx and Durkheim.
19 This is the reason why it can complain without any risk that its advice is ignored, as
it has neither to bring about the necessary decisions nor to take responsibility for
them.
20 If one accepts Treibel’s definition of the problem constellation, migration research
would also urgently require engagement with social theory – this might indeed not
be harmful, but would increase the problem of poaching in too many reserves.
21 For a historical approach concerning the relation between disciplines and interdisci-
plinarity, see Swoboda (1979).
22 Durkheim (1977); it is easy to recognise that sociology tried from the outset to dis-
tance itself from a Marxian perspective, which shares with it the assumption that
the cohesion of a society can only be conceived of in a ‘classless society’, in which
asymmetries, unintended inequalities and, hence, integration problems are absent.
23 Discernible, for instance, with regard to similar education and career, shared litera-
ture, intensity of communication and mutual references in publications, shared
standards, conferences, etc.
24 It is striking that migration research in different countries maintains its way of look-
ing at problems by tying itself to politically mediated patterns of conceptualising, in
significant isolation from the general and special theoretical debate in related disci-
plines – it operates only in a limited way with an internal orientation. In German-
speaking sociology, this can be seen in the fact that the debate about adequate theor-
etical concepts for the description and explanation of inequality, conducted for more
than twenty years in inequality research, and the question of the relation between
inequality research and differentiation theory in migration research were kept at a
distance – as if migrants were clear cut cases (of inequality), for which these debates
are of no significance. This has only started to change in recent years: Bommes
(2003a), Weiß (2005) and the latest Sinus study (Sinus Sociovision 2008) demon-
strate that this point of view has no reason apart from an established division of la-
bour between nationally oriented inequality research interested in the position of ci-
tizens in the social structure and migration research covering the ‘rest’.
25 In difference to the functional orientation of fundamental research understood as
the orientation towards securing the conditions to experience the world in the same
manner.
26 Regardless of the fact that the usability of knowledge is decided by its users and not
its producers (Wingens and Fuchs 1989).
27 In the Netherlands, there was a strong denunciation of researchers who were ac-
cused of having invented multicultural illusions. The public debate which emerged
during 2006/07 in German daily and weekly newspapers about the achievements
and failures of migration research, about right and wrong science (cf. Bommes
2006), threw glaring light on the awkward situation of migration research, accord-
ing to Kuhn (1970). He argues that solutions are only seen as sufficient when they
are accepted by many. They ‘may not, however, be drawn at random from society as
a whole’, but they have to come from the scientific community. ‘One of the strong-
est, if still unwritten, rules of scientific life is the prohibition of appeals to heads of
state or to the populace at large in matters scientific’ (168).
28 Outside descriptions are not only produced in science: The economy describes poli-
tics, education or the law under its premises and so forth. Every time the respective
system is seen with its benefits for the describing system in view, whether, for in-
stance, the educational system produces qualified individuals for the economy,
families render children educable, science produces usable knowledge for political
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decisions, etc. Here the relation of the self-description of social systems and outside
descriptions by sciences is the topic (cf. in detail Kieserling 2004).
29 The role of migration research as reflexive theory (for this term, see Luhmann and
Schorr 1988) becomes apparent, once one compares it to disciplines that became
responsible for dealing with modern society in the trajectory of the scientific system:
political science for politics, economics for the economy, pedagogy for the educa-
tional system, theology for religion, etc. In all these cases, the same tension arises
between outside and self-description, formulated as the question of the extent to
which they are reflexive theories of the respective social system or scientific theories.
Reflexive theories take up the differentiated perspectives and plausibilities of prac-
tice, presuppose them, and provide them with justifications: in pedagogy, economy,
law, or (normative) political science. The described tension becomes apparent when
the societal improbability of education, economy, law, or politics can still also be-
come a topic; this can be checked by the fact that scientific contributions practically
still match the problems of the functional systems they deal with.
30 Like the name of the EU-funded Network of Excellence ‘Immigration, Integration
and Social Cohesion in an Integrating Europe’ (IMISCOE).
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